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         This thesis studies the impact of political connections on firm activity. Given the literature 
gaps, the three corporate activities selected to be examined are i) seasoned equity offerings, ii) 
share repurchases, and iii) mergers and acquisitions. 
         First, the results of the study show the impact of political connection on seasoned equity 
offerings. Using seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 2005 to 2017 in the USA, the study 
shows that political connection is associated with lower SEO flotation costs, in terms of lower 
gross spreads and less adverse market reactions to SEO announcements. The empirical 
evidence is robust regarding controls for firm characteristics, corporate governance features, 
the removal of outliers, and an instrumental variable approach. The subsample analysis 
suggests that the effect is higher in primary issues. Additional analysis shows that political 
connection is negatively associated with SEO proceeds. Overall, the evidence is consistent with 
the argument that political connection reduces the cost of raising external capital.  
       Secondly, this study examines how political connections affect post-buyback performance. 
Politically connected firms generated higher post-buyback abnormal return and operating 
performance than unconnected firms. These differences persist after controlling firm 
characteristics, firm fixed effects, using a two-stage regression, and matching estimation. The 
probability of a company repurchasing shares and the amount of shares repurchased increases 
with political connectedness. Taken together, our study provides strong evidence that political 
connections have a significant effect on share repurchase activities. 
       Finally, this paper examines the effect of political connections on corporate risk-taking in 
mergers and acquisitions and associated implications on shareholder value. The results suggest 
that corporate political connections are positively associated with bidder post-acquisition 
financial leverage and equity return volatility around the M&A announcement period. 
Politically connected acquirers generated higher returns than non-connected bidders in risk-
increasing deals, suggesting that investors perceive political connections as a means to hedge 
uncertainty from high risk deals. Further analysis suggests that politically connected bidders 
acquired more firms and are less likely to diversify and purchase more firms from the heavily 
regulated industries than non-connected acquirers. 
Overall, the results of the three studies show new channels through which political 
connections affect corporate activities. 
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           Do political connections increase corporate value, and where do they come from? This 
question is one of the vigorously debated topics in financial economics. Prior studies have 
shown that, on the one hand, political connections can lead to lower cost of bank loans (see, 
e.g., Houston et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Sapienza, 2004), increase firm value (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Civilize, 
Wongchoti, and Young, 2015), lead to less SEC enforcement action (Correia, 2014), enable 
firms to enjoy favourable litigation outcomes (e.g., Firth, Rui & Wu, 2011; Lu, Pan, and Zhang, 
2015; Correia, 2014; Jia, Mao, and Yuan, 2019; Yu and Yu, 2011), allow firms to obtain 
government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013; Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 
2019), and mitigate IPO underpricing (Gounopoulos, et al., 2017). On the other hand, there is 
also evidence that political connections can lead to non-value maximizing management 
behaviour (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011; Boubakri et al., 2012; Shen, Lin, and Wang, 
2015; Kostovetsky, 2015), and can negatively affect a firm's post-initial Public Offering (IPO) 
performance (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007). These mixed findings motivate uncovering other 
possible channels through which political connections might create or destroy corporate value. 
          Despite the extensive research on the impact of political connections on corporate value, 
other channels through which political connections might affect firm value are unexplored – 
the area of seasoned equity offerings, share repurchases, and risk-taking in the M&A setting. 
These channels raise three questions on the impact of political connections on corporate value. 
First, do political connections affect SEO flotation costs in terms of gross spreads and SEO 
announcement stock returns? Second, what is the association between political connections 
and post- share repurchase stock performance? Third, do political connections exacerbate 
corporate risk-taking in an M&A setting? 
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        This study has a lot of implications on corporate governance practices in both the UK and 
the USA. The corporate governance system in both countries appears similar but there are 
significant differences. While the UK and the USA have less concentrated individual block-
holders, institutional investors control more than 50% of their equity market. However, several 
relationships comprise the corporate governance system within a specific nation (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003), two most important ones are the internal governance relationship (between the 
CEO and the board of directors) and the external governance relationships (between the firm 
and its shareholders). These relationships indicate a divergence that is existing between the 
USA and the UK. For example, one of the major areas of divergence is the amount of CEO 
power in the USA compared with the UK. In about 80% of firms in the USA, the chief 
executive (CEO) is also the chairman of the board whereas about 90% of the UK companies 
follow a dual leadership style (Higgs, 2003), separating the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, 
following the Cadbury Committee in 1992 (Cadbury, 1992). Extant studies have produced a 
mixed result on the association between CEO duality and corporate performance (Elsayed, 
2007; Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli, 2016). 
       The relationship between a company and its shareholders is another area of divergence in 
the corporate governance system between the UK and the USA. While institutional investor 
ownership exists in both countries, it is less in the USA than in the UK. Extant 
literature suggests that institutional investors perform a monitoring role which reduces agency 
problems and maximizes shareholders' wealth (Cornett et al., 2007; Demiralp et al., 2011; 
Hutchinson, Seamer, and Chapple, 2015). Politically connected directors might play a key role 
in aligning the interest of managers and their shareholders. Specifically, politically connected 
directors are independent of the management, they might be able to face up to the CEO to 
protect equity investors interests during major business decisions such as seasoned equity 
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offerings, share repurchases, and M&A, which, if not properly conceived, could destroy 
corporate value, and tarnish outside (e.g., former politicians) directors reputation. 
        This study also highlights the nature of the financial systems in both the USA and the UK. 
In terms of share repurchase, they are subject to strict regulations regarding execution and 
disclosure in both countries. The safe harbour promulgation of Rule 10b-18 in the USA requires 
that repurchasing firms should limit the daily volume of repurchases to a specified quantity, 
avoid trading during the last half hour before the closing of the market, and use one dealer on 
a single day (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Similar to the USA, the companies Acts in 1981 
requires repurchasers in the UK to cancel all the shares repurchased, repurchased not more than 
15% of the outstanding shares, pay not more than 5% of the average share price for the five 
business days before the repurchase date (Kim, Schremper and Varaiya, 2004), and must 
publish their repurchase activity on the next business day (Crawford and Wang, 2012).    
          Unlike the USA repurchasers, the UK repurchasers are not allowed to buy back shares 
one month before the publication of quarterly results and two months before the publication of 
semi-annual and annual earnings and (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002). And their executives are not 
allowed to sell their shares within the same period. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) find that UK 
companies repurchasing shares earned smaller returns around share repurchase announcement 
and in the long-term than repurchasers in the USA. The scholars argued that the regulatory 
provisions in the UK make it less likely that firms can use superior information to buy back 
shares when their shares are undervalued. Since this study employs share repurchase data from 
the USA and political connections increases the information asymmetric between managers 
and equity investors (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 2010; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011), 
politically connected repurchasers might have superior information about their firm. And such 




     This study also highlights the nature of raising external capital in USA. Specifically, it 
focuses on the possible determinants that might affect firms in accessing external capital. Ando 
and Auerbach (1988) and Friend and Tokutsu (1987) examined the cost of raising external 
capital in both the USA and Japan and find that it is higher in the USA. The scholars argue that 
the possible explanation of the differences in the cost of raising external capital in the USA and 
Japan are the differences in risk, differences in the tax treatment of individual capital income, 
and imperfections in the international flow of capital. However, Kim and Zhang (2015) find 
that politically connected firms in the USA are tax aggressive due to lower expected cost of tax 
enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital 
market pressure for transparency, and higher risk‐taking tendencies induced by political 
connections. Also, Boubakri, Mansi, and Saffar (2013) find that political connections are 
positively associated with corporate risk-taking and that this relationship is higher when 
government extraction is higher. Therefore, it is plausible that political connections might 
affect the cost of raising external capital through seasoned equity offerings. 
        Therefore, this study examines the effect of having formal politicians on the corporate 
board on firm activities. The three corporate activities studied are seasoned equity offerings, 
share repurchases, and mergers and acquisitions. The choice of these company activities is 
motivated by gaps in the literature and their significance to the firms and at the macro level.  
        Chapter 2 considers the effect of political connections on seasoned equity offerings. The 
existing literature has established, thus far, that political connections provide connected firms 
with easier and cheaper access to finance. These studies focus on the cost of debt (e.g., 
Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; Houston et al., 
2014) and initial public offerings (e.g., Francis, Hasan, and Sun, 2009; Liu, Tang, and Tian, 
2013; Li and Zhou, 2015; Bao, Johan, and Kutsuna, 2016; Gounopoulos et al., 2017). However, 
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there is no study on the impact of political connections on seasoned equity offerings on the 
author's knowledge. 
        Chapter 2 examines the effect of political connections on seasoned equity offerings 
flotation costs in terms of gross spreads and SEO announcement stock returns. Using a large 
and up-to-date sample of USA seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 2005 to 2017, it is found 
that political connections are associated with lower SEO flotation costs in terms of gross 
spreads and announcement stock returns. The findings suggest that both underwriters and the 
market consider politically connected issuers less risky than non-connected issuers. All these 
results are robust regarding controls for firm characteristics, corporate governance features, the 
removal of outliers, and an instrumental variable approach. The subsample analysis shows that 
the effect of political connections on SEO flotation costs is higher in primary issues. The study 
also examines the association between political connections and SEO proceeds and finds that 
political connections are negatively associated with SEO proceeds, consistent with the 
evidence (e.g., Faccio, 2010; Belghitar, Clark and Saeed, 2019) that politically connected firms 
rely more on debt. 
        Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of political connections on share repurchases. 
Specifically, this chapter examines politically connected repurchasers' performance and the 
likelihood that connected companies might repurchase shares. 
         It has been established that political connections provide connected firms with cheaper 
and easier access to capital. In the share repurchase context, easy access to capital is essential 
since share repurchases can be myopic if financed by scrapping value-maximizing investments 
(Edmans, Fang, and Huang, 2018; Bendig et al., 2018) or if it results in raising costly external 
funds (Lie, 2005). Therefore, repurchasing firms with access to cheaper capital might not forgo 
value-maximizing investments and, as such, might remain more competitive following a share 
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buyback than firms with costly capital. However, easy access to cheap capital might cause 
agency problems of free cash flows, resulting in negative NPV projects and overinvestments. 
It has been found that share repurchase is a potential mechanism to reduce a firms' 
overinvestment problems (Chen et al., 2013; Lobo, Robin, and Wu, 2019). Therefore, it is 
expected that the market reaction to share repurchase announcements by firms with cheaper 
capital might be higher than firms with costly capital. Based on these two effects, this chapter 
hypothesized that share repurchase of politically connected firms should be associated with 
higher stock returns around the announcement period and in the long term. Also, the probability 
of a company repurchasing shares, and the value of shares repurchased should be higher for 
politically connected firms. 
             Chapter 3 tests these hypotheses on a sample of USA share repurchases announced 
over 2005 – 2017. Classifying firms whose directors have political backgrounds into connected 
repurchasers and those without former politicians as non-connected repurchasers, it is found 
that politically connected repurchasers generated higher stock returns around the share 
repurchase announcement period and in the long term. Operating performance following share 
repurchase announcement month is also higher for connected firms. Also, it is found that the 
probability of a company repurchasing shares, and the value of shares repurchased is higher 
for politically connected firms. These findings are robust to controlling firm characteristics, 
firm fixed effects, using a two-stage regression, and matching estimation. 
              Chapter 4 investigates the impact of political connections in mergers and acquisitions. 
Existing literature has found that political connections have a significant impact on mergers 
and acquisitions. Brockman et al. (2013) argue that the effect of political connections on M&A 
stock returns is subject to the institutional environment. Whereas Ferris et al. (2016) show that 
politically connected acquirers pay a higher premium, acquire more target firms, and generate 
value in the USA. Using USA data, Croci et al. (2017) further show that the acquisition process 
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for politically connected target firms is lengthier and that they earn a higher premium from 
bidders lacking political expertise. Using Chinese data, Schweizer et al. (2017) find that 
politically connected acquirers in China generated lower returns than non-connected acquirers 
and are more likely to conduct cross-border acquisitions. However, it is unknown whether 
political connections induce acquirer's risk-taking. 
         Chapter 4 re-examines the impact of political connections on mergers and acquisitions 
using a broad sample of UK acquisitions announced and completed from 2007 to 2017. 
Specifically, the study investigates the association between corporate political connections and 
bidder risk-taking in M&A and its implication for shareholders' value. It is found that political 
connections are associated with higher equity return volatility around the M&A announcement 
period and with higher bidder gains in risk-increasing deals. The impact of political 
connections on acquirer returns in risky deals persists regardless of the measures of risky deals 
(e.g., acquisition of unlisted targets, large deals, frequent acquirers, or glamour acquirers). It is 
also found that politically connected bidders acquired more firms and are less likely to 
diversify, and purchase more firms from the heavily regulated industries than non-connected 
acquirers. 
           Overall, the findings in all three studies present new channels through which corporate 
political connections affect firm activities. First, chapter 2 contributes to the literature on the 
effect of political connections on the cost of raising external capital. Prior studies have 
examined the impact of political connections on the cost of bank loans (see, e.g., Houston et 
al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004) and 
access to bank loans (Claessens et al., 2008). While Boubakri et al. (2012) focused on the rate 
of returns offered to equity investors, this study examines the effect of political connections on 
SEO gross spreads and the market reaction to SEO announcements. The results complement 
the findings in Boubakri et al. (2012) by showing that politically connected issuers enjoy lower 
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SEO flotation costs in terms of lower gross spreads and less negative SEO announcement 
effect.  
         Second, chapter 2 also extends the literature on the determinants of SEO gross spreads. 
While Lee and Masulis (2009) find that the information asymmetry between managers and 
outside investors is positively associated with SEO gross spread, Butler, Grullon, and Weston 
(2005) document that stock market liquidity is associated with lower SEO gross spread, chapter 
2 shows that political connection is associated with lower SEO gross spreads. 
         Third, chapter 2 also contributes to the literature (see, e.g., Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo 2013; 
Dutordoir, Strong, and Sun, 2018) on the determinants of SEO announcement stock returns. 
This study finds that politically connected issuers experienced a less negative market reaction 
to their SEO announcement than non-connected issuers. 
          Fourth, chapter 3 contributes to the debate on the impact of political connection on 
corporate decisions and a firm’s value. For example, prior studies have examined the effect of 
political connections on the firm’s value (e.g., Faccio 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; 
Cooper et al., 2010; Akey 2015), mergers and acquisitions decisions and performance (e.g., 
Brockman, Rui, and Zou 201; Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 2016; Schweizer, Walker, and 
Zhang, 2019; Croci et., al., 2017), initial public offering (IPO) pricing (Gounopoulos et al., 
2017), and top executive’s pay rates (Chizema et., al., 2015). More closely related to this article 
is the work of López-Iturriaga and Martín (2019). Whereas chapter 3 provides evidence on the 
effect of political connections on share repurchase performance, likelihood, and magnitude in 
the USA, López-Iturriaga, and Martín (2019) focus on the number of shares repurchased and 
the dividend paid in Spain. 
         Fifth, this study also contributes to the literature on how corporate board and director 
characteristics affect share repurchase decisions and outcomes. For example, Custódio and 
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Metzger (2014) find that financial expert CEOs’ are more likely to repurchase shares. And 
Evgeniou and Vermaelen (2017) focus on board gender diversity and find that it is associated 
with the likelihood of a company repurchasing shares and lower long-term stock returns. 
Chapter 3 shows that political connections increase the probability of a company repurchasing 
shares, the value of shares repurchased, and the impact on both operating and stock returns. 
      Sixth, chapter 4 contributes to the literature on corporate risk-taking, corporate political 
strategies, and M&A. The study shows that connected acquirers generated higher CAR in risk-
increasing deals than non-connected acquirers, suggesting that investors perceive corporate 
political connections as a mechanism to hedge uncertainties that might arise from acquisitions 
with higher risk. Also, it provides empirical evidence of a positive relationship between 
corporate political connections and bidder risk.  
     Seventh, chapter 4 provides evidence that politically connected acquirers are more 
leveraged following M&A completion, suggesting that they exhibit less conservative financial 
policy following an acquisition. Also, it provides new evidence that politically connected 
acquirers are more likely to conduct non-diversifying deals that are less likely to reduce bidder 
default risk. Chapter 4 further offers insight into the existing literature on the role of corporate 
political connections in M&A by showing that politically connected acquirers are more likely 
to acquire targets from the heavily regulated industries than non-connected acquirers. 
           The thesis is arranged in the following pattern. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 focus on the impact 
of political connections on seasoned equity offerings, share repurchases, and M&A, 
respectively. The studies are presented independently. Chapter 5 reports conclusions and 







Political Connections and Seasoned Equity Offerings 
2.1      Introduction 
        A stream of finance and economics research has provided insights into how firms can 
potentially benefit from their political connections. Indeed, researchers have established that 
political connections can affect a firm's investment decisions, further improving their 
competitive advantage and value. Specifically, extant studies provide evidence that political 
connections can affect the following: merger and acquisition decisions and outcomes 
(Brockman, Rui, and Zou, 2013; Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 2016; Croci et al., 2017), 
share repurchase decisions (Nnadi, Sorwar, and Roddy, 2019), corporate performance 
(Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Civilize, Wongchoti, and Young, 2015), Securities 
Exchange Commission enforcement (Correia, 2014), access to bank loans (Houston et al., 
2014; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004), 
litigation outcomes (Firth, Rui & Wu, 2011; Lu, Pan, and Zhang, 2015; Correia, 2014; Jia, 
Mao, and Yuan, 2019; Yu and Yu, 2011), corporate employment (Faccio and Hsu, 2017; 
Bertrand et al., 2018), top executive pay (Chizema et al., 2015), and IPO under-pricing 
(Gounopoulos et al., 2017).  
        Despite the extensive research on the impact of political connections in the business 
world, as demonstrated above, the effect of political connections on seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) is still unknown.   
         Therefore, this study seeks to fill this gap by examining the association between political 
connections and SEO flotation costs regarding gross spreads and SEO announcement stock 
returns. This study focuses on seasoned equity offerings for two reasons. First, SEO gross 
spreads constitute by far the larger share of the total costs of equity issuance. For example, 
raising capital through SEO costs the average issuer between 5.1% and 7.1% of the total 
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proceeds (e.g., Lee and Masulis, 2009; Lee et al.,1996). Moreover, Butler, Grullon, and Weston 
(2005) document that gross spreads represent over 76% of the total costs of raising capital 
through SEOs. Therefore, SEO gross spreads amount to a substantial loss of capital for the 
issuing firms (Lee and Masulis, 2009). Second, while seasoned equity offerings announcement 
is mostly unpredicted (Dutordoir, Strong, and Sun, 2018), it can negatively affect shareholders' 
wealth. For example, extant studies (see, e.g., Denis, 1994; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Kim, Li, 
Pan and Zuo, 2013, Hao, 2014; Li et al., 2016) estimate the impact of SEO announcements in 
the USA and find a negative impact of SEO announcements on firm value. Besides, some 
scholars (see, e.g., Slovin, Sushka, and Lai, 2000; Gajewski and Ginglinger, 2002; Hauser, 
Kraizber, and Dahan, 2003; Liu et al., 2016) studied SEO announcements in non-USA markets 
(e.g., China, France, Isreal, United Kingdom) and reached a similar conclusion. Therefore, 
using SEOs as an empirical setting allows us to estimate whether political connections affect 
shareholder value directly. 
           This study argues that political connections will be negatively associated with SEO 
gross spreads. The rationale for this argument is as a result of the following reasons. First, 
politically connected firms have preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008) and 
cheaper cost of the bank loan (see, e.g., Houston et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 
2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004). As a result, politically connected firms might 
only follow through with their SEOs if the negotiated investment bankers' fee is satisfactory. 
Second, prior literature suggests that politically connected firms facing legal action enjoy lower 
penalties and increased forbearance (see, e.g., Firth, Rui & Wu, 2011; Lu, Pan, and Zhang, 
2015; Correia, 2014; Jia, Mao, and Yuan, 2019; Yu and Yu, 2011). Therefore, since stock 
issues might attract lawsuits (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004), investment bankers 




        Third, extant literature (see, e.g., Hillman, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2009; Ferris, Houston, 
and Javakhadze, 2016; Tihanyi et al., 2019; El Nayal, van Oosterhout and van Essen, 2019) 
suggests that an association with former politicians enable firms to gain non-public information 
concerning regulations and the economy at large. Pham (2019) argues that this sensitive 
information enables politically connected firms to hedge against economic policy uncertainties. 
Therefore, SEO underwriters might consider politically connected issuers to be less risky when 
compared with non-connected issuers. Besides, underwriters might view underwriting SEOs, 
by politically connected issuers, as an opportunity to associate with former politicians to 
indirectly gain access to non-public information about how to navigate government 
bureaucracies. 
        Using a large sample of USA SEOs, completed between 2005 and 2017, the study 
examines the association between political connections and SEO gross spreads. First, this study 
partition seasoned equity issuers into politically connected and non-connected boards, using 
the information about board members' background, following Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
(2009) and Houston et al. (2014). The findings suggest that political connection is positively 
associated with lower underwriting gross spreads. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests 
that ceteris paribus, SEO gross spreads are 15 to 16 percentage points lower when an issuer is 
politically connected. Moreover, the subsample analysis shows that the effect of political 
connections on SEO gross spreads is higher in primary issues. 
         The study also examines the relationship between political connections and SEO 
announcement returns. This chapter anticipates that political connections might have two 
opposing effects on SEO announcement stock returns. The first explanation is based on the 
adverse selection theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) that states that when there is asymmetric 
information regarding the value of firms' assets in place, the market perceive SEO 
announcements as signalling firm overvaluation. As a result, potential investors intend to 
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under-value the firm’s equity (Bo, Huang and Wang, 2011). However, political connections 
exacerbate the information asymmetry between managers and investors since they exhibit low-
quality earnings reporting (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011) and inaccurate analysts' 
earnings forecasts (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 2010). Lee and Masulis (2009) argue that low 
accruals quality tends to lead to more moral hazards and adverse selection. Therefore, investors 
might find it difficult to assess the exact financial health of politically connected issuers. 
Besides, Lee and Masulis (2009) posits that around SEO announcement, the market are more 
likely to discount their valuation of a firm with poor quality accounting information to take 
into account the higher agency problems and adverse selection risks that investing in such 
company entails. Therefore, the market reaction to SEO announcements by politically 
connected issuers might be more negative than non-connected issuers.  
       On the other hand, the market reaction to SEO announcements might reflect the added 
value provided by political connections. For example, political connections provide connected 
firms with relaxed regulatory oversight (Ferris, Houston & Javakhadze, 2016), preferential 
access to resources and information (Hillman,2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2009; Tihanyi et al., 2019; 
El Nayal, van Oosterhout and van Essen, 2019), and the knowledge about how to sail over 
government bureaucracies (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009). This research evidence suggests 
that political connections may help issuers to navigate through SEO related regulations. 
Moreover, former politicians' presence on an issuer's board might signal to the market that 
political networks might provide connected issuers with economic rents (Chen et al., 2011) and 
government protections. Therefore, the market reaction to SEO announcements by politically 
connected issuers might be less adverse than non-connected issuers. 
        However, the effect of political connections on SEO announcement stock returns remains 
an open empirical issue. Therefore, the study examined the effect of political connections on 
SEO announcement returns in both a univariate and multivariate setting. The results show that 
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politically connected issuers experience less adverse market reactions to their seasoned equity 
offer announcements than their non-connected counterparts. The results suggest that the market 
is more likely to factor in former politicians' added value on the issuer's board while reacting 
to their SEO announcement. Also, the subsample analysis shows that the market reaction to 
SEO announcement by politically connected issuers is higher in the case of primary issues. 
       The empirical results continue to hold after controlling for possible endogeneity issues. 
For example, it is plausible that the effect of political connections on both SEO gross spreads 
and SEO announcement stock returns results from omitted variables. Therefore, the study 
employed the instrumental variable approach, proposed by Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014) 
and Kim and Zhang (2015), and find that the effect of political connections on both SEO gross 
spreads and announcement returns remained unchanged. The study further considers the 
possibility that good governance affects the cost of raising external equity (e.g., Tompkins and 
Huang, 2010; Kim and Purnanandam, 2014). Therefore, in the spirit of Kim, Li, Pan, and Zuo 
(2013), various corporate governance features were controlled, and the results continue to hold. 
Finally, the study examines whether political connections affect SEO proceeds. Prior literature 
(e.g., Faccio, 2010; Belghitar, Clark, and Saeed, 2019) suggests that politically connected firms 
rely more on debt; therefore, the study anticipates a negative relationship between political 
connections and the SEO proceeds. This study mitigates the possible effect of omitted variables 
by using an instrumental variable approach to examine the effect of political connections on 
SEO proceeds. The results suggest a negative association between political connections and 
SEO proceeds, lending support to the evidence (e.g., Faccio, 2010; Belghitar, Clark and Saeed, 
2019) that politically connected firms rely more on debt. 
       This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the literature 
regarding the effect of political connections on raising external capital. Prior studies have 
examined the impact of political connections on the cost of bank loans (see, e.g., Houston et 
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al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004) and 
access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008). More closely related to this paper, Boubakri et al. 
(2012) examine the impact of political connections on equity capital cost and find that political 
connection is associated with a lower cost of equity capital. While Boubakri et al. (2012) 
focused on the rate of returns offered to equity investors, this study examines the effect of 
political connections on SEO gross spreads and the market reaction to SEO announcements. 
The results complement the findings of Boubakri et al. (2012) by showing that politically 
connected issuers enjoy lower SEO flotation costs in terms of lower gross spreads and less 
negative SEO announcement effect. 
      Second, the study extends the literature regarding the determinants of SEO gross spreads. 
Lee and Masulis (2009) find that the information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors is positively associated with SEO gross spread. Whereas Butler, Grullon, and Weston 
(2005) document that stock market liquidity is associated with a lower SEO gross spread, this 
thesis provides new evidence on the determinants of SEO gross spreads. The study finds a 
significant difference in the offer price discounts paid to investment bankers by politically 
connected and non-connected issuers. Specifically, the study found that political connection is 
associated with lower SEO gross spreads.  
      This study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of SEO announcement stock 
returns. Consistent with prior literature (see, e.g., Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo 2013; Dutordoir, 
Strong, and Sun, 2018), the findings show that SEO announcement is negatively associated 
with firm value. However, after partitioning issuers into politically connected and non-
connected issuers, the study found that politically connected issuers experienced a less adverse 
market reaction to their SEO announcement than non-connected issuers. This study is the first 




        This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. While 
section 3 describes the data and the variables. Section 4 reports the impact of political 
connections on SEO flotation costs regarding gross spreads and announcement returns. Also, 
section 5 tests the robustness of the findings. Section 6 reports the impact of political 
connections on SEO proceeds, and Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Related Literature 
2.2.1 Political connections and Initial Public Offerings 
        In this section, the study reviews prior literature on the impact of political connections on 
corporate access to equity capitals. Extant literature on the role of political connections on 
equity capital focuses mainly on the initial public offerings. For example, Francis, Hasan, and 
Sun (2009) study the role of political connections in going public in China. Using 423 firm 
commitment IPOs of A-share common stocks over the years 1994–1999, these scholars find 
that unlike non-connected firms, politically connected firms have relatively lower under-
pricing, higher offering prices, and lower fixed costs during the going-public process. Also, 
Gounopoulos et al. (2017) study 1578 IPOs in the USA between 1 January 1998 and 30 June 
2013 and find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying 
experience fewer under-pricing. 
       Liu, Tang, and Tian (2013) examine the value of political capital in the Chinese IPO market 
between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2010. The authors find that political connection is 
positively associated with the probability of IPO approval of entrepreneurial firms in China. 
The scholar’s further show that shareholders value politically connected executives than 
external sources of political connections such as politically connected sponsors and PE 
investors. Later studies by Li and Zhou (2015) and Bao, Johan, and Kutsuna (2016) also find 
that politically connected firms in China are more likely to have IPOs approved. 
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         Also, Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) investigated the Post-IPO performance of partially 
privatized firms in China between 1993 and 2001. They find that partially privatized firms with 
politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs in terms 
of stock returns, earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. In another Post-
IPO performance level study, Liu, Uchida, and Gao (2012) study the performance of 627 
Chinese A-share IPOs that went public on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange 
between 2000 and 2007. The scholars find that politically connected firms enjoy higher stock 
returns in the three years following their IPOs. Also, Wu, Li, and Li (2012) further show that 
CEO political connections with the central government play a more significant role in IPO 
performance than political connections with regional governments. 
2.2.2 Political connections and equity investors rate of returns. 
        In contrast with previous studies, Boubakri et al. (2012) examine the cost of firms' equity 
capital from 26 countries between 1997 and 2001. Using 1248 firm-year matched observations, 
they find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-
connected peers regarding the rate of return required by equity investors. 
          Overall, extant literature suggests that the cost of engaging in initial public offerings and 
the rate of returns offered to equity investors differs between politically connected and non-
connected firms. However, the impact of political connections on seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) is still unknown. 
2.3 Data and SEO sample description 
2.3.1 SEO sample construction 
           This chapter employs SEO data from the USA market due to the following reasons: First, 
stock prices of public firms in the USA might accurately reflect firm value due to the higher 
disclosure standards required by the USA security and exchange commission that mitigates 
information asymmetries. This is in contrast with the stock prices of firms in emerging markets, 
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which appears to be inadequate measures of firm value due to higher degrees of information 
asymmetry (von Eije and Wiegerinck, 2010). Also, the USA has strong legal and institutional 
environments. Therefore, agency conflicts might be lesser compared with countries with 
weaker legal and institutional environments (Feito-Ruiz, Fernández, and Menéndez-Requejo, 
2015).  
         The sample of USA common stock seasoned equity offerings is taken from the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) New Issue Database over 2005-2017, as this is the period for which the 
study also has data on issuers' board composition. The sample criteria require issuers to be 
listed on either the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq stock exchange and not to operate in the utility or 
financial industry (SIC codes 4900–4999 or 6000–6999). Consistent with prior literature (e.g., 
Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Bradley and Yuan, 2013), we 
exclude Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs); limited partnerships; unit issues; simultaneous 
international offerings; spin-offs; rights and standby issues; closed-end funds; reverse 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs); unit investment trusts, and SEOs with offer prices less than $3. As 
a result, the final sample consists of 2432 SEOs with available financial data on the Thomson 
Reuters DataStream and proxy statements on the EDGAR database. 
2.3.2 Measuring Political Connections  
       Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) argue that a firm is likely to be politically connected if 
at least one board member holds, or formerly held, any of the following positions: President, 
presidential (Vice-Presidential) candidate, member of the House of Representatives, Senator, 
Cabinet secretary/deputy secretary/undersecretary or assistant secretary, Governor, United 
Nations representative, Ambassador, Mayor, staff member to the White House, presidential 
campaigner or political party appointment, appointed member of a presidential committee or 
council and Director/Deputy Director/Commissioner to a federal department or agency 
including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency 
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(FEMA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Social Security Administration (SSA), Civil Rights Centre 
(CRC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), etc. 
           Therefore, this study focuses on the explicit political connections of equity issuing firms 
consistent with Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) and Houston et al. (2014). Specifically, 
indicator (binary) variables are constructed to measure whether an issuer is politically 
connected, using data from individual issuer proxy statement.  
For robustness check, this study employs an alternate proxy for political connections, the total 
number of former politicians on the issuer board scaled by the total number of board directors 
(see, Chizema, Liu, Lu, and Gao, 2015). 
2.3.3 Sample statistics 
            Table 2.1 presents both the time-series distribution and the summary statistics of the 
sample. The study winsorized all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate 
outliers' possible effects. Panel A indicates that the observations tend to be evenly spread across 
the years, and there is no substantial clustering. While Panel B shows that politically connected 
issuers comprise 11.9% of the observations. Also, the ratio of former politicians to the total 
number of directors is 1.6%. Panel C presents the issuer and offer characteristics. It shows that 
politically connected issuers obtained larger proceeds on average and are less likely to be 
registered on the Nasdaq stock exchange. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Houston, Jiang, 
Lin and Ma, 2014; Ferris, Houston & Javakhadze, 2016), it was found that, on average, 
politically connected firms are larger and hold less cash compared with non-connected firms. 
Also, politically connected issuers tend to have a large board size and more independent 
directors than non-connected issuers. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.1 About Here] 
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2.4 Empirical findings 
2.4.1 Political Connections and SEO Gross Spread 
          SEO gross spread is the offer price discount paid to investment bankers for their risk-
bearing services, and it is mainly comprised of selling concessions, underwriting fees, and a 
management fee. SEO gross spreads are an essential source of revenue for investment banks. 
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether investment banks might factor in the 
connections that former politicians provide by charging connected issuers lower gross spreads.  
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the univariate analysis of SEO gross spreads between politically 
connected issuers and non-connected issuers. For the full sample, column 1 shows that the 
average gross spread is 4.5%, whereas the subsample results (column 2 and 3) show that gross 
spreads are lower for politically connected issuers (3.6956) than non-connected issuers 
(4.6098) and the difference (-0.9142) is statistically significant at the 1% levels. This study also 
examines the different types of seasoned equity issuance, and the findings suggest that 
politically connected issuers have lower gross than non-connected issuers regardless of the type 
of stock issue. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.2 About Here] 
       The univariate analysis suggests that political connections are associated with lower SEO 
flotation costs, in terms of lower gross spreads. Therefore, this study now seeks to determine, 
in a multivariate setting, whether the effect of political connections on SEO gross spreads will 
survive when other determinants of SEO gross spreads were included. The principal regression 
is: 
Gross Spread (%) = F (Political Connections Measure, Offer Characteristics, Issuer 




 In equation (1), the dependent variable is the gross spreads. The primary independent variable 
of interest is the political connections indicator variable, connected issuers, that takes the value 
of one if an issuer has a former politician on its board and zero otherwise. This study does not 
expect political connections to be the only determinant of SEO gross spreads. Therefore, 
various offer- and issuer-specific determinants of SEO gross spread found in the literature are 
included. Specifically, leverage, ROA, TOBIN'S Q, Capex are included. Following prior 
literature (e.g., Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005; Lee and Masulis, 2009), this study also 
controls the economy of scale effect by including offer size (log of proceeds). Furthermore, 
further control for the effect of information quality by including firm size (log of total assets), 
secondary offers, tangible assets, and stock return volatility (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 2003; 
Lee and Masulis, 2009; Gao, 2011). To mitigate possible market microstructural effects (see, 
Grullon and Weston, 2005), this study includes a dummy variable equal to one if an issuer is 
listed in the Nasdaq stock exchange and zero otherwise. 
        Panel B of Table 2.2 presents the baseline results. Column (1) shows that the connected 
issuers variable's coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% percent level. 
The results remain unchanged after controlling for industry fixed in column (2). Specifically, 
SEO gross spreads are 15 to 16 percentage points lower when politicians are on the board. 
Hence, the main result that political connections are negatively associated with an issuer gross 
spread persists after controlling for other factors known to affect issuer gross spreads. 
Kim and Weisbach (2008) noted that primary issues raise capital for the firm and increase the 
number of shares outstanding, while secondary issues do not raise capital for the firm and keep 
the number of shares outstanding constant. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether the 
effect of political connections on SEO gross spreads is equally essential for all equity issuance 
types. Therefore, this study runs the regressions separately for primary, secondary, and 
combined issues (column (3), (4), and (5), respectively). The subsample analysis reveals that 
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the political connection variable, connected issuers, is negative in all subsamples (columns 3 
through 5) and statistically significant only in primary and combined issues (columns 3 and 5, 
respectively). This result suggests that the effect of political connections is higher when SEOs 
involve raising capital for the firm than when it involves issuing shares for some shareholders.  
However, the control variables' coefficients are generally consistent with the SEO literature 
findings (see Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005; Lee and Masulis, 2009). For example, the 
coefficient on the log of total assets (Firm Size) is negative and statistically significant (p-
value<0.01). Also, consistent with the argument that secondary offers lower information 
asymmetry (Lee and Masulis, 2009) and lessens the adverse selection associated with the sale 
of primary stocks (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003), the results show that the coefficient on the 
percentage of secondary shares offered (Secondary) is negative and statistically significant at 
the conventional levels. However, the stock return volatility indicator (volatility) is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level across the alternative regression specifications. 
Thus, consistent with the idea that information asymmetry between managers and investors 
increases SEO gross spreads. 
       Consistent with an economy of scale effect, columns 1 and 2 show that the coefficient on 
the proceeds' log is negative. The regression coefficient on Tobin's Q is also negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient ranges from -0.0215 to -0.0219 across 
column 1 and 2. Thus, consistent with the idea that higher growth firms are more attractive 
underwriters' clients (see Lee and Masulis, 2009). Overall, this section supports the argument 
that political connection is associated with lower SEO gross spreads. 
2.4.2 SEO announcement return and Political Connections 
       This section examines the market response to seasoned equity offerings by politically 
connected boards and non-connected boards. Following Lease, Masulis and Page (1991), 
Corwin (2003), and Kim, Li, Pan, and Zuo (2013), the SEO announcement returns are 
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computed using the market adjusted model. Specifically, this study calculates SEO 
announcement returns by subtracting the USA market index's daily returns from the issuer's 
daily stock return around the SEO announcement date (0) and summing the differences. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Dutordoir, Strong, and Sun, 2018; Kim and Purnanandam, 
2014; Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo, 2013), filing dates from the SDC database are used as the offer 
announcement date. 
        The study also examines SEO announcement returns over the day before and after the 
SEO announcement day (-1, +1). Besides, the possibility that firms might announce SEOs after 
stock market closure (see, Lease, Masulis and Page, 1991; Dutordoir, Strong, and Sun, 2018) 
are taking to account by further estimating SEO announcement returns over the two days (0, 
+1) and three days (0, +2) windows around SEO announcement day (event day 0). Panel A of 
Table 2.3 presents the CAR around the seasoned equity offerings announcement period and 
tests the difference between politically connected and non-connected issuers. Consistent with 
prior studies (e.g., Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo, 2013; Li, Liu, and Veld, 2019), the average SEO 
announcement stock returns for the full sample in column 1 ranges from -1.36% to -1.78%. 
The negative CAR suggests that the market, in a general view, considers SEO announcements 
as unpleasant news. However, the negative market reaction is smaller for politically connected 
issuers than non-connected issuers. In particular, the result in event window (-1, +1) shows that 
the cumulative abnormal returns are 0.75% (p-value<0.10) lower for non-connected boards. 
The two days (0, +1) event window suggests that the SEO announcement returns are 0.72% (p-
value<0.01) lower for non-connected issuers. Also, the three-day (day 0 through day + 2) show 
that the SEO announcement returns are 0.92% (p-value<0.05) lower for non-connected issuers. 
This result suggests that SEO announcement stock returns of politically connected issuers are 




                                   [Please Insert Table 2.3 About Here] 
        The univariate test suggests that the market reaction to SEO announcement is less adverse 
for politically connected issuers than non-connected issuers. However, politically connected 
issuers tend to be larger, use more leverage, and hold less cash. Therefore, the result in panel 
A (Table 2.3) could be due to confounding effects between political connections and SEO 
announcement returns, and as such misleading. To mitigate this concern, the study examines 
the association between political connections and SEO announcement returns while controlling 
these likely confounding effects in a multivariate setting. The principal regression is: 
CAR = F (Political Connections Measures, Offer Characteristics, Issuer Characteristics-1, 
Industry and Year fixed effects) …………………………………………………………. (2) 
       Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the multivariate regression analysis results on the association 
between political connections and SEO announcement returns. The dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2 is the three days CAR (-1, +1) and two days CAR (0, +1), respectively. 
Whereas the dependent variable in columns 3 through 6 is the three days CAR (0, +2). The 
primary independent variable of interest is the political connections indicator variable, 
connected issuers, that takes the value of one if an issuer has a former politician on its board 
and zero otherwise. Various offer- and issuer-specific characteristics and the year and industry 
fixed effects are controlled. Cash holding (cash), tangible, ROA, Capex, leverage, and the 
percentage of secondary offers are included. The study also considers a firm's growth potential 
(proxied by Tobin's q), firm risk level, and asymmetric information (proxied by stock return 
volatility and the natural log of total assets). Given that larger proceeds relative to issuers size 
might signal firm overvaluation (following Dutordoir, Strong, and Sun, 2018), the ratio of 
offering proceeds to total assets (relative offer size) are included. Finally, a dummy variable 




     Columns 1 through 3 show that coefficients on the political connection's indicators are 
positive and statistically significant at the conventional levels. As a result, the evidence 
supports the notion that politically connected issuers' SEO announcement stock returns are less 
negative than those of non-connected issuers.  
       Consistent with prior (e.g., Lee and Masulis, 2009; Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo, 2013; Kim and 
Purnanandam, 2014; Dutordoir, Strong, and Sun, 2018; Li, Liu, and Veld, 2019) studies on 
SEO returns, the R-squares results are less than 10%, and the controls variables are mainly 
insignificant.  
        Columns 1 through 3 provide evidence that political connection is associated with less 
negative SEO announcement returns. However, the question that needs to be addressed is 
whether the market will respond to SEO announcements by connected issuers in a similar way 
in all equity issuance types. Since companies probably issue new stock to invest in value 
maximizing projects, it is anticipated that the effect of political connections on SEO 
announcement returns might be higher when SEOs help firms raise capital than when insiders 
decide to issue stock through secondary offers.  
       The study, therefore, run regressions separately for primary, secondary, and combined 
issues (specifications (4), (5), and (6), respectively). The findings show that the coefficient on 
the political connection indicator, connected issuers, is positive and statistically significant (p-
value<0.05) for subsample primary issues. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that 
ceteris paribus, former politicians' presence on issuers board, is associated with 0.94% higher 
CAR. However, the effect of political connection on issuer CAR based on the secondary and 
combined issues is positive and insignificant. The result supports the argument (Bradley and 
Yuan, 2013) that unlike secondary issues, primary issues signal to the market that industry 
prospects are promising. Overall, columns 4 through 6 suggest that the effect of political 
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connections on SEO announcement returns is higher for primary offers than for secondary 
offers.  
2. 5. Endogeneity 
2.5.1 Instrumental Variable Approach 
     Thus far, the results indicate that political connection is associated with both lower gross 
spreads and less negative SEO announcement returns. However, despite controlling for the 
various issuer and offer specific characteristics, it is still plausible that the results are driven by 
omitted variables that might be related to both political connections and the dependent 
variables. Therefore, the study addressed potential endogeneity issues using the instrumental 
variable approach. Following Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014) and Kim and Zhang (2015), 
the distance (in kilometers) from issuers headquarters to Washington, D.C are used as an 
instrument for the presence of former politicians on corporate boards. This instrument's 
rationale is that there is no evidence that the distance from corporate headquarters to 
Washington, D.C, is correlated with SEO gross spreads and returns. Also, former politicians 
are more likely to remain in Washington, D.C, where they might have established their political 
networks (Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014). For example, Barrack Obama remained in 
Washington, D.C, after serving as the USA president. However, if the distance from corporate 
headquarters to Washington, D.C is a useful instrument for political connectedness as 
documented by Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014) and Kim and Zhang (2015), we would 
expect that issuers whose corporate headquarter is far from Washington, D.C are potentially 
less likely to appoint former politicians to their board. The principal regression is: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(PoliticalConnections𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0+𝛼𝛼1Distance𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼2Issuer Characteristics-1+𝛼𝛼3Offer 





where Political Connectionsi dummy, the dependent variables in the regressions, equals one if 
an issuer i has a former politician on its board. Distance, the key explanatory variables, is the 
natural log of one plus the distance from corporate headquarters to Washington, D.C. Issuer 
and offer characteristics are the full set of the control variables. Table 2.4 presents the results 
of the IV-regressions. In the first stage regressions, former politicians' presence on corporate 
boards is predicted using a probit model. Column 1 and 3 show that the coefficient on the 
instrumental variable, distance, is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that issuers 
whose corporate headquarters are far from Washington, D.C are less likely to appoint former 
politicians to their board compared with issuers whose headquarters are closer to Washington, 
DC. Therefore, the first stage fitted values for political connectedness are used in the second 
stage regression. Column 2 shows that the instrumented value of political connections is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that politically connected 
issuers generated higher announcement returns than non-connected issuers. Also, column 4 
shows that the instrumented value of political connections is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that political connections are associated with a lower 
gross spread. Overall, this result supports the earlier evidence on the impact of political 
connections on SEO gross spreads and returns. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.4 About Here] 
2.5.2 Alternative measure of political connectedness 
       So far, the findings suggest that politically connected issuers enjoy lower gross spreads 
and less negative market responses to SEO announcements. However, in the baseline 
regressions, this study employed a dummy variable, Connected Issuers, to denote whether an 
issuer has a former politician on its board at the SEO announcement period. Although the use 
of a dummy variable helps to mitigate the effect of outliers in the baseline results, it is also 
plausible that the results are sensitive to the measure of political connections. In the spirit of 
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Chizema, Liu, Lu, and Gao (2015), the study mitigated this concern by employing an alternate 
proxy, Pcontinous, the total number of former politicians on the issuer board scaled by the total 
number of board directors. 
        In Table 2.5, this study repeated the main regressions using this new proxy for political 
connections. Columns 1 and 2 show that politically connected issuers generated higher returns 
than non-connected issuers around the SEO announcement period. Turning to SEO gross 
spreads, Columns 3 and 4 show that political connections are associated with lower gross 
spreads. Overall, this section supports the evidence that political connections are associated 
with lower gross spreads and less negative SEO announcement returns. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.5 About Here] 
2.5.3 Can economic downturns drive the results? 
         This study further examines the robustness of the main results by excluding observations 
during the year 2008. The intuition behind excluding observations during the year 2008 is that 
the financial crisis resulted in a decline in firm value, whereby issuers might not negotiate 
favorable terms with investment bankers, unlike the situation in the normal period. Therefore, 
investment bankers might charge higher fees during the financial crisis. Also, equity issuance 
around the financial crisis might signal to the market that a company's condition is critical, and 
the stock returns around the SEO announcement period might be more negative than in the 
normal period. 
      Since politically connected firms have cheaper access to bank loans (see, e.g., Houston et 
al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004) and 
are more likely to be bailed out than non-connected firms (Faccio, Masulis, and Mcconnell, 
2006; Blau, Brough and Thomas, 2013; Banerji, Duygun and Shaban, 2018). One might argue 
that SEO flotation cost is higher for non-connected firms just because politically connected 
firms might have obtained government bailouts or cheaper bank loans during the financial crisis 
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and, as a result, issued few equities in the year 2008. In contrast, non-connected firms might 
focus more on their only option, equity issuance, during the financial crisis since they are less 
likely to receive both government bailouts and low costs bank loans. 
     Importantly, this study addressed this concern since Table 2.1 suggests that politically 
connected firms issued few equities in the year 2008. Specifically, Table 2.1 shows that out of 
98 SEOs conducted in the year 2008, 19 SEOs (19%) were issued by politically connected 
firms, whereas non-connected firms issued 79 SEOs (81%).  
      In Table 2.6, the baseline regressions were repeated, excluding the observations in the year 
2008. The results in columns 1 and 2 show that politically connected issuers generated higher 
returns than non-connected issuers around the SEO announcement period. When focusing on 
SEO gross spreads, Columns 3 and 4 show that the effect of political connection on SEO gross 
spreads is negative and statistically significant at the conventional levels. Overall, the results 
are similar to the primary evidence that political connection is associated with lower gross 
spreads and less negative SEO announcement returns. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.6 About Here] 
2.5.4 Controlling for Other Forms of Corporate Governance 
      Prior studies (e.g., Tompkins and Huang, 2010; Kim and Purnanandam, 2014) provide 
evidence that good governance is associated with a lower cost of raising external equity. 
Therefore, it is plausible that the impact of political connections on SEO gross spreads and 
announcement returns is an indirect effect of good corporate governance since politically 
connected issuers might have good governance than non-connected issuers. The study 
addressed this concern by re-examining the baseline regression while controlling for various 
corporate governance features. 
      In the spirit of Kim, Li, Pan, and Zuo (2013), the percentage of outside directors, CEO 
duality, and board size are included. Also, Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016) provide 
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evidence that a firm's leverage and risk level is lower when the CEO is a female than when the 
CEO is a male. Therefore, a dummy variable takes the value of one if the CEO is a female, and 
zero otherwise is included. Walters, Kroll, and Wright (2007) find that CEO tenure affects firm 
performance, whereas Serfling (2014) document a negative association between CEO age and 
stock return volatility. Therefore, CEO tenure and age are controlled. The study also considers 
the ratio of the total number of female directors to the total number of directors, since gender 
diversity improves informativeness of stock prices (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng, 2011) and corporate 
governance quality (Evgeniou and Vermaelen, 2017). 
      In Table 2.7, the baseline regressions are repeated while controlling for the issuer and offer-
specific characteristics as well as the corporate governance features. In column 1, the corporate 
governance features are included, and the primary variable of interest, Connected Issuers. The 
results suggest that politically connected issuers generated higher CAR around the SEO 
announcement period than non-connected issuers. Furthermore, both issuer and offer 
characteristics are controlled for in column 2, and the results suggest that the effect of political 
connections on SEO announcement returns remained positive and statistically significant. 
When focussing on issuer gross spreads, columns 3 and 4 show that the coefficient on the 
political connection's indicator, Connected Issuer, is negative and statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. Overall, this section suggests that the impact of political connections on 
SEO gross spreads and announcement returns is not an indirect effect of corporate governance. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.7 About Here] 
2.6 Additional Analysis: 
2.6.1 Offer Size and Political Connections 
      In this section, this study examines whether politically connected firms closely follow the 
pecking order theory. The pecking order theory predicts that when external funds are required, 
managers with superior information about the value of their assets in place prefer debt to equity 
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(Myers and Majluf 1984). Therefore, since political connections decrease the cost of raising 
debt by a firm (e.g., Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Houston 
et al., 2014), it is anticipated that politically connected firms should rely less on equity. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 2.8 About Here] 
To examine whether politically connected firms rely less on equity than non-connected firms, 
the relationship between political connections and offer size is examined. However, while the 
univariate results in Table 2.1 suggest a positive relationship between political connections and 
offer size, this evidence might be misleading if confounding effects exist between political 
connections and offer size. For example, politically connected firms tend to be large, have 
higher debt, and low growth potential. Therefore, this study examines the relationship between 
political connections and offer size using the instrumental variable approach while controlling 
for possible confounding effects. The instrumental variable approach lessens the concerns that 
the results are driven by omitted variables that might explain political connections as well as 
offer size. Similar to table 2.4, the study used the distance (in kilometers) between issuers 
headquarters and Washington, D.C as an instrument for the presence of former politicians on 
corporate boards. As explained earlier, issuers whose headquarters are closer to Washington 
might be able to appoint former politicians to their boards since former politicians might likely 
to remain in Washington, D.C, where they might have built their networks. Also, there is no 
evidence that the distance from corporate headquarters to Washington, D.C, is correlated with 
Offer size. 
     Table 2.8 presents the results of the IV-regressions. In the first stage regressions, former 
politicians' presence on corporate boards are predicted using a probit model. Both the corporate 
governance features and the full set of the control variables used in the baseline regressions, as 
well as the instrumental variable (natural log of one plus the distance from corporate 
headquarters to Washington, D.C), are controlled. Column 1 shows that the instrumental 
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variable, distance, is a useful instrument for political connections. After including the first-
stage fitted values for political connectedness in the second stage regression, the results suggest 
that the univariate results do not carry over to the multivariate results. Specifically, column 2 
shows that the instrumented values of political connections are negative and statistically 
significant at the conventional level, suggesting that political connections are associated with 
a lower offer size. Overall, the result indicates that politically connected firms closely follow 
the pecking order theory by relying less on equity. 
2.7 Conclusion 
      While several studies provide evidence on the effect of political connections on the process 
of raising external capital, to my knowledge, there is no evidence on the impact of political 
connections on seasoned equity offerings. This paper examines the association between 
political connections and SEO flotation's costs in terms of gross spreads and SEO 
announcement stock returns. Prior studies suggest that political connections provide firms with 
the following: preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008), lower cost of bank loans 
(see, e.g., Houston et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004), lower 
penalties and increased forbearance from lawsuits (see, e.g., Firth, Rui & Wu, 2011; Lu, Pan, 
and Zhang, 2015; Correia, 2014; Jia, Mao, and Yuan, 2019; Yu and Yu, 2011), and sensitive 
information concerning regulations and the economy at large (Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 
2016; Pham (2019). All of the above are likely to increase an issuer's bargaining power with 
the underwriters; therefore, it is anticipated that politically connected issuers might enjoy lower 
SEO gross spreads. 
       In the spirit of Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) and Houston et al. (2014), the study 
partitioned issuers from 2005 to 2017 in the USA into politically connected and non-connected 
issuers and find that political connection is associated with lower SEO gross spreads. The study 
further examined the market reaction to seasoned equity offering announcements and find that 
33 
 
the market reaction to the SEO announcement is less negative when politically connected 
issuers announce seasoned equity offerings than for those of their non-connected counterparts. 
The study runs regressions separately for primary, secondary, and combined issues to mitigate 
the impact of confounding effects that might arise from insider sales of shares in secondary 
issues (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). The result suggests that the effect of political connection 
on both SEO announcement returns and gross spreads is higher in primary offers than in 
secondary offers. 
      The results are robust when controlling for corporate governance features, using an 
instrumental variable approach, and redefining political connections. In an additional analysis, 
the results show that political connection is negatively associated with SEO proceeds. 
Supporting the notion that politically connected firms rely more on debt (e.g., Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2010; Belghitar, Clark and Saeed, 2019). 
      The empirical evidence that political connections reduce SEO flotation costs in terms of 
lower gross spreads and less adverse market reaction to SEO announcement is closely related 
to Boubakri et al. (2012), finding that political connections reduce the rate of returns offered to 
equity investors. Additionally, Claessens et al. (2008) find that political connections provide 
connected firms with preferential access to finance, whereas Houston et al. (2014) and Sapienza 













Equals (1) if at least one board member holds or formerly held any of the following positions: 
President, presidential (Vice-Presidential) candidate, member of the House of Representatives, 
Senator, Cabinet secretary/deputy secretary/undersecretary or assistant secretary, Governor, 
United Nations representative, Ambassador, Mayor, staff member to the White House, 
presidential campaign or political party, appointed member of a presidential committee or 
council and Director/Deputy Director/Commissioner to a federal department or agency 
including: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Social Security Administration (SSA), Civil Rights Centre 
(CRC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
etc. otherwise (0). 
Pcontinous The total number of former politicians on issuer board scaled by the total number of board 
directors. 
RelSize The Ratio of offering proceeds to total assets. 
Secondary The Ratio of SEO shares being sold by existing shareholders to total SEO shares 
LN(Proceed) Natural log of the total amount raised in the SEO 
Nasdaq Indicator variable equals one if the SEO issuer's stock is Nasdaq listed over the SEO registration 
period and zero otherwise. 
CAR The market-adjusted cumulative abnormal stock return around the SEO announcement. See, 
Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo (2013). 
Gross Spread Underwriter's purchase price for a share of the SEOs as a percent of the offer price obtained 
from the SDC. 
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to book value 
of total assets 
Cash Cash and short-term investments scaled by book value of total assets 
Tobin’s Q (Market value of common equity + Total assets − Book value of common equity)/Total assets. 
See, Brockman, Rui, and Zou (2013) 
LN(Total 
Assets) 
Natural logarithm of total assets 
Volatility The standard deviation of daily stock return during the trading period (−90, −11) prior to the 
issue date. 
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets 
Tangible Ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to book value of assets 
DISTANCE The natural logarithm of one plus the distance (in kilometers) from a firm's headquarter to 
Washington D.C.  
Board Size The number of directors on the board, measured in the year prior to the SEO announcement. 
CEO Age The natural logarithm of CEO age 





The percentage of independent directors measured in the year prior to the SEO announcement. 
Female CEO indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise.  



































Table 2.1: Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the firm characteristics between politically connected and non-
connected issuers in the sample. Panel A presents a time-series distribution of the sample. Panel B 
contains the nature of politically connected issues in the sample. Panel C reports the average issuer and 
offer characteristics of politically connected and non-connected issuers. The sample contains 2432 
seasoned equity offerings between January 2005 and December 2017 in the USA. Variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Time-Series Distribution of The Sample 
Year Connected Issuers = 1 Non-Connected Issuers = 0 Obs 
2005 25 130 155 
2006 19 149 168 
2007 22 126 148 
2008 19 79 98 
2009 33 186 219 
2010 17 152 169 
2011 24 163 187 
2012 23 151 174 
2013 20 217 237 
2014 31 226 257 
2015 23 225 248 
2016 11 141 152 
2017 22 198 220 
Total 289 2143 2432 
Panel B: Politically Connected Issuers  
Obs Mean Median Std 
Connected Issuers 2432 0.1188 0 0.3236 
Pcontinous 2432 0.0158 0 0.0466 
Panel C: Issuer and Offer Characteristics  













Nasdaq 2432 0.6365 1.0000 0.4811 0.4706 0.6589 -0.1883*** 0.0000 
Proceeds 2432 4.6275 4.6439 1.2111 5.2252 4.5469 0.6783*** 0.0000 
Secondary 2432 0.3336 0.0000 0.4556 0.3391 0.3329 0.0062 0.8293 
Total Assets 2432 12.8891 12.6813 1.7841 13.8788 12.7557 1.1231*** 0.0000 
CAPEX 2432 0.0616 0.0266 0.0898 0.0702 0.0604 0.0097 0.1029 
ROA 2432 -0.0754 0.0545 0.2943 -0.0402 -0.0801 0.0399** 0.0248 
Cash 2432 0.3288 0.1536 0.3416 0.2562 0.3386 -0.0824*** 0.0000 
Leverage 2432 0.2719 0.2370 0.2560 0.2879 0.2698 0.0181 0.2274 
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Tangible 2432 0.2455 0.1170 0.2790 0.3112 0.2367 0.0745*** 0.0001 
Tobin’s Q 2432 2.8143 1.9787 2.2021 2.6869 2.8315 -0.1446 0.3093 
Volatility 2432 0.0343 0.0292 0.0203 0.0332 0.0344 -0.0012 0.3428 
CEO Tenure  2432 1.7723 1.7918 0.6946 1.8770 1.7582 0.1188*** 0.0052 
Board Size 2432 2.0627 2.0794 0.2354 2.1937 2.0450 0.1486*** 0.0000 
Independent 
Directors 
2432 1.8651 1.9459 0.2997 1.9848 1.8490 0.1359*** 0.0000 
Female CEO  2432 0.0271 0.0000 0.1625 0.0138 0.0289 -0.0151* 0.0530 
CEO Duality  2432 0.3302 0.0000 0.4704 0.4948 0.3080 0.1868*** 0.0000 
CEO Age 2432 3.9780 3.9890 0.1448 3.9963 3.9756 0.0208*** 0.0084 
Female 
Proportion 























Table 2.2: SEO Gross Spread and Political Connections  
Table 2.2 Estimates the impact of political connections on seasoned equity offering (SEO) gross spread. 
Panel A presents the univariate analysis of the association between SEO gross spread and political 
connections for a sample of USA SEOs announced over the period 2005 to 2017. Panel B reports the 
cross‐sectional OLS regression analysis of SEO gross spreads on political connections and other issuer- 
and offer-specific characteristics. The dependent variable is the log gross spreads. The dependent and 
all the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and issuer clustering. 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis – Gross Spreads 











(Col. 2 – Col. 
3) 
P-Value 
(A) All Issues 4.5028 3.6956 4.6098 -0.9142*** 0.0000 
  2153 252 1901   
(B) Primary Issues Only 5.1157 4.3227 5.2228 -0.9001*** 0.0000   
1370 163 1207 
  
(C) Secondary Issues 
Only 
2.8398 2.0428 2.9479 -0.9051*** 0.0001 
  
561 67 494   
(D) Combined Issues 4.9231 4.0826 5.0156 -0.9329*** 0.0077   
222 22 200 
  
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis – Gross Spreads 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Connected Issuers -0.1639*** -0.1501*** -0.0831* -0.1772 -0.0951*  
(-2.85) (-2.73) (-1.90) (-1.22) (-1.74) 
Nasdaq -0.0592 -0.0592 -0.0403 -0.1596* -0.0127  
(-1.45) (-1.45) (-0.96) (-1.70) (-0.30) 
Secondary -0.5567*** -0.5554***     
(-13.29) (-13.24)    
LN(Proceeds) -0.0033 -0.0057 -0.0445*** 0.0386 -0.0644*  
(-0.16) (-0.29) (-2.79) (0.65) (-1.67) 
LN(Total Assets) -0.1978*** -0.1941*** -0.1081*** -0.3605*** -0.1079***  
(-11.06) (-11.19) (-7.57) (-6.93) (-3.52) 
CAPEX -0.2554 -0.1880 -0.0782 0.5190 -0.4726  
(-0.98) (-0.74) (-0.29) (0.70) (-1.22) 
Leverage 0.0561 0.0548 -0.0097 0.3941** 0.0587  
(0.86) (0.82) (-0.17) (2.12) (0.49) 
Cash 0.0728 0.1364** 0.0359 -0.0873 0.0693  
(1.41) (2.21) (0.71) (-0.27) (0.47) 
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ROA 0.1921*** 0.1823*** 0.1134*** -0.2772 0.0554  
(3.80) (3.49) (3.14) (-0.63) (0.58) 
Tangible -0.0074 0.0372 -0.1708 -0.0965 -0.0860  
(-0.06) (0.29) (-1.26) (-0.43) (-0.63) 
Volatility 1.6429*** 1.7764*** 1.3098*** 3.1218 1.0393  
(3.25) (3.45) (3.37) (1.35) (1.32) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0215*** -0.0219*** -0.0154** -0.0619** -0.0223**  
(-3.47) (-3.59) (-2.67) (-2.41) (-2.17) 
Constant 3.9427*** 3.8813*** 3.2949*** 5.6962*** 2.8302***  
(20.47) (18.39) (17.18) (9.02) (7.84) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
observations 
2153 2,153 1,370 561 222 




















Table 2.3: Political Connections and SEO Announcement Return 
Table 2.3 Estimates the impact of political connections on the stock price reaction to seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) announcements. Panel A presents the univariate analysis of the association between 
political connections and seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement stock returns for a sample of 
USA SEOs announced over the period 2005 to 2017. Panel B reports the cross‐sectional OLS regression 
analysis of SEO announcement stock returns on political connections and other issuer- and offer-
specific characteristics. The dependent variable in column 1 through 3 is the CAR, measured over the 
window (-1, +1), (0, +1), and (0, +2) respectively, relative to the announcement day (0). While the 
dependent variable in column 4 through 6 is the CAR, measured over the window (0, +2) relative to the 
announcement day (0). Column 1 through 3 report the results from the full sample whereas Column 4 
through 6 is centred around announcements of SEOs primary, secondary, and combined issues, 
respectively. The dependent and all the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and issuer clustering. 











Diff. (Col. 2 
– Col. 3) 
P-Value 
CAR(-1,+1) -0.0178 -0.0112 -0.0187 0.0075* 0.0603  
1916 208 1708 
  
CAR(0,+1) -0.0136 -0.0072 -0.0144 0.0072*** 0.0085  
1916 208 1708 
  
CAR(0,+2) -0.0156 -0.0074 -0.0166 0.0092** 0.0138  
1916 208 1708 
  
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Connected 
Issuers 
0.0072* 0.0073** 0.0081** 0.0094** 0.0001 0.0064 
 
(1.85) (2.50) (2.15) (2.06) (0.01) (0.56) 
Nasdaq 0.0049 0.0029 0.0009 0.0045 -0.0012 -0.0069  
(1.40) (1.17) (0.28) (0.90) (-0.26) (-0.82) 
Secondary -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0017     
(-0.84) (-1.01) (-0.54)    
RelSize 4.4550 3.5276* 2.0699 1.7165 7.2285 0.7840  
(1.58) (1.84) (0.81) (0.53) (1.46) (0.15) 
LN(Total 
Assets) 
0.0011 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0025 -0.0008 
 
(0.92) (-0.20) (0.37) (0.04) (1.21) (-0.20) 
CAPEX 0.0244 0.0343* 0.0403 0.0345 0.0709* -0.0299  
(0.90) (1.70) (1.63) (1.13) (1.73) (-0.47) 
Leverage 0.0173** 0.0064 0.0102 0.0175* 0.0041 -0.0057  
(2.61) (1.29) (1.62) (1.94) (0.46) (-0.29) 
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Cash 0.0111 0.0014 0.0040 0.0067 0.0412** -0.0383**  
(1.42) (0.27) (0.58) (0.77) (2.62) (-2.10) 
ROA -0.0031 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0165 -0.0236  
(-0.46) (0.09) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
Tangible -0.0023 -0.0063 -0.0083 -0.0023 -0.0181 -0.0004  
(-0.26) (-0.91) (-0.99) (-0.17) (-1.62) (-0.02) 
Volatility -0.1104 -0.0721 -0.1536* -0.2865*** -0.0178 0.2146  
(-1.35) (-1.20) (-1.84) (-2.70) (-0.12) (1.27) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0012 -0.0017** -0.0016* -0.0021** -0.0009 -0.0005  
(-1.39) (-2.74) (-1.94) (-2.05) (-0.57) (-0.24) 
Constant -0.0306 0.0072 0.0092 -0.0091 -0.0065 -0.0128  
(-1.50) (0.45) (0.47) (-0.29) (-0.18) (-0.20) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
observations 
1,916 1,916 1,916 1,202 480 234 




















Table 2.4: Instrumental Variable Approach 
This table reports the instrumental variable regression results on the impact of political connections on 
both SEO gross spreads and announcement stock returns using the distance (KM) between corporate 
headquarters and Washington, DC as an instrument for political connections. The sample contains USA 
SEOs announced over the period 2005 to 2017. In the first stage we predict political connections using 
(Distance) the log of one plus the distance from a firm's headquarter to Washington DC with issuer and 
offer variables as well as year and industry fixed effects. The dependent variable in column 2 is the the 
CAR, measured over the window (0, +2) relative to the announcement day (0). While the dependent 
variable in column 4 is the SEO gross spreads. Column 1 and 3 present the first stage probit regression 
whereas column 2 and 4 report the second-stage regression. The dependent and all the explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The t and z‐statistics reported in 































Nasdaq 0.0394 0.0009 0.0328 -0.0608  
(0.28) (0.29) (0.21) (-1.46) 
Secondary -0.1867 0.0006 -0.1332 -0.5715***  
(-1.38) (0.17) (-1.03) (-13.18) 







0.0473 -0.0039    
(0.67) (-0.20) 
LN(Total Assets) 0.2969*** -0.0023 0.3112*** -0.1671***  
(5.94) (-1.15) (4.79) (-6.92) 
CAPEX -0.6691 0.0502** -0.7653 -0.2922  
(-0.78) (2.02) (-0.84) (-1.06) 
Leverage -0.6193** 0.0158** -0.4114 0.0166  
(-2.51) (2.26) (-1.63) (0.24) 
Cash -0.3828 0.0076 -0.2747 0.1110*  
(-1.43) (1.02) (-0.89) (1.76) 
ROA -0.7016*** 0.0046 -0.8372*** 0.1184*  
(-3.29) (0.62) (-3.67) (1.87) 
Tangible 0.1878 -0.0107 -0.0880 0.0344  
(0.61) (-1.30) (-0.26) (0.27) 
Volatility 1.9258 -0.1709** 1.5326 1.8948***  
(0.80) (-2.02) (0.68) (3.59) 
Tobins’ Q 0.0923*** -0.0024** 0.0855*** -0.0144*  
(3.61) (-2.57) (3.19) (-1.86) 
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Constant -4.7426*** 0.0389 -5.1915*** 3.5266***  
(-5.32) (1.48) (-5.68) (12.05) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 1,916 1,916 2,153 2,153 
Pseudo R2 (Adjusted 
R2) 






















Table 2.5: Alternative Measure of Political Connectedness  
This table reports the cross‐sectional OLS regression analysis of the impact of political connections on 
both SEO gross spreads and announcement stock returns whilst controlling for issuer- and offer-specific 
characteristics. The dependent variable in column 1 and 2 is the CAR, measured over the window (0, 
+2) relative to the announcement day (0). While the dependent variable in column 3 and 4 is the SEO 
gross spreads. We redefine political connections using an alternate proxy, Pcontinous, the total 
number of former politicians on issuer board scaled by the total number of board directors (see, 
Chizema, Liu, Lu, and Gao (2015). All the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and issuer clustering. 
 
SEO-CAR SEO-Gross Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PContinous  0.0535** 0.0477* -2.0101*** -0.8854**  

























   


































































Constant -0.0163*** 0.0078 1.3673*** 3.9041***  
(-12.21) (0.40) (56.35) (18.45) 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES YES YES 
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Number of observations 1,916 1,916 2,153 2,153 


































Table 2.6: Can Economic Downturns Drive the Results?  
This table reports the cross‐sectional OLS regression analysis of the impact of political connections on 
both SEO gross spreads and announcement stock returns whilst excluding observations in the year 2008. 
The dependent variable in column 1 and 2 is the CAR, measured over the window (0, +2) relative to the 
announcement day (0). While the dependent variable in column 3 and 4 is the SEO gross spreads. The 
dependent and all the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
issuer clustering. 
 
SEO-CAR SEO-Gross Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









PCONTINOUS   0.0476* 
 




Nasdaq 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0652 -0.0632  
(0.43) (0.41) (-1.57) (-1.54) 
Secondary -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.5655*** -0.5661***  
(-0.63) (-0.63) (-13.02) (-13.02) 







-0.0053 -0.0058    
(-0.26) (-0.29) 
LN(Total Assets) 0.0004 0.0005 -0.1932*** -0.1949***  
(0.33) (0.40) (-10.96) (-10.97) 
CAPEX 0.0351 0.0351 -0.2116 -0.2205  
(1.37) (1.37) (-0.81) (-0.85) 
Leverage 0.0133** 0.0131** 0.0603 0.0632  
(2.04) (2.02) (0.88) (0.92) 
Cash 0.0026 0.0025 0.1258** 0.1282**  
(0.37) (0.36) (1.97) (2.00) 
ROA -0.0015 -0.0016 0.1871*** 0.1914***  
(-0.22) (-0.24) (3.52) (3.57) 
Tangible -0.0102 -0.0102 0.0248 0.032144  
(-1.19) (-1.20) (0.19) (0.24) 
Volatility -0.1567* -0.1572* 1.6980*** 1.7195***  
(-1.86) (-1.86) (3.17) (3.21) 
Tobins’ Q -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0222*** -0.0225***  
(-2.00) (-1.98) (-3.54) (-3.59) 
Constant 0.0019 0.0014 3.8826*** 3.8985***  
(0.10) (0.07) (18.23) (18.26) 
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Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 1,837 1,837 2,066 2,066 































Table 2.7: Controlling For Other Forms of Corporate Governance  
This table reports the cross‐sectional OLS regression analysis of the impact of political connections on 
both SEO gross spreads and announcement stock returns whilst controlling for issuer- and offer-specific 
characteristics as well as corporate governance features. The dependent variable in column 1 and 2 is 
the CAR, measured over the window (0, +2) relative to the announcement day (0). While the dependent 
variable in column 3 and 4 is the SEO gross spreads. The dependent and all the explanatory variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and issuer clustering. 
 
SEO-CAR SEO-Gross Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected Issuers 0.0079** 0.0072* -0.2391*** -0.1392**  
(2.14) (1.88) (-2.85) (-2.48) 
Tenure-CEO 0.0013 0.0015 -0.0154 -0.0351  
(0.83) (0.97) (-0.42) (-1.38) 
Board Size 0.0109* 0.0055 -1.2119*** -0.0401  
(1.65) (0.69) (-9.50) (-0.46) 
Independent Directors -0.0035 0.0008 0.5682*** 0.0005  
(-0.83) (0.18) (5.45) (0.01) 
Female CEO -0.0025 -0.0006 0.2059** 0.1856**  
(-0.26) (-0.06) (2.04) (2.63) 
Female Proportion -0.0019 0.0052 -0.5712** -0.2680  
(-0.15) (0.38) (-2.07) (-1.40) 
CEO Duality 0.0033 0.0004 -0.0434 0.0117  
(1.18) (0.13) (-0.93) (0.34) 
CEO Age -0.0123 -0.0038 -0.2268 0.0724  

























   





































































Constant 0.0130 0.0156 3.7773*** 3.7075***  
(0.36) (0.39) (6.63) (9.25) 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 1,916 1,916 2,153 2,153 






















Table 2.8: Political Connections and SEO Proceeds 
 This table reports the instrumental variable regression results on the impact of political connections on 
SEO proceeds using the distance (KM) between corporate headquarters and Washington, DC as an 
instrument for political connections. The sample contains USA SEOs announced over the period 2005 
to 2017. In the first stage we predict political connections using (Distance) the log of one plus the 
distance from a firm's headquarter to Washington DC with issuer and offer variables as well as year and 
industry fixed effects. The dependent variable in column 2 is the natural log of SEO proceeds. Column 
1 present the first stage probit regression whereas column 2 report the second-stage regression. The 
dependent and all the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The t and z‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and issuer clustering. 
 
Ist Stage 2nd Stage 
Predicted-Connection 
 







Tenure-CEO 0.1242 0.0379  
(1.41) (1.30) 
Board Size 0.9328** 0.4524***  
(2.43) (3.77) 
Independent Directors 0.2123 -0.1701**  
(0.71) (-2.23) 
Female CEO -0.2511 0.0569  
(-0.91) (0.51) 
Female Proportion 0.8177 0.1663  
(1.32) (0.86) 
CEO Duality 0.2515** 0.0697*  
(2.08) (1.72) 
CEO Age -0.0729 -0.2756**  
(-0.19) (-2.33) 
Nasdaq 0.0625 0.0743  
(0.41) (1.44) 
Secondary -0.0736 0.1561***  
(-0.56) (3.00) 
LN(Total Assets) 0.2209*** 0.6589***  
(4.32) (32.13) 
CAPEX -1.0690 0.9915**  
(-1.17) (2.79) 
Leverage -0.5647** -0.3515***  
(-2.28) (-3.96) 
Cash -0.3433 0.2687**  
(-1.09) (2.46) 
ROA -0.6867** 0.0181  
(-2.61) (0.19) 




Volatility 1.2788 -0.6887  
(0.58) (-0.88) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0833*** 0.1613***  
(3.25) (15.69) 
Constant -6.1142*** -4.4180***  
(-3.83) (-7.78) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Cluster by Issuer YES YES 
Number of observations 2432 2432 





















Political Connections and Share Repurchases 
3.1 Introduction 
          A growing body of economic literature has established that political connections affect 
corporate investment decisions (Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 2016). Nevertheless, existing 
research dedicated to the question of whether corporate political connection affects firm value 
has provided mixed evidence on the impact of political connections on firm value. While some 
of these studies suggest that political connections are negatively associated with firm 
performance (e.g., Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2008; Hadani 
and Schuler, 2012; Bertrand et al., 2018), several studies, on the other hand, provide evidence 
that political connections can increase shareholder value (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So, 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Akey, 2015; Ferris, Houston, 
and Javakhadze, 2016). In addition to the disagreement on the impact of political connections 
on firm value, another channel through which political connections might affect firm value is 
unexplored – the area of share repurchases.  
         Therefore, this study seeks to fill this gap by examining the effect of political connections 
on shareholder value in the share repurchase context. Specifically, the aim is to examine 
whether firms with former politicians on their board generated higher returns from share 
repurchases than their counterparts without former politicians on their board. This chapter 
focuses on share repurchases for two reasons. First, the determinants of share repurchase 
decisions (Dittmar, 2000) and its effects on firm value (Edmans, Fang, and Huang, 2018) can 
be accurately estimated. Therefore, it is possible to accurately assess the impact of share 
repurchase decisions by politically connected firms on shareholders' value. Also, share 
repurchases are substantial economic activities that often do not benefit firms (Boudry, 
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Kallberg, and Liu, 2013). It is pertinent to determine why some firms benefit from share 
repurchases, and others do not. For example, could former politicians' presence on corporate 
boards result in higher stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period and the 
long term? 
         The primary analysis addresses the effect of political connections on the market reaction 
to share repurchase announcements. This study anticipates that political connections might 
have two opposing effects on stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period. 
First, extant literature (Wu, 2012; Evgeniou and Vermaelen, 2017; Manconi, Peyer, and 
Vermaelen, 2018) suggests that corporate governance is positively associated with higher stock 
returns around share repurchase announcement. Therefore, the market reaction to share 
repurchase announcements by politically connected firms might be less favourable compared 
with that of non-connected firms since political connections undermine corporate governance 
and exacerbate agency problems (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 
2011; Boubakri et al., 2012; Shen, Lin, and Wang, 2015; Kostovetsky, 2015). 
        On the other hand, political connections provide politically connected companies with 
both information and financial advantage. However, easy access to finance can cause agency 
problems of free cash flows, resulting in negative NPV projects and empire building 
(entrenchment). Besides the free cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) predicts that firms with 
excess cash and few investment opportunities might face substantial agency costs if the excess 
cash is not distributed to shareholders. Given that share repurchase is a potential mechanism to 
reduce a firms' overinvestment problems, thereby removing the incentive for wasteful 
investment and increasing firm value (Chen et al., 2013; Lobo, Robin, and Wu, 2019), the 
market reaction to share repurchase announcements by politically connected firms might be 
higher compared with non-connected firms. However, the effect of political connections on the 
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stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period remains an open empirical 
issue. 
       This chapter examines the relationship between political connections and stock 
performance around the share repurchase announcement period, controlling for various firm 
characteristics as well as industry and year fixed effects. Following Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
(2009) and Houston et al. (2014), this research uses information about board members' 
backgrounds to classify firms into politically connected and non-connected groups. The results 
show that a portfolio of S&P 1500 firms classified as politically connected firms generated 
higher stock returns around share repurchase announcement than a portfolio of S&P 1500 firms 
classified as non-connected firms. 
       This study also examines repurchasing firms' stock performance in the long term. This 
chapter predicts that political connections will be positively associated with repurchasing firms' 
long-term stock performance. The prediction stems from the evidence that share repurchases 
can be myopic if financed by scrapping value-maximizing investments (Edmans, Fang, and 
Huang, 2018; Bendig et al., 2018) or if it results in raising costly external funds (Lie, 2005). 
However, politically connected firms have a financial advantage. Specifically, they have 
preferential access to finance (Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008), cheaper costs of both bank 
loans (e.g., Sapienza, 2004; Houston et al., 2014), and equity capital (Boubakri et al., 2012). 
One would, ceteris paribus, expect that politically connected firms can afford to follow through 
with their share repurchase programs and remain competitive by not repurchasing shares at the 
detriment of their first-choice investment (value-enhancing investments) or long-run 
investments. 
       Consequently, the chapter hypothesizes that the long-run stock returns following share 
repurchase announcements will be higher for politically connected firms than those of non-
connected firms. Therefore, this research estimates the effect of political connections on the 
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repurchasing firm's long-term stock returns in both univariate and multivariate settings. For up 
to three years following share repurchase announcements, politically connected firms gained 
higher stock returns than their non-connected counterparts. The results suggest that share 
buyback programs produce higher stock returns for firms that are politically connected. 
       Importantly, firm fixed effects, an instrumental variable, and the propensity score matching 
approach were used to address the possibility that other factors drive the effect of political 
connection on repurchasing firm's stock returns. These approaches control possible unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, omitted variables, and the observable differences in firm characteristics 
between politically connected and non-connected boards that might explain share repurchase 
returns. The findings that political connections are associated with repurchasing firm's stock 
returns are robust to the three approaches. 
      Furthermore, this chapter examines whether politically connected boards are associated 
with repurchasing firms accounting performance following share repurchase announcement 
year and finds that politically connected boards generated higher accounting returns in the three 
years following share repurchase announcement than non-connected boards. This evidence is 
consistent with the premise that politically connected firms are more likely to remain 
competitive following share repurchase by not repurchasing at the expense of their first-choice 
investments and thereby earning higher operating returns. 
      In an additional analysis, this study also examines whether politicians' presence on 
corporate boards increases the probability of a company repurchasing shares and the amount 
spent on share repurchases using a panel of Standard and Poor's (S&P) 1,500 firms over 2006-
2017. The results suggest that politically connected boards are more likely to repurchase shares 
more often than non-connected boards while controlling for other determinants of share 
repurchases, year and industry fixed effects. Specifically, the probability of a company 
repurchasing shares is 47 percentage points higher when politicians are on the board. When 
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focusing on the value of shares repurchased, the results reveal a positive and significant 
relationship between political connection and the amount spent on a share repurchase. These 
results continue to hold after using firm-fixed effects to control firm-level heterogeneity in 
share repurchase value, and further using the distance between corporate headquarters and 
Washington, DC as an instrument (see, Houston et al., 2014) for political connections. 
In summary, these results suggest that firms with former politicians on their corporate board 
are more likely to generate higher stock returns around share repurchase announcement and in 
the long-term than firms without former politicians on their board. 
          This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows how political 
connections contribute to our understanding of the outcome of share repurchases. Also, it 
provides new insights into the debate on the impact of political connection on corporate 
decisions and a firm's value. For example, prior studies have examined the impact of political 
connections on the firm's value (e.g., Faccio 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Cooper 
et al., 2010; Akey 2015), mergers and acquisitions decisions and performance (e.g., Brockman, 
Rui, and Zou 201; Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 2016; Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang, 
2019; Croci et al., 2017), initial public offering (IPO) pricing (Gounopoulos et al., 2017), and 
top executive's pay rates (Chizema et al., 2015). More closely related to this article is the work 
of López-Iturriaga and Martín (2019). Whereas this study provides evidence on the effect of 
political connections on share repurchase performance, likelihood, and magnitude in the USA, 
López-Iturriaga, and Martín (2019) focus on the magnitude of shares repurchased and the 
dividend paid in Spain. 
        This chapter also contributes to the studies about how corporate board and director 
characteristics affect share repurchase decisions and outcomes. Custódio and Metzger (2014) 
analyzed financial expert CEOs' impact on corporate decisions and find that they are more 
likely to repurchase shares. This study provides evidence that the propensity to repurchase 
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shares and the value of shares repurchased are higher when a firm has a director with a political 
background. Evgeniou and Vermaelen (2017) focus on board gender diversity and find that it 
is associated with the likelihood of repurchasing shares and lower long-term stock returns. The 
scholars argued that gender diversity increases information disclosure, which provides fewer 
opportunities to repurchase undervalued stock, resulting in smaller long-term excess returns. 
This research shows that political connections are positively associated with the probability of 
a company repurchasing shares, the value of shares repurchased, and the impact on both 
operating and stock returns. Consistent with the notion that political connections provide firms 
with a financial advantage and decrease information disclosure, which provides a higher 
opportunity to repurchase undervalued stock, resulting in higher returns.  
         The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in this 
paper and the measures of political connectedness; Section 3 reports the empirical analyses and 
the main results of the article; Section 4 presents endogeneity tests; Section 5 reports additional 
robustness tests. In section 6, this paper report additional analysis. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
3.2 Data and Variable Constructions 
3.2.1 Data and Political Connectedness measurement 
     This chapter employs the single country research design (the USA market) so as to hold 
constant the numerous country-level factors (legal, regulatory, institutional, cultural etc.) that 
might influence share repurchase outcome. As noted by Gerakos, Piotroski and Srinivasan 
(2013) concentrating on one market will enhance the use of detailed data for the sampled firms 
without being anxious about data availability and comparability across markets. This approach 
is also comparable to other studies such as Croci, Pantzalis, Park, and Petmezas (2016), and 
Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze (2016) with their single market focus. 
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Share repurchase data is obtained from Thomson Reuters's Securities Data Company Platinum 
database (SDC). Following Acemoglu et al. (2016), the study collects financial and stock price 
data from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope data. To keep the 
data manageable, the study focuses on the USA share repurchase data for firms in Standard 
and Poor 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Smallcap 600 indices) at any point 
in time between 2006 and 2017; this is the period where the data on the S&P 1500 firms is 
accessible.  Besides, the sample period that ends in the year 2017 allows for the long-term stock 
returns to be estimated. 
       Repurchasing firms are classified into connected or non-connected firms following the 
approach of Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009), Houston et al. (2014), and Kim and Zhang 
(2016). Each of the firms' proxy statements from the EDGAR database was collected. The 
EDGAR database contains information concerning public firms' (SEC) filing. Firms are 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to provide a brief history of each 
of the board member's career backgrounds. From the career history, it is possible to determine 
whether board members are politically connected (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Houston 
et al., 2014; Kim and Zhang, 2016).  
       This chapter examines all board members' biographical information using annual proxy 
statements (2006-2017). Following Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009), A firm is classified as a 
politically connected firm if at least one board member holds, or formerly held, any of the 
following positions: President, presidential (Vice-Presidential) candidate, member of the 
House of Representatives, Senator, Cabinet secretary/deputy secretary/undersecretary or 
assistant secretary, Governor, United Nations representative, Ambassador, Mayor, staff 
member to the White House, presidential campaigner or political party appointment, appointed 
member of a presidential committee or council and Director/Deputy Director/Commissioner to 
a federal department or agency including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal 
59 
 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Social Security 
Administration (SSA), Civil Rights Centre (CRC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
3.2.2 Sample statistics 
         The sample yields 15,801 observations with a non-missing proxy statement and the firm 
characteristics of interest. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics. Panel A shows that 
politically connected firms are significantly (p-value < 0.01) older and larger than non-
connected firms. Politically connected firms have a higher market-to-book ratio, higher 
leverage, and hold less cash compared with non-connected firms; this is consistent with Faccio 
(2010), Kim and Zhang (2016), and Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze (2016). Prior literature 
(see Dittmar, 2000; Lee and Suh, 2011) provide evidence that cash holdings are associated with 
a share repurchase. Politically connected firms appear to pay higher cash dividends compared 
with non-connected firms. The work of Grullon and Michaely (2004) suggests that firms are 
likely to substitute a share repurchase for a dividend payment. The average operating 
performance in the sample is 0.128; politically connected firms (0.150) appear to have higher 
operating performance compared with non-connected firms (0.125), consistent with Boubakri, 
Cosset, and Saffar (2012). The work of Custódio and Metzger (2014) shows that firms with 
higher operating performance are more likely to repurchase shares compared with firms with 
lower operating performance. Overall, the summary statistics suggest that the difference in firm 
characteristics between politically connected firms and non-connected firms is generally in-
line with prior literature on political connections.    
         Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of 5036 share buyback programs 
between 2006 and 2017. Like panel A, politically connected firms that announced share 
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repurchases are older and larger than non-connected firms. Also, they hold less cash and are 
have more debt than non-connected firms. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 3.1 About Here] 
3.2.3 Time-Series Distribution of Repurchase announcements sample 
    This chapter also examines the number of share repurchase announcements made by 
politically connected and non-connected firms across the sample years in table 2. Share 
repurchase announcements decreased around the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). Table 
2 suggests that the observations appear to be spread across the years, and there is no significant 
clustering. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 3.2 About Here] 
3.3 Empirical findings 
3.3.1 Political Connections and Short-Term Stock Performance 
       This section examines whether politically connected boards deliver higher stock returns 
than their non-connected counterparts around the share repurchase announcement period. 
Following Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004), and Chen and Wang (2012), this chapter measures 
the initial market reaction to share repurchase announcement by calculating the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return over three (-1, +1) days and five (-2, +2) days event windows around share 
repurchase announcement date. Specifically, short-term abnormal stock performance is the 
difference between repurchasing firms buy and hold returns and the USA market index for the 
three (-1, +1) days and the five (-2, +2) days event windows around share repurchase 
announcement date. The market return is the USA value-weighted market index 
(TOTMKUS)(R.I.) obtained from the DataStream.  
      Table 3.3 reports both the univariate and the multivariate analysis of the abnormal 
announcement stock returns. Panel A reports the univariate analysis. Consistent with the share 
repurchase literature (e.g., Chan et al., 2018), column (1) of panel A shows that the market 
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regards a share repurchase announcement as good news. For example, the average abnormal 
stock returns for the full sample around the three (-1, +1) days and five (-2, +2) days 
announcement period is 1.1% (p-value<0.01) and 1.2% (p-value<0.01) respectively. However, 
column (2) and (3) shows that politically connected boards are associated with higher 
announcement stock returns than non-connected boards. For example, the average three-day 
(− 1, + 1) stock return around the announcement period for politically connected boards is 1.4% 
compared to 1.0% stock return for non-connected boards and the difference (0.4%) is 
statistically significant at the 5% levels. Also, the five-day (-2, +2) abnormal return shows that 
politically connected boards (1.5%) generated higher announcement stock returns than non-
connected boards (1.1%) and the difference (0.4%) is significant at the 5% levels. 
      The univariate analysis appears to support the prediction that corporate political 
connections are associated with higher stock returns around the share repurchase 
announcement period. Next, the study seeks to determine whether the effect of political 
connections on repurchasing firm's announcement returns will survive when controlling for 
other determinants of share repurchase announcement returns. 
[Please Insert Table 3.3 About Here] 
        Panel B presents the cross-sectional regressions of the announcement stock returns on 
political connections. Controlling for the determinants of share repurchase such as firm age 
(Ln(Age)), capital expenditure (Capex), operating performance (ROA), Cash Holding (Cash), 
total debt to assets ratio (Leverage), total Assets (Ln(Size)), cash dividend (Dividend), market-
to-book ratio (M.B.), recent stock returns (RET), intangible assets (Tangible), sales growth (S-
Growth), and a set of year and industry fixed effects. In column (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable is the three-day (−1, +1) buy-and-hold abnormal stock, and in column (3) and (4), the 
independent variable is the five-day (-2, +2) buy-and-hold abnormal stock. The results show 
that political connections are positively and significantly associated with share repurchase 
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announcement stock returns. Specifically, the coefficients on both the three-day (-1, +1) and 
five-day (-2, +2) announcement stock returns, column (1) through (4), respectively, are positive 
and statistically significant at the conventional levels.  
3.3.2 Political Connections and Long-Term Stock Performance. 
        This section tests the second hypothesis and seeks to determine whether political 
connections are associated with the long-term stock performance following the share 
repurchase announcement month. Consistent with Bargeron, Bonaime, and Thomas (2017) and 
Evgeniou and Vermaelen (2017), the study computes the long-term stock returns over the 
standard 12-, 24-, and 36-month event windows using the buy and hold return method, an 
approach widely used and accepted (e.g., Brockman, Rui, and Zou 2013; Bargeron, Bonaime 
and Thomas, 2017; Iyer and Rao, 2017). Specifically, the long-term abnormal stock 
performance is computed as the difference between the repurchasing firm's buy and hold 
returns and that of the USA market index for the 12, 24, and 36-month horizon following share 
repurchase announcement month.  
         Table 3.4 reports on both the univariate and the multivariate analysis of the long-term 
stock returns. On the univariate basis, Panel A shows that political connections are associated 
with higher stock returns in the three years following share repurchase month. For instance, in 
the 36-month following share repurchase announcement month, politically connected boards 
experienced a 12.10% increase in their share price whereas non-connected boards gained 
5.10% and the difference (7.0%) is statistically significant at the 1% levels. Panel B of Table 
3.4 reports the cross-sectional regression of the long-term stock returns following the share 
repurchase announcement month. As with all the tests, this chapter controls for various firm 
characteristics as well as industry and year fixed effects. The study also uses heteroskedasticity‐
robust standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The primary explanatory variable of interest 
is an indicator as to whether the repurchasing firm is politically connected (1) or not (0).        
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Consistent with the second hypothesis, when a firm has a former politician on its board, long 
term stock returns following share repurchase announcement is significantly larger ( at the 1% 
level) over the 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month horizon. Specifically, column (1) through 
(3) shows that the signs on the political connections indicator are positive and statistically 
significant at the conventional levels. Also, the signs on the control variables are generally 
consistent with those in existing share repurchase literature (e.g., Chan et al., 2018; Evgeniou 
and Vermaelen, 2017) 
                                [Please Insert Table 3.4 About Here] 
3.4 Endogeneity Concerns 
        As a further check, the study examines whether the main findings that political 
connections are associated with higher stock returns will continue to hold after adjusting for 
possible endogeneity issues in a two-stage-least-square (2SLS) analysis and propensity score 
matching approach. 
 3.4.1 2SLS Analysis 
     Thus far, the results show a positive and significant association between political 
connections and stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period and in the 
long-term. However, unknown and omitted variables may drive these findings. Specifically, it 
is plausible that certain unobserved determinants of employing politicians might also increase 
repurchasing firms' stock returns. This research re-examines the impact of political connections 
on share repurchase performance using two-stage least squares regressions to mitigate this 
factor.  
      The distance (in kilometers) between Washington, D.C. and corporate headquarter is used 
as the instrumental variable for political connection, following Houston et al. (2014) and Kim 
and Zhang (2016). It is unclear whether the distance between the corporate headquarter and 
Washington, DC, affects firms repurchasing firms' stock performance. However, Houston et 
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al. (2014) and Kim and Zhang (2016) find that the distance (in kilometers) from corporate 
headquarters to Washington, DC is a useful instrument for the presence of politicians on 
corporate boards. Since politicians are likely to remain in Washington, DC, where they might 
have established political networks (Houston et al., 2014), therefore, it is anticipated that firms 
whose corporate headquarter are closer to Washington, DC, are more likely to attract politicians 
to their board compared with those that are far away from Washington, DC. The principal 
regression is: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(PoliticalConnections𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0+𝛼𝛼1Distance𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼2firmCharacteristics-1+Year𝑡𝑡+ 
Industry+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 …………………………………………….. (4) 
 
where Political Connectionsi dummy, the dependent variables in the regressions, equals one if 
an issuer i has a former politician on its board. Distance, the key explanatory variables, is the 
natural log of one plus the distance from corporate headquarters to Washington, D.C. Firm 
characteristics are the full set of the control variables. 
       Table 3.5 reports the results for both the first stage and second stage regression. In column 
(1), (3), (5), and (7), this study runs a probit model for political connections on the instrumental 
and control variables. Consistent with Houston et al. (2014), the results show that the 
coefficient on the instrument (DISTANCE) for political connections is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% levels, suggesting that the distance between firms headquarter 
and Washington, DC, is a good predictor for political connections.  
        In column (2), (4), (6), and (8), the first-stage fitted values are included for political 
connections in the second stage regressions. The results in column (2) through (5) show that 
the instrumented value of political connection is positive and statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. These results support the earlier evidence that there is a positive and 
significant association between political connections and stock returns around the share 
repurchase announcement period and in the long-term. 
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        [Please Insert Table 3.5 About Here] 
       Furthermore, this chapter assesses whether the possible endogeneity associated with 
political connections affected the baseline results by performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is based on the premise that in the absence of endogeneity, the 
ordinary least square (O.L.S.) regression is more efficient than the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regressions (Antia, Pantzalis and Park, 2010). However, political connections must be 
treated as endogenous if the null hypothesis is rejected. Coccorese and Ferri (2020) pointed out 
that the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results in 
table 3.5 show insignificant values in chi-squared. This indicates that this study is not subject 
to endogeneity, justifying the O.L.S. estimator's use in the primary analysis.  
3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching Approach. 
        In addition to the instrumental variable approach, the second step to adjust for possible 
endogeneity issues is to control for the observable differences in the characteristics between 
politically connected and non-connected repurchasing firms. This is important given that it is 
plausible that politically connected repurchasing firms might have better performance ability 
than their non-connected counterparts, thereby creating a possible endogeneity problem that 
might result from sample selection bias. This study employs the propensity score matching 
approach to eliminate potential sample selection bias. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) posit that 
the propensity score matching approach can effectively eliminate sample selection bias because 
it deals with distributing the covariates between a control group and treatment group and, 
finally, creating matched balanced samples with characteristics similar to those of the treatment 
group. 
        The matching candidates are required to be traded at least three years following the share 
repurchase announcement date so that the effect of the share repurchase initiative on the long-
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term stockholder's wealth can be determined. Besides, this makes the sample relatively stable 
over time. Applying these criteria yields a sample of 3764 repurchasing firms. Following 
Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2019), this chapter estimates propensity scores using the probit 
model. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for political connection, and the 
independent variable includes all the firm characteristics included in the primary analysis since 
they might capture a firm's propensity to be politically connected (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Faccio, 
2010; Boubakri et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014). The study matched firms using a one-to-one 
nearest neighbor technique. Both the treatment and the control firms are from the same (two-
SIC) industry, and both firms have announced a share repurchase in the same year (660 
politically connected repurchasing firms and 660 non-connected repurchasing firms). 
         Panel A of Table 3.6 reports parameter estimates for the probit model used in calculating 
the propensity score. Column 1 shows that politically connected and non-connected 
repurchasing firms' firm characteristics are statistically different before implementing the 
propensity score matching. Whereas column 2 shows that the sample is well balanced after 
implementing the propensity score matching. Specifically, politically connected firms' firm 
characteristics are not statistically different from those of non-connected repurchasing firms 
after matching. 
                                                 
[Please Insert Table 3.6 About Here] 
       This study used the matched balanced sample to examine the effect of political connections 
on the repurchasing firms' stock performance. For brevity, this chapter documents only the 
coefficients of interest in panel B. Column (1) through (4) show that political connections are 
positively associated with repurchasing firm's stock performance both in the long-term and 
around share repurchase announcement period, and the effect is statistically significant at the 
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1% levels. This finding reinforces the earlier findings that political connection is positively 
associated with the repurchasing firms' stock performance. 
3.5 Additional robustness check 
         So far, the results suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to generate 
higher stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period and in the long-term. 
However, the results raise three essential questions.  
        First, can firm fixed effects account for the results? It is plausible that most firms that 
attract politicians to their board are extraordinary repurchasers that performances better 
irrespective of their size and cash levels. Therefore, one might argue that firm-specific 
heterogeneity in share repurchase returns is driving the results. To lessen this concern, the study 
further probes the effect of political connections on share repurchase performance by including 
firm fixed effects in panel A of Table 3.7. Besides, addressing this concern is essential since 
there are multiple observations for some firms. Even after including firm fixed effects in 
column (1) through (8), the coefficient on the political connection's variable remains positive 
and statistically significant at the conventional levels.  
                           [Please Insert Table 3.7 About Here] 
     Secondly, do economic downturns drive the results? Table 3.2 suggests that politically 
connected firms initiated fewer share buybacks than non-connected firms in the year 2008. One 
might argue that the declining stock price during the 2008 global financial crisis might have 
motivated non-connected firms to initiate more share buybacks than politically connected, and 
as such, underperformed. To sort out this concern, this chapter excludes observations in the 
2008 financial crisis. Panel B of Table 3.7 shows that the effect of political connections on 
stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period and in the long-run remains 
positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that economic downturns do not 
drive the findings. 
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       Finally, can an information asymmetry explain the effect of political connections on share 
repurchase performance? Extant studies suggest that the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors positively affects stock returns around the share repurchase 
announcement period and in the long-term (e.g., Barth and Kasznik, 1999; Billett and Yu, 
2016). Thus, these scholars argue that managers with superior information about their company 
have more prospects of identifying whether their future performance will be better than market 
expectations and, therefore, might have more opportunity to repurchase undervalued stocks. 
Given that political connection exacerbates the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors (e.g., Chen et al., 2010; Chaney et al., 2011), it is plausible that politically connected 
firms might have a higher prospect to repurchase undervalued stock compared with non-
connected boards. Resulting in higher stock returns following the share repurchase 
announcement. 
       To test whether information asymmetry explains the impact of political connections on 
share repurchase returns, this study controls information asymmetry in the main analysis. 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kim, Li, Pan and Zuo 2013; Huang and Thakor, 2013), this 
chapter uses a firm's idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. It is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock return during the trading period 
(−90, −11) before the share repurchase announcement date. 
      In undocumented results, the study re-examines the relationship between political 
connections and share repurchase performance while controlling for information asymmetry, 
and again the coefficients on the political connections indicator remain positive and statistically 
significant at the conventional levels. However, the information asymmetry indicator 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with higher information 
asymmetry gained more stock returns around the share repurchase announcement period and 
in the long run. This chapter further repeats the analysis while including the interaction P.C. x 
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AsymInfo, as well as the information asymmetry indicator (AsymInfo). The results show that 
the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive but statistically insignificant. These results 
suggest that information asymmetry does not explain the impact of political connections and 
share repurchase stock returns. 
3.6 Additional analysis 
3.6.1 Political Connections and Operating Performance 
        In this section, this study examines the operating performance of politically connected and 
non-connected firms following the share repurchase announcement year. Extant literature (e.g., 
Sapienza, 2004; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012; Houston et al., 
2014) suggest that politically connected firms have a financial advantage compared with non-
connected firms. Therefore, this chapter anticipates that politically connected firms can finance 
future investments following a share repurchase program. Therefore, they might remain 
competitive and generate higher operating returns following share repurchase compared with 
non-connected firms.  
       The study computes operating performance following share repurchase announcement 
year, as operating income before depreciation (EBITDA) scaled by total assets using the 
matched balanced sample; this ensures that the results are not driven by the observable 
differences between politically connected and non-connected firms. Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) document that the main advantage of using operating income before depreciation 
(EBITDA) instead of income before extraordinary items is that this measure is not affected by 
changes in the capital structure. The study computes the abnormal operating performance as 
the repurchasing firm-specific ROA for one year, two years, or three years following share 
repurchase announcement year minus it's ROA in the year before the share repurchase 
announcement year. This chapter further used cash-adjusted total assets to scale operating 
income before depreciation following Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Lie (2005). The cash‐
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adjusted total assets are equal to total assets, minus cash and short-term investments. Lie (2005) 
suggested removing cash and short-term investments from total assets lessen concerns that 
scaled operating performance increases only because cash was removed from the asset base to 
finance share repurchases. 
       Table 3.8 presents the O.L.S. regression analysis of abnormal operating performance 
changes over three years, following the share repurchase announcement year. The explanatory 
variable is an indicator of whether the repurchasing firm is politically connected (1) or zero (0) 
otherwise. This study also includes firm characteristics and further controlled for industry and 
year fixed effects. Panel A presents both the changes on return on assets and the return on cash-
adjusted assets for the three years following the share repurchase announcement year. The 
dependent variable in column (1) through (3) is the changes in the return on assets. The 
coefficient on the political connections' indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% levels, indicating that politically connected firms generated higher operating performance 
in the three-years following share repurchase announcement year, compared with non-
connected firms. In column (4) through (6), the dependent variable is the changes in the return 
on cash-adjusted assets. The results show that the political connection indicator's coefficient 
remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% levels in the three years following the 
share repurchase announcement month. 
                                                [Please Insert Table 3.8 About Here] 
      However, in column (7) through (9), the study re-examines the return on assets (ROA) for 
the 1, 2, and 3 years following share repurchase announcement year while excluding prior 
returns on assets. This lessens the concern that non-connected repurchasing firms 
underperformed connected firms simply because they had higher operating performance in the 
year before the share repurchase announcement year. Again, the findings (column (7) through 
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(9)) suggests that the coefficient on the political connections’ indicator remains positive and 
statistically significant at the conventional levels.  
     This chapter repeats the analysis in table 3.8 using industry-adjusted operating performance 
as the dependent variable in an undocumented result. Operating performance is industry 
adjusted by deducting all the corresponding firms' median performance in the same (two SIC) 
industry group that announced share repurchase in the same year. The results indicate that the 
coefficient on the political connections' indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 
conventional levels in the three years following the share repurchase announcement year.  
Overall, this section suggests that politically connected firms generated a superior operating 
performance in the one, two, and three years following share repurchase announcement year, 
compared with their non-connected counterparts. 
3.6.2 Political Connections and Share Repurchase Decisions 
        This chapter also examines the impact of political connections on the probability of USA 
companies repurchasing shares and the value of shares repurchased. Repurchasing shares 
decreases corporate liquidity and exacerbates financial constraints (Chen and Wang, 2012). 
Therefore, if politically connected firms have preferential and cheaper access to capital, the 
study anticipates that politically connected firms might be less concerned about reducing 
liquidity compared with non-connected firms. Moreover, the study predicts that the probability 
of repurchasing shares and the value of shares repurchased might be higher for politically 
connected firms than non-connected firms. 
      This chapter tests the prediction by running a panel regression on the determinants of share 
repurchase decisions in which the main variable of interest is a politically connected board 
dummy that takes the value one (1) if at least one of the firms' board member holds or formerly 
held any of the following positions described in section (2.1), and zero (0) otherwise. 
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Table 3.9 presents the baseline regression on whether politically connected boards are more 
likely to repurchase shares compared with non-connected boards. In columns (1) and (2) the 
study runs probit regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 
one (1) if a firm repurchase share in a given year, and zero (0) otherwise. Controlling a set of 
variables used in the share repurchase analysis (e.g., Dittmar 2000; Huang and Thakor, 2013; 
Custódio and Metzger 2014), such as firm age (Ln(Age)), capital expenditure (Capex), 
operating performance (ROA), cash Holding (Cash), total debt to assets ratio (Leverage), total 
assets (Ln(Size)), cash dividend (Dividend), market-to-book ratio (M.B.), recent stock returns 
(RET), intangible assets (Tangible), and sales growth (S-Growth). These variables measure 
factors that affect share repurchase programs, such as firm size, life cycle, managerial motives 
for excess capital, dividend substitution, and undervaluation. The study also controls for time 
variation and unobserved systematic differences by including year and industry fixed effects. 
The results show that the coefficient on the political connections' variable is positive and 
statistically significantshowalue<0.01), suggesting that politically connected boards are more 
likely to repurchase shares than non-connected boards. A company's propensity to repurchasing 
shares is 47 percentage points higher when a politician is a board member. 
        Consistent with the share repurchase literature (e.g., Bhattacharya and Jacobsen, 2015; 
Dittmar, 2000; Huang and Thakor, 2013; Custódio and Metzger 2014), the estimated 
coefficients on the other control variables generally display the predicted signs. For example, 
both regressions show that firm size, operating performance, and cash holdings are positively 
associated with the probability of repurchasing shares. In contrast, capital expenditure, 
leverage, prior stock returns, higher market-to-book value, and dividend payment decreases the 
propensity of a firm repurchasing shares. 
[Please Insert Table 3.9 About Here] 
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         Column 2 and 3 of Table 3.9 presents results on whether there is a relationship between 
political connections and shares repurchased value. The study runs an ordinary least square 
(O.L.S.) and firm fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is the value of 
shares repurchased by a firm in a given year scaled by the book value of assets (see, e.g., Huang 
and Thakor, 2013). This chapter includes industry and year fixed effects in column (2) and 
further control for firm fixed effects in column (3). The coefficient on the political connections 
dummy remained positive and statistically significant at the conventional levels 
          In column (4) and (5), this research re-examines the association between political 
connections and shares repurchased value. The study runs ordinary least square (O.L.S.) and 
firm fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural log of one plus the 
value of shares repurchased by a firm in a given year. Moreover, further control for time 
variation and unobserved systematic differences, including the year and industry fixed effects, 
also adjusted for within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity using clustered standard errors. 
Column (4) and (5), without and with firm fixed effects respectively, show that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between political connections and the value of shares 
repurchased, lending support to the findings in column (2) and (3) that political connections 
are positively associated with the value of shares repurchased. 
          For robustness reasons, this study re-estimates the association between political 
connections and share repurchases using the distance from corporate headquarters to 
Washington DC as an instrument for political connectedness. Column (6) through (8) shows 
that the instrumented value of political connections is positive and statistically significant at 
the conventional levels. This suggests that an omitted variable does not drive the impact of 
political connections on the likelihood of a company repurchasing shares and the value of 
shares repurchased. Overall, the section concludes that political connections are positively 
associated with the likelihood of a company repurchasing shares and the value of shares 
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repurchased. The effect persists after controlling for other determinants of share repurchase, 
fixed effects, and adjusting for potential endogeneity issues 
3.6.3 Further Sensitivity Tests 
         This chapter conducted additional sensitivity tests: (1) measuring political connections as 
a ratio of directors with a political background to the total number of board directors (see, e.g., 
Chizema et al., 2015); (2) using daily returns from the announcement date to compute the 
average annual buy-and-hold returns. The study defines each year as a uniform block of 252 
trading days following Chen and Wang (2012); (3) using (-3, +3) and (-5, +5) windows as an 
alternative share repurchase announcement period return windows; (4) this chapter examines 
whether regulatory concerns account for the differential performance between politically 
connected and non-connected firms around share repurchase announcement period and in the 
long-term by excluding firms from the regulated industries (SIC code 6000–6999 and 4900–
4999). None of these sensitivity tests changes the results. 
3.7 Conclusion  
         This chapter finds that political connections have a persistent effect on share repurchase 
performance in the USA. Using share repurchase programs initiated by Standard and Poor's 
(S&P) 1,500 firms over 2006-2017, the results show that the market responds more favorably 
to the share repurchase announcements by politically connected boards compared with non-
connected boards. Further analysis shows that politically connected firms generated higher 
abnormal stock and operating returns in the long-term, following the share repurchase 
announcement period, suggesting that politically connected boards do not repurchase shares at 
the detriment of their first-choice investment, as a result, remain competitive compared with 
non-connected firms. 
         This research further provides evidence that a company's probability of repurchasing 
shares and the amount spent are higher when former politicians are board members. This result 
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continues to hold in a two-stage regression, controlling for other determinants of the share 
repurchase and firm, industry, and year fixed effects. These results suggest that political 
connections are an essential determinant of a company's likelihood of repurchasing shares and 





















Appendix B Variable definitions 
POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS 
Equals (1) if at least one board member holds or formerly held any of the following positions: 
President, presidential (Vice-Presidential) candidate, member of the House of Representatives, 
Senator, Cabinet secretary/deputy secretary/undersecretary or assistant secretary, Governor, 
United Nations representative, Ambassador, Mayor, staff member to the White House, 
presidential campaign or political party, appointed member of a presidential committee or 
council and Director/Deputy Director/Commissioner to a federal department or agency 
including: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Social Security Administration (SSA), Civil Rights Centre 
(CRC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
etc. otherwise (0). 
LN(SIZE) Firm size proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt to book value of assets in year t-1 
LN(AGE) The natural logarithm of firm age 
CASH Cash and short-term investments scaled by book value of total assets in year t-1 
RET RET is the prior twelve-month buy-and-hold abnormal return, adjusted by that of the USA 
value-weighted market index return (TOTMKUS)(RI) provided by DataStream. 
DIVIDEND the ratio of cash dividends paid to net income in year t-1 
MB market value of equity plus debt to the book value of assets in year t-1 
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets in year t-1 
TANGIBLE Ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets in year t-1 
S-GROWTH The difference in current and lagged value of sales divided by lagged value of sale 
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to book value 
of total assets in year t-1 
DISTANCE The natural logarithm of one plus the distance (in kilometers) from a firm's headquarter to 









Table 3.1: Summary Statistic 
 Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the firm characteristics between politically connected and 
non-connected boards in the sample. Panel A presents an unbalanced panel of 1,595 firms (15,801 firm 
years) that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at 
any time between 2006 and 2017. Panel B shows summary characteristics of S&P 1500 firms that 
announced share repurchases at any time between 2006 and 2017. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed level, respectively. 
Panel A: All Firms 
 















LN(AGE) 15,801 2.898 2.995 3.526 0.736 3.017 2.879 0.138*** 0.000 
CAPEX 15801 0.049 0.034 0.065 0.047 0.044 0.051 -0.006*** 0.000 
ROA 15801 0.128 0.122 0.180 0.098 0.150 0.125 0.025*** 0.000 
CASH 15801 0.150 0.091 0.217 0.159 0.138 0.153 -0.014*** 0.000 
LEVERAGE 15801 0.250 0.233 0.370 0.198 0.261 0.248 0.013*** 0.002 
LN(SIZE) 15801 14.700 14.620 15.770 1.649 15.891 14.507 1.384*** 0.000 
DIVIDEND 15801 0.218 0.082 0.394 0.375 0.234 0.216 0.017** 0.023 
MB 15801 0.250 0.234 0.371 0.196 0.262 0.249 0.013*** 0.001 
RET 15801 0.041 0.005 0.196 0.320 0.058 0.039 0.019*** 0.004 
TANGIBLE 15801 0.295 0.197 0.451 0.267 0.273 0.299 -0.026*** 0.000 
S-GROWTH 15801 0.082 0.062 0.151 0.195 0.066 0.085 -0.019*** 0.000 
Panel B:  Repurchase announcements sample 
LN(AGE) 5036 2.921 3.044 3.526 0.699 2.969 2.906 0.063** 0.006 
CAPEX 5036 0.043 0.031 0.057 0.039 0.039 0.044 -0.005*** 0.000 
ROA 5036 0.158 0.147 0.205 0.087 0.168 0.155 0.013*** 0.000 
CASH 5036 0.168 0.115 0.245 0.156 0.150 0.173 -0.023*** 0.000 
LEVERAGE 5036 0.224 0.202 0.333 0.189 0.238 0.219 0.019*** 0.001 
LN(SIZE) 5036 15.032 14.945 16.048 1.595 15.971 14.734 1.237*** 0.000 
DIVIDEND 5036 0.197 0.107 0.315 0.275 0.223 0.188 0.035*** 0.000 
MB 5036 0.224 0.203 0.334 0.187 0.239 0.220 0.019*** 0.001 





























TANGIBLE 5036 0.238 0.158 0.338 0.224 0.230 0.241 -0.011 0.121 
S-GROWTH 5036 0.070 0.058 0.127 0.143 0.058 0.073 -0.015*** 0.001 
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Table 3.2: Time-Series Distribution of Repurchase announcements sample 
 Table 3.2 presents the time-series distribution of repurchase announcements sample between politically 
connected and non-connected firms that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P 
Small cap 600 indices) at any time between 2006 and 2017.  
Panel A: Time-Series Distribution of Repurchase announcements sample 
Year PC NPC Observation 
2006 83 323 406 
2007 125 385 510 
2008 67 314 381 
2009 31 139 170 
2010 80 286 366 
2011 130 371 501 
2012 111 325 436 
2013 139 328 467 
2014 163 386 549 
2015 140 411 551 
2016 76 278 354 
2017 68 277 345 














Table 3.3: Political Connections and Short-term Stock Returns 
Panel A reports the Univariate analysis of the association between political connections and share 
repurchase announcement stock returns. The sample includes firms that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 
500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any time between 2006 and 2017. Panel B 
presents the multivariate analysis of share repurchase announcement stock returns. The dependent 
variable in column (1) and (2) is the three-day (-1, +1) BHAR and the dependent variable in column (3) 
and (4) is the five-day (-2, +2) BHAR around share repurchase announcement period. BHAR is 
calculated over the value-weighted market index. Year and industry controls are used. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors, clustered by firm. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 






(Col. 2 – Col. 3) 
P-value 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
 
(-1, +1) 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.004** 0.014  
(17.36) (11.94) (13.54) 
  
 
5036 1213 3823 
  
(-2, +2) 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.004** 0.008  
(15.57) (11.21) (11.93) 
  
 
5036 1213 3823 
  
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT 0.013** 0.048*** 0.007 0.046***  
(1.97) (4.29) (1.00) (3.74) 
PC 0.004** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.008***  



























































































Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Firm YES YES YES YES 
N 5,036 5,036 5,036 5,036 

























Table 3.4: Political Connections and Long-term Stock Returns 
Panel A reports the Univariate analysis of the association between political connections and long-term 
stock returns following share repurchase announcement. The sample includes firms that were in S&P 
1500 firms (S&P500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any time between 2006 and 
2017. Panel B presents the multivariate analysis of the association between political connections and 
long-term stock returns following share repurchase announcement. The dependent variable in column 
(1) is the 12-month BHAR following share repurchase announcement month. In column (2), the 24-
month BHAR is the dependent variable. The dependent variable in column (3) is the 36-month BHAR 
following share repurchase announcement month. BHAR is calculated over the value-weighted market 
index. Year and industry controls are used. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors, clustered by firm. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 





Diff. (Col. 2 
– Col. 3) 
P-value 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
BHAR(12 month) 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.016* 0.074  
(8.17) (6.06) (6.12) 
  
 
5036 1213 3823 
  
BHAR(24 month) 0.045*** 0.079*** 0.033*** 0.046*** 0.001  
(6.80) (6.54) (4.29) 
  
 
4691 1145 3546 
  
BHAR(36 month) 0.069*** 0.121*** 0.051*** 0.07*** 0.001  
(7.09) (6.66) (4.53) 
  
 
4334 1069 3265 
  
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
 BHAR(12-Month) 
    (1) 
BHAR(24-Month) 
   (2) 
BHAR(36-Month) 
     (3) 
INTERCEPT 0.428*** 0.466*** 0.765***  
(5.68) (3.68) (3.66) 
PC 0.052*** 0.110*** 0.177***  
(4.61) (5.00) (4.84) 
LN(AGE) -0.001 0.003 -0.006  
(-0.12) (0.18) (-0.28) 
LN(SIZE) -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.048***  
(-5.82) (-4.21) (-4.22) 
CAPEX -0.209 -0.228 -0.618  
(-1.14) (-0.71) (-1.35) 
ROA -0.121* -0.115 -0.189  
(-1.89) (-1.06) (-1.11) 
CASH 0.017 0.106 0.229*  
(0.44) (1.34) (1.79) 
LEVERAGE -0.024 -0.041 1.496  
(-0.59) (-0.12) (1.25) 
DIVIDEND -0.047*** -0.097*** -0.110**  
(-2.92) (-2.95) (-2.07) 
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MB 0.010 0.052 -1.427  
(0.23) (0.15) (-1.19) 
RET -0.000 0.028 0.002  
(-0.01) (0.89) (0.05) 
TANGIBLE 0.009 0.025 0.099  
(0.29) (0.45) (1.15) 
S-GROWTH 0.176*** 0.177** 0.192**  
(4.55) (2.76) (1.96) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Cluster by Firm YES YES YES 
N 5,036 4,691 4,334 






















Table 3.5: Political Connections and Stock Returns: Instrumental Variable 
Approach. 
This table reports the 2-SLS IV regression regression results on the association between political 
connections and repurchasing firms stock returns using the distance (KM) between corporate 
headquarters and Washington, DC as an instrument for political connections. The sample includes firms 
that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any time 
between 2006 and 2017. Column (1), (3), (5), and (7) present the first-stage probit regression. Whereas 
column (2), (4), (6), and (8) present the second stage regression results. BHAR is calculated over the 
value-weighted market index. Year and industry controls are used. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. The t and z‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors, 
clustered by firm. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 


























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INTERCEPT -0.661*** 0.054*** -0.661*** 0.337*** -0.682*** 0.424*** -0.668*** 0.716***  


































LN(AGE) -0.019 0.002 -0.019 -0.000 -0.021 0.005 -0.025 -0.002  
(-0.96) (1.42) (-0.96) (0.01) (-1.03) (0.32) (-1.17) (-0.08) 
LN(SIZE) 0.097*** -
0.004*** 
0.097*** -0.023*** 0.099*** -0.036*** 0.100*** -0.061*** 
 
(9.45) (-3.57) (9.45) (-4.02) (9.52) (-3.11) (9.29) (-3.23) 
CAPEX -0.768** -0.049 -0.768** -0.182 -0.746* -0.176 -0.691* -0.533  
(-2.05) (-1.50) (-2.05) (-0.97) (-1.93) (-0.55) (-1.79) (-1.17) 
ROA 0.629*** -0.009 0.629*** -0.145** 0.616*** -0.164 0.587*** -0.273  
(4.38) (-0.76) (4.38) (-2.09) (4.19) (-1.38) (3.91) (-1.54) 
CASH 0.044 0.013* 0.044 0.017 0.049 0.106 0.039 0.229*  
(0.45) (1.75) (0.45) (0.45) (0.48) (1.35) (0.38) (1.80) 
LEVERAGE -0.272 -0.006 -0.272 -0.010 -0.287 -0.013 -0.278 1.546  
(-1.48) (-0.39) (-1.48) (-0.23) (-1.52) (-0.04) (-1.48) (1.32) 
DIVIDEND -0.029 -0.007** -0.029 -0.046*** -0.033 -0.095*** -0.039 -0.105**  
(-0.74) (-2.45) (-0.74) (-2.85) (-0.82) (-2.88) (-0.94) (-1.98) 
MB 0.128 0.009 0.128 0.000 0.146 0.031 0.138 -1.464  
(0.65) 0.60 (0.65) (0.01) (0.71) (0.09) (0.68) (-1.24) 
RET 0.035 -0.004 0.035 -0.002 0.034 0.025 0.030 -0.002  
(1.56) (-1.49) (1.56) (-0.09) (1.44) (0.80) (1.24) (-0.05) 
TANGIBLE -0.008 0.010* -0.008 0.011 -0.016 0.029 -0.037 0.109  
(-0.10) (1.87) (-0.10) (0.34) (-0.19) (0.52) (-0.45) (1.25) 
S-GROWTH -0.019 0.006 -0.019 0.177*** -0.006 0.179*** -0.021 0.197**  
(-0.36) (1.03) (-0.36) (4.58) (-0.11) (2.77) (-0.36) (2.01) 
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Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by 
Firm 

















N 5036 5036 5,036 5,036 4,691 4,691 4334 4334 










































Table 3.6: Political Connections and Stock Returns: Propensity Score 
Matching Approach. 
This table reports the OLS regression results on the association between political connections and 
repurchasing firms stock performance, using the propensity score matching method. The sample 
includes firms that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 
indices) at any time between 2006 and 2017. The candidates for the propensity score matching were 
matched using the nearest neighbor propensity score matching approach. We use Probit model to 
calculate propensity scores and include a dummy variable for political connection as the dependent 
variable. We match firms using a one-to-one nearest neighbor technique and require that both the 
treatment and the control firms must be in the same (two-SIC) industry and both firms announced share 
repurchase in the same year. Panel A reports parameter estimates for the probit model used in 
calculating the propensity score. The “Pre-Match” column reports the estimates of the probit model 
estimated using the sample before matching. We then used the estimates to generate the propensity 
scores for matching politically connected and non-connected firms. The “Post-Match” column reports 
the estimates of the probit model estimated using the matched balanced. Panel B reports the OLS 
regression results on the association between political connections and repurchasing firms stock 
performance, using the propensity score matched sample. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors, clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Panel A.  
Pre-match Post-match 
INTERCEPT -5.628*** -0.243  
(-8.00) (-0.27) 
LN(AGE) -0.145* -0.035  
(-1.75) (-0.33) 
LN(SIZE) 0.373*** 0.038  
(8.35) (0.69) 
LEVERAGE -49.135* -1.438  
(-1.77) (-0.04) 
CAPEX -2.896 1.094  
(-1.55) (0.40 
ROA 2.452*** -0.941  
(3.94) (-0.97) 
CASH -0.286 -0.283  
(-0.66) (-0.53) 
DIVIDEND -0.161 0.121  
(-0.91) (0.51) 
RET 0.184* 0.075  
(1.68) (0.47) 
TANGIBLE -0.291 0.066  
(-0.78) (0.14) 
S-GROWTH -0.214 0.374  
(-0.84) (1.00) 





Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Cluster by Firm YES YES 
N 3,764 1,320 
Pseudo‐R2 0.158 0.009 
P-value of χ2 < 0.001 1.000 
Panel B: Short and Long-Term Stock Returns  
BHAR(-2, +2) BHAR(12-month) BHAR(24-month) BHAR(36-month)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PC 0.012*** 0.068*** 0.138*** 0.229***  
(3.72) (4.59) (5.22) (5.54) 
INTERCEPT 0.076*** 0.205 0.395* 0.498  
(3.26) (1.44) (1.68) (1.44) 
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Firm YES YES YES YES 
N 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320 

















Table 3.7: Robustness checks on the effect of political connections on post-
buyback stock performance. 
This table reports different robustness checks on the effect of political connections on post-buyback 
stock performance. Panel A reports the multivariate analysis of the association between political 
connections and repurchasing firms stock returns controlling for firm fixed effects. The sample includes 
firms that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any 
time between 2006 and 2017. The dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is the five-day (-2, +2) 
BHAR around share repurchase announcement period. The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) is 
the 12-month BHAR following share repurchase announcement month. In column (5) and (6), the 24-
month BHAR is the dependent variable. The dependent variable in column (7) and (8) is the 36-month 
BHAR following share repurchase announcement month. BHAR is calculated over the value-weighted 
market index. Panel B reports the multivariate analysis of the association between political connections 
and repurchasing firms stock returns excluding firms from the regulated industries. The sample includes 
firms that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any 
time between 2006 and 2017. The dependent variable in column (1) is the five-day (-2, +2) BHAR 
around share repurchase announcement period. The dependent variable in column (2) is the 12-month 
BHAR following share repurchase announcement month. In column (3), the 24-month BHAR is the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable in column (4) is the 36-month BHAR following share 
repurchase announcement month. BHAR is calculated over the value-weighted market index. For all 
regressions, Year and industry controls are used. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors, clustered by firm. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A: controlling for firm fixed effects  
BHAR(-2, +2) BHAR(12-Month) BHAR(24-Month) BHAR(36-Month)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INTERCEPT 0.009** 0.009** 0.053** 0.059*** 0.034* 0.035 -0.045* -0.044  
(2.39) (2.31) (2.54) (2.66) (1.66) (1.61) (-1.68) (-1.56) 
PC 0.001* 0.001* 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.029***  
(1.87) (1.81) (3.60) (3.57) (3.66) (3.56) (3.59) (3.49) 
LN(AGE) -0.008 -0.008 -0.016 -0.016 -0.002 -0.003 -0.045 -0.046  
(-1.48) (-1.49) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.46) (-0.48) 
LN(SIZE) -0.007** -0.007** -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.311*** -0.312*** -0.411*** -0.413***  
(-2.05) (-2.05) (-7.05) (-7.04) (-8.31) (-8.31) (-7.71) (-7.71) 
CAPEX -0.051 -0.051 -1.085*** -1.084*** -1.563*** -1.563*** -1.729*** -1.731**  
(-0.98) (-0.98) (-3.43) (-3.42) (-3.13) (-3.12) (-2.65) (-2.64) 
ROA -0.022 -0.022 -0.525*** -0.525*** -0.772*** -0.774*** -1.315*** -1.319***  
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-4.13) (-4.12) (-4.24) (-4.25) (-4.43) (-4.43) 
CASH 0.004 0.004 -0.127 -0.127 -0.120 -0.119 0.018 0.020  
(0.27) (0.27) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-0.70) (-0.70) (0.08) (0.09) 
LEVERAGE 0.002 0.002 -0.019 -0.019 -0.289 -0.289 1.273 1.275  
(0.05) (0.05) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-1.25) (-1.24) (1.21) (1.21) 
DIVIDEND -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.018 0.062 0.062  
(-0.89) (-0.89) (0.18) (0.18) (0.47) (0.46) (1.13) (1.11) 
MB 0.011 0.011 0.141 0.141 0.598** 0.597** -0.898 -0.900  
(0.22) (0.22) (1.33) (1.33) (2.35) (2.34) (-0.84) (-0.84) 
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RET -0.009** -0.009** -0.043** -0.043** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.190*** -0.190***  
(-2.46) (-2.46) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.76) (-2.75) (-4.36) (-4.35) 
TANGIBLE -0.013 -0.013 0.184 0.184 0.234 0.235 0.044 0.047  
(-0.55) (-0.55) (1.22) (1.21) (0.84) (0.84) (0.13) (0.14) 
S-GROWTH 0.010 0.009 0.066 0.067 -0.071 -0.070 -0.191* -0.189*  
(1.31) (1.31) (1.42) (1.42) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-1.83) (-1.82) 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by 
Firm 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5036 5,036 5,036 5,036 4,691 4,691 4,334 4,334 
R-Squared 0.013 0.013 0.050 0.050 0.072 0.072 0.084 0.084 
Panel B: Excluding financial crisis  





INTERCEPT 0.060*** 0.456*** 0.509*** 0.998***  
(4.40) (6.73) (3.84) (4.46) 
PC 0.009*** 0.057*** 0.119*** 0.188***  
(3.50) (4.66) (5.24) (4.87) 
LN(AGE) 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001  
(1.39) (0.13) (0.32) (0.03) 
LN(SIZE) -0.003*** -0.022*** -0.036*** -0.058***  
(-4.07) (-5.95) (-4.97) (-4.70) 
CAPEX -0.078** -0.288 -0.485 -1.069**  
(-2.36) (-1.42) (-1.37) (-2.10) 
ROA 0.005 -0.119* -0.077 -0.163  
(0.48) (-1.73) (-0.67) (-0.90) 
CASH 0.013* 0.015 0.121 0.250*  
(1.68) (0.37) (1.51) (1.91) 
LEVERAGE -0.013 -0.019 -0.061 1.465  
(-1.05) (-0.49) (-0.19) (1.24) 
DIVIDEND -0.006* -0.034* -0.058 -0.069  
(-1.70) (-1.92) (-1.60) (-1.16) 
MB 0.014 0.033 0.127 -1.321  
(1.10) (0.77) (0.39) (-1.11) 
RET -0.005 -0.001 0.038 0.021  
(-1.50) (-0.08) (1.18) (0.46) 
TANGIBLE 0.016** 0.055 0.123* 0.245**  
(2.49) (1.53) (1.84) (2.40) 
S-GROWTH 0.008 0.181*** 0.185** 0.189*  
(1.27) (4.45) (2.68) (1.80) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Cluster by Firm YES YES YES YES 
N 4,543 4,543 4,235 3,911 




















Table 3.8: Political Connections and Operating Performance 
This table reports the OLS regression results on the association between political connections and 
abnormal operating performance following share repurchase announcement year, using the matched 
balanced sample. The sample includes firms that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, 
and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any time between 2006 and 2017. Column (1) through (3) presents 
the return on assets (ROA) for the 1, 2, and 3 years following share repurchase announcement year. 
Column (4) through (6) presents the return on cash-adjusted assets for the 1, 2, and 3 years following 
share repurchase announcement year. In column (7) through (9) we re-examine the return on assets 
(ROA) for the 1, 2, and 3 years following share repurchase announcement year whilst excluding prior 
returns on assets. The abnormal operating performance is the repurchasing firm-specific ROA 
(ROCAA) for one year, two years or three years following share repurchase announcement minus it’s 
ROA (ROCAA) in the year before share repurchase announcement. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The t‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors, clustered by firm. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Return on Assets Return on cash-adjusted assets Return on Assets: Excluding 



















INTERCEPT -0.127*** -0.165*** -0.066* -0.135** -0.236*** -0.151** -0.217*** -0.258*** -0.155***  
(-2.81) (-3.49) (-1.70) (-1.98) (-2.74) (-2.44) (-4.37) (-5.03) (-3.70) 
PC 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.027***  
(5.37) (6.55) (4.81) (2.95) (3.29) (2.87) (5.63) (6.84) (5.11) 
LN(AGE) 0.006 0.005 -0.000 0.008 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.003 -0.002  
(1.45) (1.06) (-0.04) (1.45) (1.47) (0.51) (1.07) (0.72) (-0.34) 
LN(SIZE) 0.005** 0.007*** 0.003 0.009** 0.014*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.007***  
(2.54) (2.98) (1.29) (2.50) (2.87) (2.57) (4.58) (4.56) (3.05) 
LEVERAGE -5.159** -3.179 -2.099 -0.590 4.844 0.858 2.841 5.152 5.807**  
(-2.14) (-1.33) (-0.69) (-0.15) (1.59) (0.23) (1.00) (1.55) (2.25) 
CAPEX 0.046 -0.228* -0.203* -0.057 -0.194 -0.151 -0.278*** -0.564*** -0.523***  
(0.38) (-1.90) (-1.78) (-0.30) (-0.95) (-0.79) (-2.81) (-4.77) (-4.57) 
ROA -0.354*** -0.368*** -
0.349*** 
-0.404*** -0.439*** -0.498*** 
   
 
(-6.56) (-7.40) (-6.63) (-5.61) (-5.83) (-6.96) 
   
CASH 0.049** 0.067** 0.071** -0.136*** -0.181*** -0.122** 0.012 0.028 0.034  
(2.20) (2.64) (2.38) (-3.02) (-3.44) (-2.48) (0.53) (1.08) (1.25) 
DIVIDEND -0.003 0.020* 0.032*** -0.008 0.019 0.018 -0.011 0.013 0.024**  
(-0.26) (1.93) (2.70) (-0.47) (1.35) (1.06) (-0.83) (1.12) (2.03) 
RET 0.032*** 0.015 -0.002 0.053*** 0.024 0.010 0.022** 0.004 -0.012  
(3.43) (1.30) (-0.21) (3.05) (1.36) (0.72) (2.33) (0.34) (-1.25) 
TANGIBLE 0.013 0.035** 0.041** 0.019 0.029 0.051** 0.029 0.052*** 0.056***  
(0.67) (2.41) (2.66) (0.79) (1.27) (2.13) (1.56) (3.37) (3.59) 
S-GROWTH 0.029 0.043 0.025 0.052 0.066 0.012 0.036 0.051 0.033  
(0.96) (1.41) (1.18) (1.18) (1.34) (0.41) (1.19) (1.63) (1.41) 
MB 5.209** 3.254 2.152 0.641 -4.774 -0.786 -2.810 -5.100 -5.775**  
(2.16) (1.36) (0.70) (0.16) (-1.56) (-0.21) (-0.99) (-1.53) (-2.24) 
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Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by 
Firm 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 































Table 3.9: Political Connections and Share Repurchase Decisions 
This table reports the regression results on the association between political connections and share 
repurchases. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a binary variable that indicate whether a firm 
repurchased shares in a given year. In Column (2) and (3) the dependent variable is the value of shares 
repurchased in a given year scaled by book value of assets. The dependent variable in Column (4) and 
(5) is the natural log of one plus share repurchase value in a given year.  Columns 6 through 8 are based 
on two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, where the first-stage regression has the form shown in 
table 3.4. The sample includes companies that were in S&P 1500 firms (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, 
and S&P Small cap 600 indices) at any time between 2006 and 2017. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The t and z‐statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors, clustered by firm. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.                 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
PROBIT 
(REP (1/0)) 
OLS (REP/ASSETS) OLS (LN(1+REP)) 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
INTERCEPT -5.528*** -0.029*** -0.005*** -3.707*** -0.382*** -0.339*** -0.021 -2.987***  
(-26.95) (-3.54) (-5.81) (-12.04) (-10.69) (-4.14) (-1.43) (-5.36) 
PC 0.473*** 0.011*** 0.001** 0.653*** 0.045*** 0.212*** 0.019* 1.215**  
(11.78) (5.72) (2.36) (7.72) (3.12) (2.78) (1.72) (2.47) 
LN(AGE) -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.033 -0.096 -0.001 -0.001 -0.028  
(-0.12) (-1.35) (-0.55) (-1.24) (-1.10) (-0.31) (-1.26) (-1.05) 
LN(SIZE) 0.263*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.268*** 0.193*** 0.026*** 0.001 0.227***  
(21.47) (4.83) (2.36) (13.45) (5.21) (4.18) (1.28) (5.34) 
CAPEX -1.588** -0.017** -0.017* -0.643* -0.942** -0.075 -0.014 -0.462  
(-2.60) (-2.03) (-1.68) (-1.69) (-2.52) (-1.06) (-1.50) (-1.10) 
ROA 2.210*** 0.049*** 0.008 1.417*** 0.322* 0.183*** 0.046*** 1.229***  
(10.54) (7.08) (1.24) (7.21) (1.71) (4.39) (5.49) (4.72) 
CASH 0.572*** 0.022*** 0.008 0.687*** 0.200 0.085*** 0.021*** 0.645***  
(4.34) (4.78) (1.21) (4.35) (1.01) (3.21) (4.41) (3.73) 
LEVERAGE -9.976 -0.019 -0.022** -1.641*** -1.034*** -0.202*** -0.015 -1.408***  
(-1.14) (-1.19) (-2.35) (-3.59) (-4.03) (-3.06) (-0.92) (-3.09) 
DIVIDEND -0.264*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.098** -0.066* -0.018** -0.003*** -0.085*  
(-4.35) (-3.23) (-2.16) (-2.34) (-1.67) (-2.47) (-2.79) (-1.87) 
MB 9.924 0.023 -0.001 1.413*** 0.306 0.185*** 0.019 1.217**  
(1.13) (1.54) (-0.15) (2.99) (1.03) (2.80) (1.33) (2.67) 
RET 0.097 -0.001 0.000 0.057 0.058 0.009 -0.001 0.046  
(1.61) (-0.69) (0.04) (1.54) (1.61) (1.39) (-0.88) (1.25) 
TANGIBLE -0.223** -0.001 0.001 -0.083 -0.199 -0.011 -0.000 -0.059  
(-2.06) (-0.30) (0.21) (-0.89) (-1.03) (-0.67) (-0.10) (-0.60) 
S-GROWTH -0.417*** -0.004* -0.003 -0.214*** -0.251*** -0.037*** -0.004* -0.218***  
(-3.67) (-1.79) (-1.55) (-3.30) (-4.12) (-3.45) (-1.81) (-3.31) 
Industry FE YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801 
Pseudo‐R2 
(Adj.‐R2) 





















Political Connections, Acquisition Riskiness, and Bidder Returns 
4.1 Introduction 
      Academic studies reporting evidence on the association between corporate political 
connections and mergers and acquisitions have identified only limited evidence of their effect 
on the takeover process and outcomes (Croci et al., 2017). For example, Ferris et al. (2016) 
present evidence that politically connected acquirers pay a higher premium; they successfully 
acquire more target firms and generate value in the USA. Brockman et al. (2013) find that the 
long-term returns for politically connected acquirers are higher than those of non-connected 
acquirers in countries with high corruption, whereas, in countries with low corruption, they 
earned lower returns than the returns for non-connected acquirers. Schweizer et al. (2017) find 
that politically connected acquirers in China generated lower returns than non-connected 
acquirers and are more likely to conduct cross-border acquisitions. Croci et al. (2017) further 
show that the acquisition process for politically connected target firms is lengthier and that they 
earn a higher premium from bidders lacking political expertise. However, it is unknown 
whether corporate political connections induce bidder risk-taking in mergers and acquisitions 
and whether the risk associated with a deal is a determinant of value creation for politically 
connected acquirers. 
       This paper tackles this literature gap and examines the association between corporate 
political connections and corporate risk-taking and the implications for shareholder value in 
the takeover setting. Mergers and acquisitions are one of the essential investments undertaken 
by a firm (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011) and might increase risk and change a firm's status 
quo (Datta et al., 2001). Therefore, the following questions are investigated here: First, do 
politically connected acquirers have higher equity return volatility around the M&A 
announcement period than non-connected acquirers? Secondly, do politically connected and 
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non-connected acquirers have stock return differentials in risk-increasing deals? Third, do 
political connections affect the bidder's financial policy after acquisitions? Finally, do political 
connections affect bidder acquisition behavior? 
       To address these questions, the paper employs a broad sample of UK acquisitions 
announced and completed over the period from 2007 to 2017. First, this chapter examines the 
association between corporate political connection and the change in bidder total risk around 
the acquisition announcement period and finds a positive association. The probability is 
examined for politically connected acquirers to generate a positive announcement CAR when 
they experience an increase in their total risk around the M&A announcement period. This is 
important, given that under perfect capital markets, firms should choose investments so as to 
maximise the market of the firm (Faccio, Marchica and Mura, 2016). The result from the logit 
regressions shows that politically connected acquirers are more likely to generate a positive 
CAR when their total risk increases around the M&A announcement period. This result is 
consistent with the prospect theory that predicts that the bottom line for managers is to maintain 
their market share, which is regarded as a fixed reference point (Wood, 2009). 
        The study further investigates market reaction to acquisitions announcement of both 
politically connected and non-connected acquirers. Specifically, the study partitioned the 
sample based on acquirers that experienced an increase or a decrease in their total risk around 
the acquisition announcement period. In both univariate and multivariate analysis, the resultant 
findings show that politically connected acquirers generated higher CAR than non-connected 
acquirers in risk-increasing deals but not in risk-decreasing deals. For robustness checks, the 
study investigates politically connected and non-connected acquirers CAR in deals that are 
arguably risky, such as deals that involves: bidders that purchased unlisted targets, bidders that 
purchased large targets, glamour acquirers, and frequent acquirers. The results show that 
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politically connected acquirers generated higher CAR than non-connected acquirers in each 
set, and the coefficients are statistically significant. 
       The study further employs instrumental variables and a propensity-score matching 
approach to address possible endogeneity in the empirical analysis. The results are robust in 
both approaches. The plausible explanation for the return differentials between politically 
connected and non-connected acquirers in deals with higher risk is that investors might 
perceive corporate political connections as a means to hedge uncertainty that might result from 
deals with higher risk. Risky deals might result in a bidder becoming a target, being financially 
constrained, and bidders might require government bailout funds in extreme cases. Investors 
have more significant incentives to prefer deals by politically connected acquirers when both 
deals by politically connected and non-connected acquirers are risky. For instance, if a bidder 
becomes a target, a study (see, Croci et al., 2017) shows that targets with political connections 
are more likely to command a higher premium for the shareholders. If an acquirer becomes 
financially constrained or requires a government bailout fund following an acquisition, the 
study by Faccio et al. (2006) shows that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed 
out compared with non-connected firms. Studies also suggest that politically connected 
acquirers have preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008), cheaper cost of equity 
(Boubakri et al., 2012; and Guedhami et al., 2013), and greater access to bank loans (Khwaja 
and Mian, 2005; Chen et al., 2013; Houston et al., 2014). 
      Also, the analysis was undertaken of the association between corporate political 
connections and bidder post-acquisition financial leverage. The results show that corporate 
political connections are positively associated with bidder financial leverage following M&A 
completion. The empirical results also show that politically connected acquirers purchased 
more targets from the regulated industries than non-connected acquirers. These findings 
furthermore show that political connections induce a greater propensity for acquirers to acquire 
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more deals (non-diversifying deals) that are less likely to reduce bidder default risk, consistent 
with Acharya et al. (2011), which suggests that risk-tolerant firms are less likely to diversify. 
Further analysis show they also acquired more deals than non-connected acquirers, consistent 
with Ferris et al. (2016). This suggests that politically connected acquirers' ability to purchase 
more deals relative to non-connected acquirers is not peculiar to the regulations and institutions 
in the USA. 
      This study makes vital contributions to the literature on corporate risk-taking, corporate 
political strategies, and M&A. First, this is the first study to the authors' knowledge to examine 
how the market assesses the impact of political connections on M&A performance at the 
announcement period. The study shows that connected acquirers generated higher CAR in risk-
increasing deals than non-connected acquirers, suggesting that investors perceive corporate 
political connections as a mechanism to hedge uncertainties that might arise from deals with 
higher risk. Second, it sheds new light on the role of political connections in corporate risk-
taking, providing empirical evidence of a positive relationship between corporate political 
connections and total bidder risk. Third, this is the first study to the authors' knowledge that 
attempts to shed light on the association between political connections and bidder post-
acquisition financial policy, which has not been addressed by previous studies. The research 
provides evidence that politically connected acquirers are more leveraged following M&A 
completion, suggesting that they exhibit less conservative financial policy following an 
acquisition. Fourth, it provides new evidence that politically connected acquirers are more 
likely to conduct non-diversifying deals that are less likely to reduce bidder default risk. Fourth, 
this paper offers new insight to the existing literature on the role of corporate political 
connections in M&A by showing that politically connected acquirers are more likely to acquire 
targets from the heavily regulated industries than non-connected acquirers.  
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         This research contributes to the existing literature. Brockman et al. (2013) examine the 
association between political connections and long-term bidder performance. This research 
examines the effect on bidder announcement stock returns and further shows that there are 
announcement stock return differentials between connected and non-connected acquirers in 
risk-increasing deals. Schweizer et al. (2017) examine politically connected acquirers' 
performance in China and find that they destroy shareholder value by engaging in cross-border 
acquisitions. This research employs a UK-based sample and finds that the politically connected 
acquirers outperformed non-connected acquirers in risk-increasing deals. Ferris et al. (2016) 
also examine politically connected acquirers in the USA and find that they pay a higher 
premium, acquire more target firms, and generate value. However, they did not consider the 
association between political connections and bidder total risk, bidder financial policy changes, 
the probability of acquiring targets in the heavily regulated industry, and bidder returns in deals 
with higher risk. This study fills this gap. The research is also close to the work of Boubakri et 
al. (2013) that examined the effect of political connections on corporate risk-taking—via 
Return on assets (ROA). They show that political connections are positively associated with 
corporate risk-taking. However, they did not examine political connections' effect on a firm's 
risk-taking in a mergers and acquisitions setting; this study fills this gap and examines the effect 
of political connections on a bidder's risk-taking (—via stock return volatility) and its 
implication for shareholder value in the takeover setting. This research traces the level of risk-
taking to bidder's policies and finds that corporate political connections are positively 
associated with bidder post-acquisition leverage, acquisition of targets from the regulated 
industries, number of deals acquired, and acquisition of deals (non-diversifying deals) that are 
less likely to decrease a bidder's default risk. 
        The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the research sample and 
the construction of variables employed in the empirical analysis. Section 3 examines the effect 
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of corporate political connections: on the change in bidder total risk, bidder returns 
announcement, changes in bidder post-acquisition leverage, and bidder acquisition behaviors. 
Section 4 reports the results from further robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 4.2 Sample and Data 
4.2.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
          This chapter employs M&A data from the UK market due to the following reasons: First, 
to the author’s knowledge, there are no published studies that addressed the benefits of political 
connections to acquirers in the UK. Also, following the US, the UK has the largest capital 
market in the world (Zhang, Sabherwal, Jayaraman and Ferris, 2016)  and most merger activity 
after the US, which represents more than 65% of all merger transactions in Europe (Doukas 
and Petmezas, 2007; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Also, acquirers are more likely to face 
antitrust litigation if they fail to comply with the regulatory institutions hence they have more 
need for political connections to gain merger approval. This is unlike Acquirers in countries 
with weaker institutions. They are less likely to face antitrust litigation and hence have less 
need for political connections to gain merger approval (Ferris, Houston and Javakhadze, 2016).  
The sample was made up of domestic M&A's announced and completed between January 1, 
2007, and December 31, 2017, from the Zephyr database, following Erel et al. (2015). This 
study chose an 11-year time-span to ensure sufficient data as well as the possibility to cover 
both economic cycles as well as the global financial crisis period. Huyghebaert and Luypaert 
(2010) observed that the Zephyr mergers and acquisition database has better coverage of 
European Acquisitions. To be included in the sample, there was a requirement that the relative 
size of the deal value to bidder size was at least 1%, and the deal value must be of the minimum 
value of £1 million. The acquirer owns less than 10% of the target company's stock before the 
acquisition and more than 50% after the deal. Finally, the acquiring firm must also have stock 
return data in the Thomson Reuters DataStream, from two days before to two days after the 
101 
 
acquisition announcement date. The application of these criteria yielded a total sample of 1,097 
deals, conducted by 530 public UK bidders. 
4.2.2 Measuring political connections 
     A bidder is categorized as a politically connected acquirer if at least one of its top officers 
or large shareholders formerly served in the government or industry regulator. An acquirer's 
political connection (PC) were measured using binary variables (PC dummy equals 1 and 0 
otherwise). 
4.2.3. Industry Patterns 
      Table 4.1 presents the number of acquisitions made by politically connected and non-
connected acquirers across industries using the Fama-French 12 industry classification scheme. 
The final sample consists of 1,097 acquisitions, where 447 (40.75%) acquisitions were 
conducted by 199 politically connected firms and 650 (59.25%) by 331 non-connected firms. 
The proportion of acquisitions conducted by politically connected firms relative to non-
connected firms is higher in the telecommunication and utility industries. The subsample shows 
that the percentage of the total acquisitions conducted by politically connected acquirers in the 
heavily regulated industries is higher than non-connected acquirers, consistent with the 
findings in Ferris et al. (2016).  
[Please Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
4.2.4 Summary statistics. 
     Table 4.2 compares bidder and deal-specific characteristics between politically connected 
and non-connected acquirers. Panel A reports that politically connected acquirers' average 
market size (2,260.390 million GBP) is significantly (p-value < 0.01) higher than the average 
market size (383.500 million GBP) of non-connected acquirers. Moeller et al. (2004) find that 
acquirer size is negatively related to the M&A announcement CAR. Politically connected firms 
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appear to have a higher (2.812) market-to-book (MTB) value compared with that of non-
connected acquirers (2.791), consistent with the findings of Ferris et al. (2016). The average 
Tobin's q for the full sample is 1.756. Politically connected acquirers (1.685) appear to have a 
lower mean Tobin's q relative to non-connected acquirers (1.806), and the mean difference is 
statistically significant. Politically connected acquirers have significantly higher collateral 
relative to non-connected acquirers. Politically connected acquirers (0.181) are also more 
leveraged than non-connected acquirers (0.163), consistent with the results in Faccio (2010). 
Maloney et al. (1993) find a positive association between acquirer leverage and M&A 
announcement CAR. The mean returns on assets (ROA) in the total sample is 0.056. Politically 
connected acquirers (0.086) earned higher returns on assets (ROA) compared to non-connected 
acquirers (0.034), being consistent with the sample characteristics in Ferris et al. (2016). 
Politically connected acquirer's cash holding (0.131) is less than that of non-connected 
acquirers (0.144). This suggests that connected firms are more likely to have higher credit 
ratings or greater access to the capital markets (see, Opler, 1999). Politically connected 
acquirers have a lower stock run-up and Sigma compared with non-connected acquirers. On 
average, concerning blockholder ownership, connected acquirer's blockholder ownership 
(22.45%) is significantly lower than non-connected acquirer's blockholder ownership 
(25.675%). The difference is because politically connected acquirers in the sample tend to be 
relatively large firms and have more widely dispersed ownership, while non-connected 
acquirers tend to be relatively small firms and have relatively more concentrated ownership.  
                [Please Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
    Panel B shows that the deal-specific features of politically connected and non-connected 
acquirers are quite different. For instance, the average deal value conducted by politically 
connected acquirers (258.470 million GBP) is significantly higher than that of non-connected 
acquirers (25.480 million GBP). Politically connected acquirers (23%) purchased more targets 
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in the heavily regulated industries compared with non-connected acquirers (16.2%), and the 
difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). The average size of a target relative to 
the bidder (relative size) is higher for non-connected acquirers (0.457) and lower for politically 
connected acquirers (0.266). Fuller et al. (2002) document that bidder and relative target size 
is positively associated with acquirer CAR in unlisted target acquisitions and negatively 
associated with bidder CAR in listed target acquisitions. The full sample suggests that the UK 
bidders acquired more unlisted targets (90.1%) than listed targets (9.9%), consistent with 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) that show that the bulk of M&A in the UK consists of unlisted 
targets. The number of listed and unlisted targets purchased by politically connected and non-
connected acquirers appears to be indifferent. Faccio et al. (2006) find that unlisted targets' 
acquirers generated higher announcement mean CAR relative to acquirers of listed targets. 
Non-connected acquirers (51.5%) purchased more diversifying deals than politically connected 
acquirers (40.9%), and the mean difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). 
Politically connected firms (66.5%) made more all-cash payments relative to non-connected 
acquirers (56%). Whereas non-connected acquirers (23.7%) made more all-stock payments 
than politically connected acquirers (7.5%). Politically connected acquirers (26%) made more 
mixed cash and stock payments than non-connected acquirers (20.3%), and the difference is 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). Panel B also shows that politically connected 
acquirers' average announcement CAR is higher than that of non-connected acquirers, 
consistent with Ferris et al.'s (2016) findings. However, the difference is statistically 
insignificant and consistent with Brockman et al. (2013) that document but does not show that 
the difference between the M&A announcement CAR for politically connected and non-





4.2.5 Time-series distribution of the sample 
    Table 4.3 compares the number of acquisitions and deal values between politically connected 
and non-connected acquirers across the sample years. Politically connected firms acquired 
more firms in 2007, whereas non-connected acquirers purchased more firms in 2015. The 
number of acquisitions for connected and non-connected acquirers decreased significantly in 
the year 2008 and 2009, possibly due to the global financial crisis. The average deal value is 
higher for connected acquirers over the years and in both subsamples. Moreover, the difference 
remains statistically significant across the years in the sample, except in 2012 and 2016. 
                              [Please Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
4.3 Empirical findings 
4.3.1 Corporate Political Connections, Acquisition Riskiness, and Success 
       In table 4.4, this study investigates the association between corporate political connections 
and the change in the bidder's total risk. This chapter further examines the probability of 
politically connected and non-connected acquirers to generate a positive CAR in either risk-
increasing or decreasing deals. Cain and McKeon (2016) document that firms with greater 
stock return volatility are "riskier" than firms with low stock return volatility. Boubakri et al. 
(2013) document a positive association between corporate political connections and firms' risk-
taking proxied by firm profitability (ROA). Consistent with this evidence, this chapter 
anticipates corporate political connections to be positively associated with the change in bidder 
total risks around the acquisition announcement period. In the spirit of Croci and Petmezas 
(2015), change in bidder total risk is computed as the bidder standard deviation of daily (excess) 
stock returns over the event window (− 30, + 30) days around acquisition announcement minus 
the one over the period (− 120, − 60) days before the deal announcement date. Excess stock 




     This research employs OLS multivariate regression to examine the change in the total bidder 
risk around the acquisition announcement period. Also, it examines the likelihood for 
politically connected acquirers to generate a positive CAR, when their total risk increase or 
decrease around acquisitions announcement period using logistic regression. Following Guay 
(1999) and Cain and McKeon (2016), this study controls leverage, firm size, and other bidders‐ 
and-deal‐specific characteristics that could plausibly affect stock return volatility. Year and 
industry fixed effects were included to control for unobserved systematic differences. Column 
(1) indicates that politically connected acquirers experienced a positive and statistically 
significant increase in their stock return volatility. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on 
the political connections indicator is positive and statistically significant for the excess stock 
return volatility. These suggest that corporate political connections are positively associated 
with increased bidder total risk around the acquisition announcement period. 
                                   [Please Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
      Column (3) through (6) presents the results from the logistic regression. The dependent 
variable takes the value one (1) if a bidder announcement (-2, +2) stock return is positive and 
zero otherwise. For the raw return volatility, column (3) shows that the coefficient on 
the political connection indicator is negative in risk-decreasing deals whereas, column (4) 
reports that the coefficient on the political connection indicator is positive and statistically 
significant in risk-increasing deals. For the excess return volatility, column (5) shows that the 
coefficient on the political connection indicator is negative in risk-decreasing deals whereas, 
column (6) reports that the coefficient on the political connection indicator is positive and 
statistically significant in risk-increasing deals. This suggests that politically connected 




      Overall, this section provides evidence that corporate political connections are positively 
associated with the change in bidder total risk around the M&A announcement period and the 
probability of generating a positive stock return in risk-increasing deals. 
4.3.2 Market Reaction to Acquisitions by Politically Connected and Non-
Connected Bidders Conditional on Deals with Greater Risk: Univariate 
Analysis. 
       Having shown that politically connected acquirers are more likely to generate positive 
CAR in risk-increasing deals. Next, the study examines, in a univariate setting, the 
announcement average CAR of acquirers whose total risk increased or decreased over the 
period 30 days before to 30 days after M&A announcement date, relative to 120 days to 60 
days before M&A announcement date. Acquirer CARs is estimated using the market adjusted 
model and the FTSE All-Share Index as the market benchmark. Following Fuller et al. (2002) 
and Faccio et al. (2006), this study employs a short event window period to determine whether 
an acquisition announcement creates value for the shareholders. Andrade et al. (2001) argue 
that short-term event windows produce a statistically reliable source of evidence on whether 
M&A creates value for the shareholders. 
       Table 4.5 shows whether there are announcement return differentials between politically 
connected and non-connected bidders in risk-increasing deals. Panel AA, column (1) show that 
acquirers that experienced an increase in their total risk around the acquisition announcement 
period generated a higher announcement mean CAR, relative to those that experienced a 
decrease in their total risk. Acquirers are classified into politically connected and non-
connected acquirers in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The results show that politically 
connected acquirers that experienced an increase in their total risk generated a higher CAR 
compared with non-connected acquirers that experienced an increase in their total risk. The 
difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. The results also show that 
politically connected acquirers whose total risk decreased around the acquisition 
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announcement period earned a higher mean CAR relative to non-connected acquirers that 
experienced a decrease in their total risk and that the difference is statistically insignificant. 
For a robustness test, the study re-estimated the bidder CAR in risk-increasing deals, when the 
bidder's total risk around the acquisition announcement period is estimated using a different 
event window ((-20, +40) – (-120, -60)) period. The results in panel AB remaining 
qualitatively, similar to the results in panel AA.  
[Please Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
      To further test the proposition that politically connected acquirers' announcement stock 
returns are higher relative to that of non-connected acquirers in deals with greater risk. This 
chapter estimates the announcement CAR for politically connected and non-connected 
acquirers in deals that are arguably risky. This is precisely the case of: I) unlisted target 
acquisition; II) large deal acquisition; III) glamour acquirers; and IV) frequent acquirers. Table 
4.5, panel B presents the results from the univariate analysis. 
4.3.2.1 CARs by Deals with Greater Risk of Information Asymmetry 
(Unlisted target acquirers) 
      For unlisted target acquisitions, Capron and Shen (2007) and Officer (2007) suggest that 
information asymmetry is less prominent in listed target acquisitions compared with unlisted 
target acquisitions. Following Croci and Petmezas (2015), this study classifies unlisted target 
acquisitions as riskier than listed target acquisitions. In panel BA, column (1), it shows that 
unlisted target acquirers generated higher CAR compared with listed target acquirers and is 
consistent with the results in Faccio et al. (2006). Listed target acquirers are classified into 
politically connected and non-connected acquirers in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The 
results show that politically connected acquirers of unlisted targets earned higher CAR 
compared with non-connected acquirers of unlisted targets, and the difference is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The results further show that politically connected acquirers 
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of listed targets underperformed relative to non-connected acquirers of listed targets, and the 
difference is insignificant. 
4.3.2.2 CARs by Deals with Higher Risk Exposure (Frequent acquirers) 
      Concerning infrequent and frequent acquirers, Croci and Petmezas (2015) document that 
acquisitions are risk-increasing corporate investments; thus, bidders' risks increase following 
an acquisition. Therefore frequent acquirers are more exposed to an increase in total risk 
compared with infrequent acquirers. Frequent acquirers are defined as firms that acquired five 
or more targets within three years in the sample, and infrequent acquirers as firms that acquired 
less than five targets in any three years (following Fuller et al., 2002). Classifying bidders into 
frequent and infrequent acquirers might also serve as a form of endogeneity control, given that 
firms that acquired five or more firms within three years are more likely to have more exposure 
to regulatory delay and litigation risk. As a result, frequent acquirers might have a greater need 
for regulatory oversight, non-public information regarding regulatory delay or denial over a 
potential acquisition, and unique insights that political connections can provide. In panel BB, 
column (1) shows that infrequent acquirers generated higher CAR relative to frequent 
acquirers. When acquirers are segmented into politically connected and non-connected in 
column (2) and (3), respectively, the results show that non-connected frequent acquirers 
significantly underperform compared to politically connected frequent acquirers, by an average 
of 1.48 percent. The results also show an insignificant difference between the CAR for non-
connected infrequent acquirers and connected infrequent acquirers. 
4.3.2.3 CARs by Deals with Higher Risk of Value Destruction (Glamour 
acquirers) 
      Regarding value and glamour acquirers, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) document that glamour 
acquirers are less likely to face stricter scrutiny from their directors and large shareholders 
before conducting an acquisition; they are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions, 
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unlike value acquirers. Following Cain and McKeon (2016), the study partition acquirers by 
glamour and value acquirers. In the spirit of Datta et al. (2001), glamour acquirers are defined 
as those acquirers with book-to-market equity below or at the median, while value firms are 
those with book-to-market equity above the median. In Panel BC, the univariate test shows that 
(in column (1)) glamour acquirers generated higher CAR than value acquirers at the acquisition 
announcement period, consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis. However, when acquirers 
are categorized into politically connected and non-connected in column (2) and (3), 
respectively, the result shows that politically connected glamour acquirers significantly 
outperform non-connected glamour acquirers, by an average of 1.11 percent. The results also 
show an insignificant difference between the CAR for politically connected value acquirers 
and non-connected value acquirers.  
4.3.2.4 CARs by Deals with Higher Integration Complexity (Large deals) 
      Concerning large deals, Alexandridis et al. (2013) document that acquirers are less likely 
to realize economic benefits from large deals, given that large deals are associated with higher 
integration complexity. Following Croci and Petmezas (2015), this study classifies large deals 
as riskier than small deals. To include unlisted target acquirers, bidders were partitioned by the 
target's relative size into three terciles for the calendar year in which the acquisition was 
announced (following Fuller et al. 2002). In Panel BD, column (1) shows that large deal 
acquirers generated higher CAR compared with acquirers of medium and small deals. Column 
(2) and (3) shows that both politically connected and non-connected acquirers of large deals 
generated a positive mean CAR. However, politically connected acquirers of large targets 
generated higher CAR than non-connected acquirers of large targets, and the difference is 
statistically significant. The results remained qualitatively similar when they both acquire a 
medium deal. However, the mean CAR difference for politically connected and non-connected 
acquirers of small deals is statistically insignificant. 
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       Overall, the results suggest that politically connected acquirers' announcement stock 
returns are higher than those of the non-connected acquirers in deals with greater risk on a 
univariate basis.  
4.3.3 Market Reaction to Acquisitions by Politically Connected and Non-
connected Bidders Conditional on deals with greater risk: Multivariate 
Analysis. 
      In the previous section, the research findings show, on a univariate basis, that politically 
connected acquirers generated higher CAR than non-connected acquirers in deals with greater 
risk. To explore this observation further, the research examines whether the effect of political 
connections on bidder CARs in deals with higher risks will survive in a multivariate setting. 
The dependable variable is the five-day (-2, +2) CAR. The explanatory variable is an indicator 
of whether the acquirer is politically connected (1) or not (0). As per studies by Golubov et al. 
(2012) and Faccio et al. (2006), deal and bidder characteristics were included in the regression. 
These include the acquirer's market-to-book value; an indicator for whether the deal was a pure 
cash offer (1) or not (0); an indicator for whether the deal was a pure stock offer (1) or not (0), 
the natural log of the acquirers' size (market value of equity one month before the acquisition 
announcement). An indicator as to whether the acquirer is from a heavily regulated (SIC codes 
4900-4999 or 6000-6999) industry (1) or not (0). This study also considers the acquirer's 
collateral, ROA, leverage, and cash holdings, all of which are measured at the fiscal year-end, 
before deal announcement. The stock price run-up, which is the acquirer's buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted return, measured from 205 days to 6 days before the announcement date, was 
included.  
         Faccio et al. (2006) document that bidder's CARs are higher when a bidder acquires 
unlisted firms than listed target acquisitions. Therefore, the study includes an indicator of 
whether the target is unlisted (1) or not (0). Moeller et al. (2007) document that the bidders 
with higher sigma generate higher acquisition announcement CARs. Sigma is measured as the 
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standard deviation of the acquiring firm's market‐adjusted daily returns from DataStream over 
the period beginning 205 and ending six days before the deal announcement.  
         Maquieira et al. (1998) find that bidder's CARs are higher in non-diversifying 
acquisitions than diversifying acquisitions. Therefore, this study includes an indicator variable 
to detect whether the acquirer and the target have the same two SIC codes (1) or not (0). For 
the USA acquirers, Golubov et al. (2015) documented that the acquirer and relative target size 
is positively correlated with bidder CAR. Also, Bae et al. (2002) found similar results for 
Korean acquirers. Acquirer's relative size (Deal value scaled by the acquirer market value of 
equity) was included in the independent variables to control this factor. 
         Table 4.6 presents the results from the multivariate regression. Column (1) shows a 
positive association between corporate political connections and acquirers announcement CAR 
for all acquisitions, consistent with Ferris et al.'s (2016) results. Column (2) shows that the 
coefficient on the political connections indicator for bidders that experienced a decrease in 
their total risk is lower, whereas, in column (3), the coefficient on the political connections 
indicator for acquirers whose total risk increased is higher and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The results in column (4) and column (5) remained qualitatively similar 
with the results in column (2) and (3), respectively, when a change in the bidder total risk 
around the acquisition announcement period is estimated using a different event window ((-20, 
+40) – (-120, -60)) period. 
                              [Please Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
    For the listed target acquirers subsample, column (6) shows that the coefficient for 
the politically connected (1/0) indicator is negative, whereas the unlisted target acquirers 
subsample in column (7) shows a positive and significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficient for 
the politically connected (1/0) indicator. For the value and glamour acquirers, column (8) 
reveals that political connections had no impact in the value acquirers subsample, whereas 
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column (9) shows that political connections had a positive and significant (p-value < 0.05) 
effect on the dependent variable. For the infrequent acquirer's subsample, column (10) shows 
that the effect of political connections on the dependent variable is insignificant, whereas 
column (11) suggests that the effect of political connections on the dependent variable is 
positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) at the conventional levels. For the deal 
size, column (12) shows that the coefficient on the political connections indicator for acquirers 
of small deals is positive and statistically insignificant, whereas column (13) shows that the 
coefficient on the political connections indicator is positive and statistically significant for 
acquirers of medium deals. Column (14) shows that politically connected acquirers of large 
deals earned higher and a statistically significant mean CAR. In summary, the findings are 
consistent with the proposition that the announcement CAR is higher for politically connected 
acquirers relative to non-connected acquirers in deals with higher levels of risk. 
4.3.4 Market Reaction to Acquisitions by Politically Connected and Non-
Connected Bidders Conditional on the Change in Total Bidder Risk: 
Instrumental variable and Propensity Score Matched Sample. 
       To address the issue of reverse causality within bidder returns, the study employs 
instrumental variable estimation, using the bidder headquarters' location as the instrumental 
variable for political connection following, Boubakri et al. (2012) and Boubakri et al. (2013). 
Table 4.7 presents the results. In column (1), probit estimation has been used to predict political 
connection, where CAPITAL is a dummy variable that equals one if the bidder's headquarters' 
location is in London. The results show that the instrument is positive and statistically 
significant. In column (2), the first-stage fitted values are included for political connections in 
the second stage OLS regression. The result shows that the instrumented value of Political 
connections is positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting no effect from political 
connections on acquirer's announcement return in risk-decreasing deals. For the risk-increasing 
deals, the process is repeated in column (3) and (4), respectively. The results in column (3) 
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show that the instrument is a good predictor of political connections. Column (4) suggests that 
the instrumented value of political connections is positive and statistically significant at the 
conventional levels, suggesting that political connections are positively associated with bidder 
announcement returns in risk-increasing deals. 
[Please Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
             To further examine the main finding that political connections are positively associated 
with bidder announcement returns in risk-increasing deals, a propensity score matching method 
was employed to address potential selection bias and control for the observable difference (e.g., 
Bidder size) between politically connected and non-connected bidders. In the spirit of 
Brockman et al. (2013), the study estimated the propensity score, using a comprehensive set of 
bidder characteristics that drive the likelihood of a bidding firm towards being politically 
connected. Specifically, the variables, following Brockman et al. (2013), including leverage, 
bidder size, market-to-book ratio, a dummy variable indicating whether the bidding firms 
headquarter is located in the capital (London), and a dummy variable indicating whether the 
bidding firm is from a heavily regulated industry (i.e., SIC is in 6000-6999 or 4900-4999). For 
each politically connected acquirer, the study selected one non-connected acquirer with the 
closest propensity (based on the propensity score) of having political connections. Finally, the 
study regressed the bidder announcement returns in both risk-increasing and decreasing deals, 
separately. Table 4.7, column (6), shows a positive association between political connections 
and bidder announcement returns in risk-increasing deals. 
4.3.5 Corporate Political connections and Post-Acquisition Financial 
Leverage 
        Target firms are often acquired because they are financially constrained (Erel et al., 2015). 
As such, a bidder might borrow more to relieve the acquired firms' financial constraints. 
Therefore, the study examines the relationship between corporate political connections and 
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bidder post-acquisition financial leverage changes. Cain and McKeon (2016) argue that 
leverage increasing transactions increase a firm's risk, whereas Phan (2014) documented that 
higher financial leverage increases a firm's risk of default. It is anticipated that corporate 
political connections are positively associated with bidder post-acquisition leverage, given that 
political connections induce firms to undertake more risk (Boubakri et al., 2013), connected 
firms have preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008), and potentially lower costs 
for bank loans (Houston et al., 2014). 
      Table 4.8 presents the results for the change in the acquirer's post-acquisition financial 
leverage. The dependent variable is the change in the acquirer's industry-adjusted book 
leverage (ΔIALEV), calculated as the difference between an acquirer's industry-adjusted book 
leverage in the second year after merger completion and its specific industry adjusted book 
leverage in the year before acquisition announcement (following Phan, 2014). Industry-
adjusted book leverage is examined as the difference between an acquirer's book leverage and 
its 2-digit industry SIC code median book leverage. 
      Bidder‐ and-deal‐specific characteristics as control variables were included. Also, other 
variables that were identified to affect leverage from other studies (Harford et al., 2009; Phan, 
2014), such as Cash-ratio and Pre-bid Book Leverage, were also included. 
                               [Please Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
    In column (1), the coefficient on the political connections’ indicator is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) at the conventional levels. The result remains 
qualitatively similar after including industry fixed effects in column (2). This indicates that 
political connections are positively associated with higher post-acquisition leverage. The 
results also show that collateral, market-to-book ratio, returns on assets (ROA), and cash ratio 
are all positive and significantly associated with debt increases after acquisition completion. 
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Whereas cash-holding and pre-bid book leverage had a strong negative association with debt 
increase after M&A completion. 
4.3.6 Political Connections and Bidder Acquisition Behaviour 
        In this section, the study examined the acquisition behavior of politically connected 
acquirers. Specifically, this chapter investigates whether connected acquirers are: i) more likely 
to acquire targets from the heavily regulated industries than non-connected acquirers; ii) more 
likely to conduct non-diversifying deals; iii) more likely to acquire more domestic firms than 
non-connected acquirers. Concerning target firms in the regulated industry, Ferris et al. (2016) 
suggest that firms with SIC codes 4900-4999 (Utilities) or 6000-6999 (financial services) are 
heavily regulated compared with other firms in other industries. Acquisitions involving firms 
from the regulated industry sectors might attract greater regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, 
acquirers of targets in the heavily regulated industries might benefit from the regulatory 
oversight that political connections provide. It is anticipated that the acquisition of targets in 
the heavily regulated industry is positively associated with bidder political connections.  
       For non-diversifying acquisitions, Ferris et al. (2016) document that non-diversifying deals 
are more likely to increase market or industry concentration and are more likely to be opposed 
by the regulators than diversifying deals. However, this study anticipates that non-diversifying 
acquisitions are positively associated with corporate political activity given that politically 
connected acquirers enjoy regulatory oversight (Ferris et al. 2016) and are more likely to have 
access to non-public knowledge regarding the M&A regulatory process.  
        Regarding the number of acquisitions, this study examines whether political connections 
motivate connected firms to be acquisitive given that political connections provide firms with 
regulatory oversight, non-public information as regards M&A regulation, unique insights, and 




        Table 4.9 presents the results of the analysis. In column (1), the dependent variable takes 
a value of one (1) if the target firm is from the heavily regulated industry and zero (0) otherwise. 
In column (2), the dependent variable takes a value of one (1) if the acquirer and target belong 
to the same 2-digit SIC code industries and zero (0) otherwise. In columns (3) through (6), the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of domestic acquisitions each 
firm makes from the year 2007 to 2017 (following Ferris et al., 2016). The explanatory variable 
is a politically connected indicator that takes the value of one (1) if the acquiring firm is 
politically connected and zero (0) if not. The study controls for deal‐and-acquirer-specific 
characteristics, industry, and year fixed effects. Column (1) shows that the coefficient on the 
political connections’ indicator is positive (0.2187) and statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) 
at the conventional levels. This result suggests that politically connected acquirers are more 
likely to acquire targets from the heavily regulated industry sectors.  
                                  [Please Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
      Column (2) presents the results for non-diversifying acquisitions. The coefficient in 
political connections indicator is positive (0.1983) and statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). 
Two possible explanations arise from this result. First, politically connected acquirers might 
prefer to conduct fewer diversifying deals given that the knowledge of the former politician or 
former regulator on their board is more beneficial (Ferris et al., 2016) when conducting non-
diversifying acquisitions. On the other hand, the direction regarding the riskiness for 
diversifying deals is unclear. For instance, Acharya et al. (2011) and Phan (2014) argue that 
diversifying M&A deals is a means of reducing a firm's default risk. In contrast, Croci and 
Petmezas (2015) argue that diversifying deals might be risky for managers because they are 
outside of their expertise and are likely to have less information and knowledge of the target 
firm industry. Therefore politically connected acquirers might prefer to trade off default risk 
for corporate value, given that they are more likely to be bailed out by the government than 
117 
 
non-connected firms (Faccio et al., 2006), they have preferential access to finance (Claessens 
et al., 2008) and lower costs for bank loans (Houston et al., 2014).  
            Column (3) suggests that politically connected firms make more domestic acquisitions 
than non-connected firms, consistent with Ferris et al.'s (2016) results. The result appears to 
persist after controlling for industry and year fixed effects in column (4). For the robustness 
check, the analysis was repeated using a Tobit model since the number of bids is truncated at 
zero (Ferris et al., 2016). The results in column (5) and (6) remain qualitatively similar to that 
in column (3) and (4), respectively.   
        In summary, there is a positive association between the acquiring firm's political 
connections and the number of domestic acquisitions the firm makes. This section's results are 
also consistent with the proposition that the likelihood of acquiring deals that might be 
disapproved or might attract greater regulatory scrutiny is higher for politically connected 
firms. 
4.4 Additional Robustness Check: 
4.4.1. Association between Political Connections and total bidder risk: 
instrumental variable regressions  
          To address the issue of reverse causality within bidder risk-taking. The study requires an 
instrument related to the political connections but uncorrelated with corporate risk-taking, 
except through independent variables for which the study controls. Following Boubakri et al. 
(2012) and Boubakri et al. (2013), the instrumental variable is the bidder's headquarters' 
location. Table 4.10 presents the results. The principal regression is: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(PoliticalConnections𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0+𝛼𝛼1CAPITAL𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼2firmCharacteristics-1+a3deal 





where Political Connectionsi dummy, the dependent variables in the regressions, equals one if 
an issuer i has a former politician on its board. CAPITAL, the key explanatory variables, is the 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the bidder's headquarters is in London. Firm and deal 
characteristics are the full set of the control variables. 
          In column (1), the study uses a probit estimation to predict political connections where 
CAPITAL is a dummy variable that equals one if the bidder's headquarters is in London. The 
results show that the instrument is positive and statistically significant. In column (2), the first-
stage fitted values for political connections in the second stage OLS regression are included. 
The result shows that the instrumented value for Political connections is positive and 
statistically significant at the conventional levels, suggesting that politically connected 
acquirers have more return volatility around the M&A announcement period. This process is 
repeated in columns (3) and (4) for the excess return volatility, respectively. The results in 
column (3) show that the instrument is a good predictor of political connections. Column (4) 
suggests that the instrumented value of Political connections is positive and statistically 
significant at the conventional levels, suggesting that political connections are positively 
associated with bidder excess return volatility around the M&A announcement period. 
                       [Please Insert Table 4.10 about here] 
4.4.2 Other Sensitivity Tests 
       To further confirm that politically connected acquirers generated higher CAR than non-
connected acquirers in deals with greater risk, other sensitivity tests were conducted: (1) using 
Buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns; (2) excluding acquirers of targets from highly 
regulated industries (SIC codes 6000‐6999 and 4900‐4999); (3) by using different 
announcement period stock return windows such as (−1, +1) and (-1,+2), (4) by grouping 
bidders by their size (large and small bidders following Faccio et al. (2006)). The results remain 





       Consistent with the empirical evidence (Boubakri et al., 2013) that corporate political 
connection induces firm risk-taking, this paper provides evidence on the link between corporate 
political connections and bidder risk-taking in M&A and its implication for shareholders' value. 
Specifically, corporate political connections are positively associated with higher equity return 
volatility around the M&A announcement period and with higher bidder gains in risk-
increasing deals, but not in risk-decreasing deals. The effect of political connections on bidder 
returns in risky deals persists regardless of whether the study measures risky deals as deals 
involving unlisted targets, large deals, frequent acquirers, or glamour acquirers. The 
enhancement in politically connected bidder's returns in risk-increasing deals indicates that 
investors perceive political connections as a means to hedge uncertainty from risky deals. 
Notably, the differential effect of corporate political connection on bidder gains in risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing deals is attributed to the incentives that political connections 
can provide. Such incentives include but are not limited to cheaper costs of bank loans (Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) and equity capital (Boubakri et al., 2012; Guedhami et al., 2013), preferential 
access to a bank loan (Claessens et al., 2008), access to government bailout funds (Faccio et 
al., 2006), higher premiums during the takeover (Croci et al., 2017). 
      The bidder post-acquisition financial leverage is also considered, and the study finds a 
positive association between corporate political connections and bidder post-acquisition 
financial leverage. The research findings also indicate that politically connected acquirers take 
advantage of their connections, insights, non-public information regarding M&A regulations, 
and regulatory oversights by conducting higher non-diversifying acquisitions, acquiring more 




        In response to the questions highlighted in the introduction, these results suggest that (1) 
corporate politically connections increase bidder total risk and politically connected acquirers 
are more likely to generate higher returns in risk-increasing deals; (2) Politically connected 
acquirers are less conservative with their financial policy following an acquisition. Specifically, 
corporate political connections are positively associated with bidder post-acquisition financial 
leverage; (3) Political connections affect the bidder acquisition behaviors. In particular, 
politically connected bidders are more likely to acquire more firms, are less likely to diversify, 















Appendix C: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A:   Acquirer characteristics 
Political connections A dummy variable that equals 1 if an acquiring firm has a former politician or former 
industry regulator as a top officer or large shareholder and 0 otherwise. 
Size  The acquiring firm’s market value of equity (in GBP) 4 weeks prior to M&A 
announcement (DataStream). 
Book-to-market Book value of equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition announcement 
divided by the market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Data is from DataStream. 
Leverage  Measured as acquirer total debt over total assets for the fiscal year ending prior to the 
announcement obtained from DataStream. 
Collateral The ratio of firm's property, plant and equipment to total assets at the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from DataStream 
Sigma Acquiring firm’s standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns (DataStream) 




((Total assets + Market value of common equity − Book value of common 
equity)/Total assets) Data from the DataStream 
Cash holding  Cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets  
ROA The ratio of EBITDA to total assets (DataStream) 
% Blockholder ownership Overall holding of a minimum of 5% of the bidders stock (Zephyr database). 
Cash ratio The ratio of cash and equivalents to the book value of assets at the beginning of the 
year. 
Stock Run-up  The bidder market‐adjusted buy‐and‐hold stock return (DataStream) computed over 
the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days before M&A announcement date 
from the Zephyr database. 
Panel B:  Deal characteristics 
Deal value transaction value in £ million (Zephyr database) 
Relative size Deal value (Zephyr database) scaled by acquirer market value of equity (DataStream) 
Unlisted target (1/0) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm is not listed on a stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise (Zephyr database) 
Listed target (1/0) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm is listed on a stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise (Zephyr database) 
Diversifying Deals (1/0) A dummy  variable that takes the value of 1 if the 2-digit primary SIC code of the 
acquirer is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise (Zephyr database) 
All-cash deal (1/0) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the acquiring firm used only cash as a 
method of payment and 0 otherwise (Zephyr database) 
All-shares deal (1/0) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the acquiring firm used only stock as a 
method of payment and 0 otherwise (Zephyr database) 
Mixed payment (1/0) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the acquiring firm used both stock and 
cash as a method of payment and 0 otherwise (Zephyr database) 
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Regulated target A dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is from either utility (Primary SIC code 
4900–4999) or finance industry ( Primary SIC code 6000–6999) and 0 otherwise 
(Zephyr database) 
CAR(-2,+2) This is the modified market adjusted cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring 
firm's stock computed over the period beginning 2 days before and ending 2 days 





























Table 4.1. Industry patterns  
This table presents descriptive statistic of the domestic acquisitions conducted by connected and non-
connected acquirers across industries based on Fama-French 12-industry classification. Regulated firms 
are defined as firms with standard industry classification (SIC) codes 4900-4999 or 6000-6999. The 
sample period is from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2017 for UK acquirers of domestic targets. 






N % N % N % 
NoDur Consumer nondurables 61 5.56 31 6.94 30 4.62 
Durbl Consumer durables 7 0.64 2 0.45 5 0.77 
Manuf Manufacturing 55 5.01 16 3.57 39 6 
Enrgy Oil, gas, and coal extraction and 
products 
29 2.64 19 4.25 10 1.54 
Chems Chemicals and allied products 8 0.73 5 1.12 3 0.46 
BusEq Business equipment 204 18.6 59 13.2 145 22.31 
Telcm Telephone and television 
transmission 
10 0.91 6 1.34 4 0.62 
Utils Utilities 15 1.37 12 2.69 3 0.46 
Shops Wholesale, retail, and some services 100 9.12 57 12.75 43 6.61 
Hlth Healthcare, medical equipment, and 
drugs 
37 3.37 18 4.03 19 2.92 
Money Finance 193 17.59 91 20.35 102 15.69 
Other Other (Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, 
Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment) 
378 34.46 131 29.31 247 38 
Subsample: 
      
Unregulated industries 889 81.04 344 76.96 545 83.85 
Regulated industries (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 
6000-6999) 
208 18.96 103 23.04 105 16.15 
Total 
 













Table 4.2. Summary statistics. 
The table compares bidder and deal-specific characteristics between politically connected and non-
connected acquirers. The sample of the UK domestic M&A is from the Zephyr M&A database for the 
period 01/01/2007 to 31/12/2017.  Deal and bidder characteristics are defined in Appendix A.  
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 99th and 1st percentiles. *, **, and *** denote significance 









N Mean N Mean N Mean Difference 
(2) - (3) 
P-value 
(2) - (3) 
Acquirer characteristics 
Firm size (£ 
million) 
1097 1148.291 447 2260.390 650 383.500 1876.898*** 0.000 
MTB 1054 2.800 434 2.812 620 2.791 0.021 0.453 
Tobin's Q 1054 1.756 434 1.685 620 1.806 -0.121** 0.044 
Collateral 1043 0.153 429 0.176 614 0.136 0.039*** 0.001 
Leverage 1052 0.171 432 0.181 620 0.163 0.017* 0.076 
ROA 1028 0.056 423 0.086 605 0.034 0.052*** 0.003 
Cash Holding 1031 0.139 416 0.131 615 0.144 -0.012 0.123 
Stock Run-up 1055 0.082 432 0.069 623 0.092 -0.024 0.174 
Sigma 1055 0.023 432 0.020 623 0.024 -0.004*** 0.000 
% Blockholder 
Ownership 
1092 24.359 446 22.452 646 25.675 -3.223** 0.013 
Deal characteristics 
Deal Value (£ 
million) 
1097 120.418 447 258.470 650 25.480 232.990*** 0.004 
Heavily 
Regulated deals  
(1/0) 
1097 0.211 447 0.230 650 0.162 0.056** 0.014 
Relative Size 1097 0.379 447 0.266 650 0.457 -0.191*** 0.004 
Listed Deals 
(1/0) 
1097 0.099 447 0.098 650 0.100 -0.002 0.466 
Unlisted  Deals 
(1/0) 
1097 0.901 447 0.902 650 0.900 0.002 0.466 
Diversifying 
Deals (1/0) 
1097 0.430 447 0.409 650 0.515 -0.107*** 0.000 
All-Cash Deals 
(1/0) 
1097 0.604 447 0.665 650 0.560 0.105*** 0.000 
All-Shares Deals 
(1/0) 
1097 0.108 447 0.075 650 0.237 -0.162*** 0.001 
Mixed Deals 
(1/0) 
1097 0.288 447 0.260 650 0.203 0.057*** 0.000 






Table 4.3 Time-series distribution of the sample 
 
Politically Connected Non-connected Difference (1) - (2) 
N Deal Value (£ million) 
(1) 




All years 447 258.47 650 25.48 0.0039 
2007 68 65.51 69 10.49 0.0000 
2008 46 22.60 54 10.13 0.0023 
2009 21 56.82 35 14.32 0.0261 
2010 28 159.81 46 17.38 0.0288 
2011 19 87.57 56 19.20 0.0205 
2012 28 33.74 34 20.33 0.1066 
2013 41 40.69 66 16.77 0.0493 
2014 58 163.00 63 34.59 0.0923 
2015 49 1203.73 82 54.48 0.0000 
2016 51 66.98 74 24.93 0.1383 
2017 38 214.07 71 27.47 0.0042 
Sub-sample 
2007-2011 182 180.96 260 16.61 0.0254 


















Table 4.4: Corporate Political Connections, Acquisition Riskiness, and 
Success 
Column (1) and (2) presents the change in bidder total risk (OLS regression) results. Change in 
acquirers’ risk is computed as bidder standard deviation of daily (excess) stock returns over the event 
window (− 30, + 30) days around acquisition announcement minus the one over the period (− 120, − 60) 
days before deal announcement date. Excess stock return is defined as the difference between a bidder’s 
stock return and the FTSE All-Share Index. Column (3) through (6) presents results from the cross‐
sectional logit regression analysis of the probability of politically connected bidders to generate a 
positive CAR in risk-increasing deals. The dependent variable takes one if a bidder announcement (-2, 
+2) stock return is positive and zero otherwise. Deal-and-bidder-specific characteristics for a sample of 
the UK acquirers of domestic targets announced over the period 2007 to 2017 were included. The t and 
z-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and bidder clustering are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. The coefficients of the year and industry fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
 Change in bidder total 
risk 
Probability of a positive CAR conditional on deal riskiness 
Return 
Volatility 
    (1) 
Excess Return 
Volatility 
          (2) 




















0.0028** 0.0022* -0.0392 0.4452* 0.0043 0.3688* 
 (2.02) (1.68) (-0.17) (1.98) (0.02) (1.66) 
Sigma -0.5917* -0.5524* 3.9726 -10.2691 -3.9315 -7.4846 
 (-1.94) (-1.84) (0.34) (-1.08) (-0.35) (-0.79) 
ROA 0.0004 0.0002 0.1692 -0.1858 0.0879 -0.2148 
 (0.15) (0.01) (0.61) (-0.61) (0.35) (-0.72) 
Stock Price Run-
up 
0.0018 0.0012 -0.4020 0.3272 -0.1999 0.3101 
 (0.48) (0.31) (-1.18) (1.14) (-0.59) (1.10) 
Cash-holding 0.0042 0.0022 -1.5146* 0.7696 -0.6676 0.1946 
 (0.67) (0.33) (-1.90) (1.05) (-0.83) (0.29) 
Relative-Size -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.2402 0.1895* -0.0915 0.1739* 
 (-0.98) (-0.98) (-1.18) (1.84) (-1.42) (1.84) 
Leverage 0.0044 0.0049 -0.2023 -1.2886** -0.0122 -1.1259* 
 (0.91) (0.99) (-0.34) (-2.00) (-0.02) (-1.84) 
Collateral -0.0007 -0.0003 0.3561 0.9578 0.5964 0.6306 
 (-0.19) (-0.10) (0.55) (1.55) (0.90) (1.03) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0549 0.0084 0.0916 -0.0091 
 (-1.11) (-1.09) (0.49) (0.11) (1.15) (-0.10) 
MTB 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0116 -0.0069 -0.0139 -0.0128 
 (1.17) (1.32) (-0.42) (-1.50) (-0.44) (-1.13) 
Ln(Size) -0.0020** -0.0018** -0.0155 -0.0367 -0.0143 -0.0207 
 (-2.65) (-2.32) (-0.21) (-0.54) (-0.19) (-0.31) 
% Blockholder 
Ownership 
-0.0009 -0.0009 0.2818 -0.1453 0.1564 -0.0078 
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 (-0.58) (-0.6) (1.14) (-0.61) (0.63) (-0.03) 
Diversifying 
Deals (1/0) 
0.001 0.0014 -0.2534 0.3016 -0.2758 0.0326 
 (0.62) (0.88) (-1.16) (1.47) (-1.25) (0.15) 
Regulated (1/0) -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.3378 -0.3680 -0.3815 -0.2889 
 (-0.56) (-0.24) (-0.73) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.62) 
Unlisted (1/0) -0.0005 -0.0001 0.6539 0.1704 0.8665* 0.0767 
 (-0.23) (-0.06) (1.46) (0.45) (1.93) (0.21) 
All-Shares (1/0) 0.0039 0.0049 0.1847 0.0553 0.2741 -0.0673 
 (0.71) (0.92) (0.54) (0.16) (0.76) (-0.21) 
All-Cash (1/0) -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0034 0.3701 0.0916 0.2827 
 (-1.02) (-1.31) (0.01) (1.60) (0.36) (1.24) 
Intercept 0.0304** 0.0289** -0.5042 0.6146 1.2102 0.0789 
 (2.37) (2.24) (-0.60) (0.83) (1.40) (0.11) 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
(R-squared) 
Pseud R^2 
(0.2322) (0.2259) 0.0834 0.0828 0.0936 0.0668 
N 936 936 441 492 439 491 


















Table 4.5: Market Reaction to Acquisition by Politically Connected and 
Non-Connected Firms: Univariate Analysis 
In Panel A, sub-panel AA compares announce average CAR (-2, +2) of politically connected and non-
connected acquirers whose total risk increased or decreased around the acquisition announcement 
period. Change in acquirers total risk is computed as bidder standard deviation of excess stock returns 
over the event window (− 30, + 30) days around acquisition announcement minus the one over the 
period (− 120, − 60) days before deal announcement date. Sub-panel AB compares announce average 
CAR (-2, +2) of politically connected and non-connected acquirers whose total risk increased or 
decreased over the event window (− 20, + 40) days around the acquisition announcement. Change in 
acquirers total risk is computed as bidder standard deviation of excess stock returns over the event 
window (− 20, + 40) days around acquisition announcement minus the one over the period (− 120, − 
60) days before the deal announcement date. The excess stock return is defined as the difference 
between a bidder’s stock return and the FTSE All-Share Index. In Panel B sub-panels BA through BD 
presents the univariate estimates of the difference in the mean CAR (-2, +2) of politically connected 
and non-connected acquirers around the M&A announcement period. Sub-panel BA focuses on the 
announcement average CAR between listed and unlisted target acquirers. Sub-panel BB compares the 
announcement average CAR between infrequent and frequent acquirers. Sub-panel BC focuses on the 
announcement average CAR between glamour and value acquirers. Sub-panel BD presents the 
univariate estimates of the difference in the mean CAR (-2, +2) of politically connected and non-
connected acquirers of large and small deals. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 








Diff. Test   Col 
(2) - Col (3) 
Panel A: Market Reaction to Acquisitions by Politically Connected and Non-connected Bidders 
Conditional on change in bidder total Risk 
Panel AA: Change in Bidder total risk ((-30, +30) – (-120, -60)) 
(A) Risk-
increasing Deals 
0.0223*** 0.0306*** 0.0161*** 0.0145* 
 578 246 332  
(B) Risk-
decreasing Deals 
0.0119*** 0.0126*** 0.0114*** 0.0012 
 495 195 300  
Diff. Test  (A) - 
(B) 
0.0104** 0.0179** 0.0047  
Panel AB: Change in Bidder total risk ((-20, +40) – (-120, -60)) 
(A) Risk-
increasing Deals 
0.0232*** 0.0321*** 0.0169*** 0.0152* 
 574 236 338  
(B) Risk-
decreasing Deals 
0.0128*** 0.0117*** 0.0136*** -0.0019 
 498 205 293  
Diff. Test  (A) - 
(B) 
0.0103* 0.0204** 0.0033  
Panel B: Market reaction to acquisitions by politically connected and non-connected bidders 
conditional on risky acquisitions i.e. unlisted target acquirers, glamour acquirers, frequent 
acquirers, and large deal acquirers. 
Panel BA: Unlisted Target (Information asymmetry) 
(A) Unlisted 
Target Acquirers 
0.0202*** 0.0264*** 0.0158*** 0.0105* 
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 988 403 585  
(B) Listed Target 
Acquirers 
-0.0064 -0.0108 -0.0033 -0.0075 
 109 44 65  
     Diff. Test  (A) 
- (B) 
0.0266*** 0.0372*** 0.0192*  
Panel BB: Frequent Acquirers (Higher risk exposure) 
(A) Frequent 
Acquirers 
0.0159*** 0.0242*** 0.0094* 0.0148** 
 222 99 123  
(B) Infrequent 
Acquirers 
0.0193*** 0.0221*** 0.0174*** 0.0047 
 875 348 527  
     Diff. Test  (A) 
- (B) 
-0.0033 0.0021 -0.008  
Panel BC: Glamour (value-destroying acquisitions) 
(A) Glamour 
Acquirers 
0.0195*** 0.0257*** 0.0146** 0.0111* 
 530 235 295  
(B) Value 
Acquirers 
0.0177*** 0.0190** 0.0170*** 0.002 
 567 212 355  
Diff. Test  (A) - 
(B) 
0.0018 0.0067 -0.0024  
Panel BD: large Deals (Higher integration complexity) 
(A) Large Deals 0.0282*** 0.0373*** 0.0232** 0.0141* 
 374 139 235  
(B) Medium 
Deals 
0.0159** 0.0233** 0.0114** 0.0118* 
 357 131 226  
(C) Small Deals 0.0075** 0.0112** 0.0039 0.0072 
 366 177 189  
Difference Test       
 A - B 0.0123* 0.014* 0.0118*  
B - C 0.0083* 0.0121* 0.0074  











Table 4.6. Market Reaction to Acquisition by Politically Connected and 
Non-Connected Firms: Multivariate analysis 
Panel A shows the results from the cross-sectional OLS regression of CAR (-2, +2) on measures of 
corporate political connection and other deal-and-bidder-specific characteristics for a sample of the UK 
acquirers of domestic targets announced over the period 2007 to 2017. Bidders are classified base on: 
i) change in total risk (column (2) through (5)); ii) acquirers of listed and unlisted targets (column (6) 
and (7) respectively); ii) value and glamour acquirers (column (8) and (9) respectively); iii) infrequent 
and frequent acquirers (column (10) and column (11) respectively); and iv)  acquirers of Large and 
small (column (12) through column (14). The t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors and bidder clustering are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The coefficients of the industry and year fixed 





Δ in Bidder total risk ((-30, 
+30) – (-120, -60)) 
Δ in Bidder total risk 
































       (13) 
Large 
Deals 
     



















0.010 0.004 0.021* 0.001 0.021* -0.012 0.016** 0.003 0.017** 0.0092 0.024** 0.007 0.014* 0.027* 
 (1.47) (0.72) (1.75) (0.09) (1.73) (0.47) (2.15) (0.26) (2.33) (0.99) (2.15) (1.10) (1.69) (1.74) 
Sigma -0.362 0.653* -0.688 0.624* -0.549 1.95* -1.098 -0.680 0.590 -0.489 0.222 -1.396 0.484 -0.478 
 (-0.64) (1.77) (-0.63) (1.70) (-0.49) (1.84) (-1.54) (-1.07) (0.95) (-0.78) (0.39) (1.01) (1.29) (-0.69) 
Unlisted 
(1/0) 
0.024** 0.022** 0.015 0.02*** 0.014   0.008 0.031** 0.033** -0.020 0.002 0.011 0.05** 
 (2.14) (2.13) (0.84) (2.64) (0.80)   (0.48) (2.1) (2.50) (-1.57) (0.16) (0.90) (2.42) 
All-Stock 
(1/0) 
0.0130 -0.003 0.025 -0.005 0.026 -0.034 0.018 0.041 -0.020 0.014 -0.010 -0.006 -0.015 0.021 
 (0.65) (-0.03) (0.96) (-0.46) (1.08) (1.41) (1.12) (1.1) (-1.14) (0.83) (-0.62) (0.39) (-1.47) (0.82) 
All-Cash 
(1/0) 
0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.004 0.04* -0.005 0.010 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.007 0.011 -0.005 
 (0.47) (0.33) (-0.17) (0.99) (-0.39) (1.84) (-0.66) (1.00) (0.41) (0.57) (-0.13) (0.63) (1.42) (-0.33) 
Stock Run-
up 
-0.004 -0.008 0.013 -0.005 0.012 -0.022 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.003 0.014 0.005 -0.03** 0.017 
 (-0.25) (-0.69) (0.51) (-0.41) (0.47) (0.75) (0.24) (0.17) (-0.59) (-0.16) (0.61) (0.25) (-2.17) (0.81) 
Cash holding -0.017 -0.035 -0.022 -0.004 -0.035 0.039 -0.015 -0.022 -0.002 -0.036 -0.037 0.047 -0.007 -0.12** 
 (-0.71) (-1.63) (-0.62) (-0.12) (-1.09) (0.52) (-0.62) (-0.5) (-0.06) (-1.25) (-0.72) (1.39) (-0.30) (-2.54) 
Relative Size 0.004 -0.005* 0.006 -0.006* 0.006 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.015*** 0.004 0.098*** 0.026 0.179 0.002 
 (0.82) (-1.84) (0.83) (-1.93) (0.81) (0.22) (1.40) (0.68) (2.98) (0.92) (2.67) (0.20) (1.51) (0.58) 
ROA 0.0031 0.006 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.026 -0.003 0.040** -0.012 -0.001 -0.012 0.022 0.0004 -0.003 
 (0.29) (0.47) (0.73) (0.14) (0.47) (1.55) (-0.23) (2.12) (-0.95) (-0.07) (-0.53) (0.44) (0.09) (-0.16) 
Ln(Size) -
0.006*** 




-0.003 -0.007** 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 





-0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.010 -0.004 0.006 0.012** -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.003 0.010 
 (-0.13) (-0.40) (0.18) (-1.43) (-0.36) (0.26) (2.05) (-0.23) (-0.41) (-0.39) (-0.33) (0.74) (0.43) (0.68) 
MTB -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -
0.003*** 
-0.000 -0.003* -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.67) (-0.77) (0.73) (-0.26) (-0.53) (1.24) (-0.51) (-0.71) (-3.35) (-0.72) (-1.71) (0.75) (-0.48) (0.48) 
Leverage -0.038 -0.004 -0.065 -0.010 -0.062 0.002 -0.0453 -0.079** 0.025 -0.059* 0.031 -0.008 0.027 -
0.088** 
 (-1.46) (-0.28) (-1.28) (-0.64) (-1.27) (0.02) (-1.72) (-2.06) (1.41) (-1.97) (0.65) (0.43) (1.06) (2.02) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 0.004* 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.011* -0.003 -0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.014 -0.002 0.010** 0.000 
 (0.51) (1.79) (0.01) (1.63) (0.69) (1.78) (-0.67) (-0.26) (2.68) (0.33) (1.59) (0.50) (2.16) (0.05) 
Collateral -0.001 0.016 -0.002 0.019 -0.004 -0.027 0.019 -0.002 0.030 -0.001 0.015 0.006 0.019 -0.006 




-0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.016 -0.006 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.003 0.003 
 (-0.52) (0.25) (-0.48) (-0.13) (-0.33) (0.68) (-0.96) (-0.01) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.85) (1.06) (-0.43) (0.23) 
Regulated 
(1/0) 
-0.017 -0.007 -0.032 -0.016* -0.021 -0.024 -0.024** -0.026 -0.012 -0.017 -0.011 -
0.014* 
-0.022* -0.0310 
 (-1.52) (-0.91) (-1.56) (-1.90) (-0.9) (-0.46) (-2.01) (-1.19) (-1.13) (-1.27) (-0.64) (-1.72) (-1.79) (-0.80) 
Intercept 0.070*** -0.031 0.089** -0.028 0.081* -
0.132* 
0.082*** 0.121*** -0.001 0.096*** -0.008 0.056 -0.013 -0.025 
 (2.99) (-1.40) (2.06) (-1.31) (1.71) (-1.99) (3.19) (3.41) (-0.01) (3.21) (-0.22) (1.38) (-0.41) (-0.55) 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 938 442 494 440 493 82 854 447 491 737 199 319 306 308 
R-squared 0.069 0.132 0.126 0.103 0.115 0.335 0.121 0.145 0.137 0.089 0.209 0.144 0.173 0.214 
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Table 4.7: Market Reaction to Acquisitions by Politically Connected and 
Non-Connected Bidders Conditional on the Change in Bidder Total Risk: 
Instrumental Variable Approach and Propensity Score Matched Sample. 
This table presents the results from the cross-sectional OLS regression of CAR (-2, +2) on measures of 
corporate political connection and other deal-and-bidder-specific characteristics from a sample of the 
UK acquirers of domestic targets announced over the period 2007 to 2017. Column (1) through (4) 
shows the results from the instrumental variable regression and column (5) and (6) presents results from 
the propensity score matched sample. The t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
and bidder clustering are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The coefficients of the industry and year fixed 
effects are omitted for brevity. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Instrumental Variable Regression Propensity Score Matched 
Sample  





































Sigma -11.7295 0.9708 -0.2852 -0.9649** 0.8713** -1.3955**  
(-1.57) (2.29) (-0.04) (-2.04) (2.18) (-2.68) 
ROA 0.4782 0.0052 1.0903** -0.0001 0.0039 0.0089  
(1.12) (0.39) (2.18) (-0.01) (0.40) (0.40) 
Stock Price Run-
Up 
-0.1236 -0.0129 0.0301 0.0205 -0.0224* 0.0309* 
 
(-0.56) (-0.98) (0.18) (1.45) (-1.84) (1.95) 
Cash-holding -0.3303 -0.0163 0.7930* -0.0304 -0.0344 0.0445  
(-0.61) (-0.53) (1.73) (-0.77) (-1.14) (1.03) 
Relative-Size -0.0308 -0.0069** 0.1344** 0.0042* -0.0093** 0.0084***  
(-0.23) (-2.27) (2.17) (1.72) (-2.75) (3.75) 
Leverage -0.3934 -0.0115 -0.8835** -0.0449 -0.0097 -0.0403  
(-0.90) (-0.79) (-2.01) (-1.23) (-0.41) (-0.94) 
Collateral 0.0802 0.0134 0.1671 -0.0126 0.0104 0.0124  
(0.21) (0.87) (0.46) (-0.41) (0.44) (0.37) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0713 0.0053 -0.1901** 0.0005 0.0084** 0.0042  
(-0.87) (1.53) (-2.35) (0.12) (2.23) (0.90) 
MTB -0.0188 -0.0001 0.0186* -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0024***  
(-0.89) (-0.16) (1.99) (-1.05) (0.31) (-3.04) 




(3.18) (-1.35) (4.54) (-2.72) (-0.96) (-1.52) 
% Blockholder 
Ownership 
0.0416 0.0039 -0.0578 -0.0044 0.0072 0.0064 
 
(0.27) (0.58) (-0.38) (-0.35) (0.82) (0.46) 
Diversifying Deals 
(1/0) 
-0.1019 -0.0039 -0.1258 0.0071 -0.0093 -0.0187 
 
(-0.74) (-0.59) (-0.92) (0.61) (-1.15) (-1.40) 
Regulated (1/0) 0.1253 -0.0075 0.8344** -0.0552* -0.0056 -0.0379  
(0.44) (-0.85) (2.75) (-1.82) (-0.33) (-1.44) 
Unlisted (1/0) 0.3296 0.0177 0.0879 0.0209 0.0171 0.0221  
(1.23) (1.48) (0.37) (1.08) (1.10) (1.03) 
All-Shares (1/0) -0.6522 0.0075 -
0.8992*** 
0.0472* -0.0049 -0.0031 
 
(-2.57**) (0.44) (-3.95) (1.91) (-0.30) (-0.12) 
All-Cash (1/0) 0.0029 0.0115 0.1086 -0.0052 0.0119 0.0084  
(0.02) (1.26) (0.75) (-0.42) (1.23) (0.55) 
Intercept -0.2207 -0.0158 -0.9654** 0.0454 -0.0335 0.0320 
 (-0.35) (-0.45) (-2.01) (0.86) (-1.05) (0.76) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES Yes Yes 
Pseudo R^2(R-
squared) 
0.1345 (0.1081) 0.1738 (0.1342) (0.1222) (0.1385) 
















Table 4.8. Corporate Political connections and Post-Acquisition Financial 
Leverage 
This table presents the results of the change in industry-adjusted financial leverage regressions. The 
dependent variable is the change in acquirer’s industry-adjusted book leverage (ΔIALEV), calculated 
as the difference between an acquirer’s industry-adjusted book leverage in the second year after merger 
completion and its specific industry adjusted book leverage in the year prior to acquisition 
announcement (following Phan, 2014) . Industry-adjusted book leverage is examined as the difference 
between an acquirer’s book leverage and its 2-digit industry SIC code median book leverage. Bidder‐ 
and-deal‐specific characteristics as control variables were included. Deal-and-bidder-specific 
characteristics, for a sample, of the UK acquirers of domestic targets announced over the period January 
1, 2007 to December 31, 2015 were included. The t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors and bidder clustering are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The coefficients of the year and 
industry fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
   (1)  (2) 
Political connection (1/0) 0.0317** 0.0280**  
(2.48) (2.18) 
Sigma -0.2286 -0.5045  
(-0.28) (-0.62) 
Unlisted (1/0) -0.0350 -0.0341  
(-1.29) (-1.25) 
All-Shares (1/0) -0.0059 -0.0027  
(-0.25) (-0.12) 
All-Cash (1/0) -0.0028 -0.0029  
(-0.20) (-0.21) 
Stock Price Run-up 0.0089 0.0127  
(0.37) (0.50) 
Cash holding -0.1739** -0.1903**  
(-2.02) (-2.29) 
Relative Size -0.0008 -0.0007  
(-0.57) (-0.45) 
ROA 0.0481** 0.0450**  
(2.05) (2.02) 
Ln(Size) 0.0051 0.0053  
(1.35) (1.43) 
MTB 0.0019** 0.0018**  
(2.43) (2.27) 
Cash-Ratio 0.1383* 0.1435*  
(1.80) (1.87) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0091 -0.0092  
(-1.53) (-1.55) 
Collateral 0.1139*** 0.1023**  
(2.77) (2.28) 




Regulated (1/0) 0.0178 0.0199  
(0.98) (1.06) 
Diversifying Deals (1/0) 0.0087 0.0041  
(0.77) (0.37) 
Intercept 0.0010 -0.0309  
(0.03) (-0.74) 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES 
N 736 736 





























Table 4.9. Political Connections and Bidder Acquisition Behaviour 
This table presents the results on the acquisition behaviour of connected bidders. The dependent 
variable in column (1) takes a value of one (1) if the target firm is from the heavily regulated industry 
and zero (0) otherwise. In column (2) the dependent variable takes a value of one (1) if the acquirer and 
target belong to same 2-digit SIC code industries and zero (0) otherwise. In Column (3) through (6), 
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of domestic acquisitions 
each firm makes from the year 2007 to 2017. The sample period is from January 1, 2007 to 
December 31, 2017 for UK acquirers of domestic targets. The t and z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. The coefficients of the industry and year fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Variables 












OLS Model Tobit Model 
 








Political connection (1/0) 0.2187** 0.1983** 0.1226* 0.1306* 0.1237* 0.1319* 
 (2.09) (2.16) (1.67) (1.71) (1.73) (1.83) 
Sigma -15.1117 3.9856 -1.7794 -1.7123 -1.7830 -1.7109 
 (-1.59) (1.00) (-0.69) (-0.63) (-0.73) (-0.69) 
Unlisted (1/0) 0.0925 -0.2193 0.1952* 0.1723 0.1955* 0.1724 
 (0.48) (-1.32) (1.93) (1.63) (1.78) (1.54) 
All-Stock (1/0) -0.1436 -0.1175 0.2246* 0.2293* 0.2243** 0.2291** 
 (-0.62) (-0.65) (1.68) (1.67) (2.08) (2.11) 
All-Cash (1/0) -0.1051 -0.1265 0.0165 0.0182 0.0173 0.0189 
 (-0.88) (-1.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.26) 
Stock Run-up -0.0352 -0.1779 0.0957 0.0934 0.0959 0.0934 
 (-0.17) (-1.48) (1.07) (0.99) (1.20) (1.14) 
Cash holding 2.1180*** -0.6678** -0.1177 -0.1628 -0.1173 -0.1629 
 (6.02) (-2.11) (-0.57) (-0.76) (-0.57) (-0.77) 
Relative Size 0.0154 0.0024 -0.0119 -0.0121 -0.0119 -0.0121 
 (0.85) (0.11) (-0.64) (-0.62) (-0.79) (-0.79) 
ROA 0.1826 -0.1426 -0.0715 -0.0708 -0.0718 -0.0711 
 (0.85) (-0.85) (-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.68) (-0.67) 
Ln(Size) 0.0018 -0.0174 -0.0271 -0.0285 -0.0274 -0.0287 
 (0.05) (-0.62) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-1.39) (-1.44) 
MTB 0.0101 0.0027 0.0040 0.0044 0.0040 0.0044 
 (1.58) (1.05) (0.77) (0.82) (0.80) (0.87) 
Leverage 0.8132*** -0.2029 0.4187*** 0.4208*** 0.4179** 0.4202** 
 (2.72) (-0.73) (2.75) (2.72) (2.29) (2.28) 
Tobin’s Q -0.2781*** -0.0050 -0.0202 -0.0194 -0.0205 -0.0196 
 (-3.36) (-0.14) (-1.05) (-0.95) (-0.89) (-0.85) 
Collateral -0.0693 0.9613*** -0.4378 -
0.4252*** 
-0.4375*** -0.4248*** 
 (-0.25) (3.70) (-3.02) (-2.8) (-2.76) (-2.61) 
% Blockholder 
Ownership 
0.1622 -0.1341 -0.0693 -0.0600 -0.0690 -0.0597 
 (1.31) (-1.32) (-0.9) (-0.76) (-0.93) (-0.79) 
138 
 
Regulated (1/0)  -0.0823 -0.0938 -0.1670 -0.0944 -0.1676 
  (-0.44) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.26) 
Diversifying Deals (1/0) -0.1121  -0.0153 -0.0022 -0.0163 -0.0031 
 (-1.08)  (-0.21) (-0.03) (-0.25) (-0.05) 
Intercept -1.0933** 0.8580** 0.8856*** 0.9435*** 0.8856*** 0.9445*** 
 (-2.53) (2.64) (4.25) (4.24) (4.27) (4.34) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
N 937 932 410 410 410 410 
Wald statistic 77.69 87.16     





















Table 4.10: Explaining the Association between Political Connections and 
bidder total risk: instrumental variable regressions. 
Column (1) through (4) presents the results from the change in bidder total risk using the instrumental 
variable approach. Change in bidder risk is measured in two ways: Change in acquirers’ risk is 
computed as bidder standard deviation of daily (excess) stock returns over the event window (− 30, 
+ 30) days around acquisition announcement minus the one over the period (− 120, − 60) days before 
deal announcement date. Excess stock return is defined as the difference between a bidder’s stock return 
and the FTSE All-Share Index. Deal-and-bidder-specific characteristics for a sample of the UK 
acquirers of domestic targets announced over the period 2007 to 2017 were included. The t and z-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and bidder clustering are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. The coefficients of the year and industry fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
 













Political Connection (1/0)  0.0234**  0.0185*   










Sigma -2.3192 -0.5819*** -2.3192 -0.5455***  
(-0.46) (-9.7) (-0.46) (-9.22) 
ROA 0.5772 -0.0005 0.5772 -0.0007  
(1.60) (-0.21) (1.60) (-0.29) 
Stock Price Run-Up -0.0375 0.0022 -0.0375 0.0015  
(-0.29) (1.14) (-0.29) (0.77) 
Cash-holding 0.2329 0.0029 0.2329 0.0013  
(0.69) (0.58) (0.69) (0.25) 
Relative-Size 0.0455** -0.0021*** 0.0455** -0.0021***  
(2.76) (-6.32) (2.76) (-6.26) 
Leverage -0.5381* 0.0077 -0.5381* 0.0074  
(-1.82) (1.65) (-1.82) (1.62) 
Collateral 0.0459 -0.0015 0.0459 -0.0010  
(0.18) (-0.38) (0.18) (-0.26) 
Tobin’s Q -0.1219** -0.0007 -0.1219** -0.0008  
(-2.28) (-1.05) (-2.28) (-1.20) 
MTB 0.0095 0.0001 0.0095 0.0001*  
(1.15) (1.38) (1.15) (1.89) 
Ln(Size) 0.1795*** -0.0034*** 0.1795*** -0.0028***  
(5.91) (-4.16) (5.91) (-3.56) 
% Blockholder Ownership -0.01948 -0.0006 -0.01948 -0.0007  
(-0.19) (-0.37) (-0.19) (-0.44) 
Diversifying Deals (1/0) -0.1203 0.0021 -0.1203 0.0023  
(-1.31) (1.35) (-1.31) (1.48) 
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Regulated (1/0) 0.5671** -0.0063* 0.5671** -0.0049  
(2.86) (-1.73) (2.86) (-1.38) 
Unlisted (1/0) 0.2468 -0.0022 0.2468 -0.0015  
(1.44) (-0.80) (1.44) (-0.55) 
All-Shares (1/0) -0.3715* 0.0058* -0.3715* 0.0064**  
(-1.96) (1.87) (-1.96) (2.09) 
All-Cash (1/0) 0.0191 -0.0022 0.0191 -0.0027  
(0.18) (-1.32) (0.18) (-1.64) 
Intercept -1.4366*** 0.0228*** -1.4366*** 0.0261***  
(-4.22) (4.00) (-4.22) (4.66) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R^2(R-squared) 0.1201 (0.2340) 0.1201 (0.2281) 















      Chapter 5 
        Conclusion 
       This thesis studies the impact of political connections on corporate activity. Specifically, 
it examines the roles of political connections on seasoned equity offerings, share repurchases, 
and M&A. These company activities' choice is based on gaps in the literature and their 
importance to the firms. 
      To summarise the findings, it has been established that issuers whose directors have a 
political background enjoy lower SEO floatation costs in terms of lower gross spreads and less 
negative market reaction. The evidence is pronounced in primary issues, where agency 
conflicts might be less. The findings withstand rigorous control for the endogeneity of political 
connections. Notably, the empirical results are consistent with the argument that political 
connections provide connected firms with cheaper capital costs. The results further show that 
political connections are negatively associated with SEO proceeds, lending support to the 
notion that political connections rely more on debt. 
         Turning to the impact of political connections on share repurchases, it is found that 
political connections are positively associated with the repurchaser's stock returns around the 
share repurchase announcement period and in the long term. The post-repurchase operating 
performance is also higher for politically connected firms. The results also show that political 
connections are positively associated with the probability of a company repurchasing firms and 
the value of shares repurchased. 
          As for the impact of political connections on mergers and acquisitions, it has been found 
that political connections are positively associated with bidder post-acquisition financial 
leverage and equity return volatility around the M&A announcement period. Further evidence 
shows that politically connected bidders acquired more firms and are less likely to diversify. 
Also, they purchased more firms from the heavily regulated industries than non-connected 
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acquirers, suggesting that connected firms are confident that they can navigate the regulations 
in these industries strictly regulated by the government. 
       While the three studies reveal new channels through which political connections affect 
corporate activities, the overall evidence is broadly consistent with the literature. 
       This thesis has important implications for both researchers and practitioners. First, this 
research sheds new light on the impact of political connections on access to external capital. 
Previous literature has focused on the effects of political connections on access to bank loans 
and the initial public offerings process. However, this study shows that political connections 
affect SEO flotation costs. As a consequence, this thesis establishes novel evidence that issuers 
whose directors have a political background enjoy lower gross spreads and less adverse market 
reaction to SEO announcements. This is consistent with the notion that political connections 
provide connected firms with a cheaper cost of capital. 
        Regarding the result that political connections are negatively associated with SEO 
proceeds, it implies that political connections enable connected firms to reduce reliance on 
external equity capital that decreases shareholders value and increases share outstanding. The 
results concerning politically connected firms' performances better than non-connected firms 
following share repurchase announcements imply that political connections make firms more 
competitive. Importantly, to the best of the author's knowledge, no other study has examined 
the impact of political connections on share repurchase performance. To the practitioners, the 
evidence shows that the market prefers buyback programs of firms with cheaper access to 
capital since it reduces the agency problem of free cash flow. The results regarding the higher 
probability of repurchasing shares by connected firms should be of particular interest to short-
term shareholders that seek quick turnover on their investments. The results concerning fast 
acquisition completion and firms' acquisition in the heavily regulated by connected firms imply 
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that connected firms provide firms in the UK with non-public information about how to 
navigate regulations. The results also caution that politically connected firms are more likely 
to engage in risk increasing M&A deals. 
        To conclude, this study has some limitations that could be fruitful if addressed in future 
work. For example, this study uses USA seasoned equity offerings data. Therefore, it would be 
valuable to determine whether the results are robust for countries (e.g., China, India, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and South Africa) that are different from the USA regarding culture, institutional 
quality, investor sentiments, and regulations, etc. Concerning share repurchases, it would be 
interesting to determine whether connected firms' managers have incentives that motivate them 
to repurchase shares. Specifically, it will be interesting to determine whether executives of 
politically connected firms have equity-incentive compensation that drives them to repurchase 
shares. Finally, the UK M&A sample starts in 2007 and ends in 2017. A natural extension of 
this study is to examine whether Brexit does not impact the findings. Therefore, it would be 
valuable to test whether the findings that political connections induce risk-increasing deals will 
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